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1. INTRODUCTION 
Aid is not homogeneous in goal, composition or effect. This is a common theme throughout 
the thesis, and while it is a simple assertion it has far-reaching consequences. The idea of a 
heterogeneous effect has been partially incorporated into the aid-growth literature, and as 
research on development aid inevitably takes place in the shadow of the controversial 
research by Burnside and Dollar (1998; 2000, BD hereafter), this is a sensible starting point. 
That research has cast a long shadow for a number of reasons. First, it offered a simple 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂŝĚǁŽƌŬƐŝŶĂŐŽŽĚƉŽůŝĐǇĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐďŽƚŚŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůǇƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ
gives clear guidance as to its implications. Second, the research was given prominence in an 
important World Bank (1998) report. Third, while many research ideas become popular in 
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƌŝŐŚƚ ?ƚŚŝƐŚĂƐĂůƐŽĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚƉŽůŝĐǇ PƚŚĞƌ ŝƐĂŶ “unusually clear link running from a 
growth ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝŶĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚƵĚǇƚŽĂƉŽůŝĐǇŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ? ?(Easterly, 2003).  
Perhaps in part because of its impact, the BD research has been widely criticised. The most 
direct attack on the BD results is also the simplest. Easterly, et al. (2004) retain the 
methodology, specification and country coverage of BD, but extend the sample from 1970 W
93 to 1970 W97, and include previously excluded observations. This simple extension results 
in the aforementioned result disappearing (although it is replicated in the 1970 W93 period). 
Burnside and Dollar (2004) have engaged with this criticism, and a number of papers 
corroborate their general conclusion (Collier and Dehn, 2001; Collier and Dollar, 2002, 2004; 
Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). However, a large number of papers directly attack the BD results 
and methodology (these include, but are not limited to, Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; 
Easterly, 2003; Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 
2001; Lensink and White, 2001; Roodman, 2007). 
While there have been many critiques and debates focused directly upon BD, the literature 
on aid effectiveness (narrowly defined as the effect of aid on growth) has splintered. Various 
stories have been told, each proposing a variable that determines the effect of aid on 
growth. The growth effect of aid has been found to be conditional on:  the amount of aid 
(i.e. it has diminishing returns, Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Lensink and White, 2001); the 
economic environment (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001, who find aid helps to mitigate the 
negative effects of certain adverse economic circumstances); export price shocks (Collier and 
Dehn, 2001); civil war and good policies (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); volatility (Lensink and 
1  W Introduction         Paul Clist 
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Morrissey, 2000); investment (Gomanee et al., 2005a), and whether or not the recipient is in 
the tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004).  
A number of surveys and general discussions of the literature are available (Doucouliagos 
and Paldam, 2008; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2009; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2010; Hansen 
and Tarp, 2000; Roodman, 2007). However, a striking point is that the papers are so copious 
and profuse as to allow different summaries of the literature to arrive at opposite 
conclusions, each citing a large evidence base: 
 ǲ           f recent 
empirical studies do conclude that aid increases economic growth, and below we cite 
  ? ?        Ǥǳ
(Addison et al., 2005) 
 ǲ the preceding data... the 
            ǳ
(McGillivray, 2004b) 
ǲȌ
significant effect of aid on growth, b) are robust, and c) are free of the 
Ǥǳ(Roodman, 2008) 
It is worth noting that the distinct conclusions found within the aid-growth literature are 
perhaps unavoidable. In order to accurately estimate the effect of aid on growth, the 
econometrician needs to successfully control for other factors. However, much of the 
profession is sceptical regarding our ability to do this (Rodrik, 2006). Indeed, there are also a 
large number of technical econometric complications as well (Durlauf et al., 2005; Roodman, 
2008).This difficulty means a variety of specifications and approaches will be used, and so a 
diverse set of results is to be expected. Unfortunately in cross-country regressions on the 
aid-ŐƌŽǁƚŚůŝŶŬ ?>ĞĂŵĞƌ ?Ɛ(1983) ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚŝƐĂƉƚ P “ ? ? ?ŚĂƌĚůǇĂŶǇŽŶĞƚĂŬĞƐĂŶǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐĚĂƚĂ
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? 
One effect of the sheer size of the aid-growth literature has been the promotion of the 
growth effect of aid as the salient criterion on which aid should be judged. This comes in part 
from a ůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶĨƵůůǇƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŝƚǇŽĨĂŝĚ ?ƐŐŽĂů ?ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
and effect. Clemens et al. (2004) argue that the heterogeneous goals of aid mean we should 
expect heterogeneous effects. Indeed, as they argue, if economic growth is not the objective 
1  W Introduction         Paul Clist 
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of a large proportion of aid, it is unsurprising if it does not meet that objective. However, the 
persistent focus and attention on the aid-growth link, coupled with contrasting conclusions, 
has fuelled the belief that aid is inherently and severely flawed, as the number of critics in 
the public sphere illustrates (Bolton, 2008; Calderisi, 2006; Glennie, 2008; Moyo, 2009). 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝĨŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŝƐŶŽƚ ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŝĚŵĂǇƐƚŝůů  ‘ǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŚĞŶŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
outcome.  Alternatively, acknowledging the heterogeneous effects of aid means a more 
nuanced view can be taken, as different types of aid given for different reasons have 
different effects. Truly incorporating this would mean allowing for a growth effect of aid to 
be more complicated than purely mediated by one factor.  
The unfortunate focus on establishing a growth effect of aid through cross-country 
regressions has meant that other questions regarding aid have been less widely discussed. 
However, a focus on the effects of aid is both understandable and fitting. The recurring 
critique is that aid is not as effective as it should be: Easterly (2006, pp.154) states that $2.3 
trillion has been spent on aid over five decades with little measurable effect. As mentioned, 
without a counterfactual it is difficult to truly understand the effect of aid. It is clear, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞ “ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŝĚŚĂƐĂƚƚŝmes been a spectacular success... [it] has also been, 
Ăƚ ƚŝŵĞƐ ? ĂŶ ƵŶŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞĚ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?(World Bank, 1998, pp.1) The recognition that aid has 
heterogeneous effects immediately implies that aid can become more effective as the 
causes of this differential impact are understood, and such knowledge utilised. The desire to 
maximise utility is at the heart of economics, and so a desire to increase aid effectiveness is 
not remarkable. However, the fact that the situations of many of the world ?s citizens remain 
so dire after so much aid explains the intensity of this focus.  
So, what is to be done? While the question of aid effectiveness remains important, the 
econometric research in the field has reached something of an impasse. Indeed, the point of 
diminishing returns of further research into the growth effect of aid has surely been 
reached. Rather than add to the voluminous literature on aid effectiveness, we take a 
different approach, agreeing with Rajan and Subramanian (2005, pp.22-23) ƚŚĂƚ  “ ? ? ?ŝƚ ŝƐ
perhaps more fruitful to move beyond the inconclusive debate of whether aid is effective, 
and focus on specific ways it can be made to work better, by better understanding the 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ ŝŵƉĂŝƌ Žƌ ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞ ŝƚƐ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ĞŶŐĂŐĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ŵŽƌĞ
specific questions, with the ultimate aim of improving our understanding of the broader 
ones. For example, a recurring theme in the thesis is governance. While attempts to 
1  W Introduction         Paul Clist 
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establish the effect of aid on growth face technical problems, focusing on more narrowly 
defined research questions enables us to examine specific channels of effect from aid to 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ĨƌŽŵ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ? dŚƵƐ ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ  ‘ĂŝĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?ŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƚŽŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĞĨĨectiveness 
of aid.  
If governance is undermined by aid, this would represent a major concern over the effects of 
aid. A commonly cited channel for this detrimental effect is the link between aid and tax, a 
topic dealt with in the second chapter. Specifically, the concern is that aid results in the state 
becoming too independent from its own citizens, as the taxation link is weakened due to the 
increase in external finance (Moore, 2007). The recent historical evidence shows that the 
link between taxation and governance is strong (Ross, 2004), and so any evidence that aid 
breaks this link, and so undermines good governance, is an important matter. Knack (2001) 
reports that aid has indeed damaged governance on average, but without modelling the 
channel endogeneity is a problematic complication. However, governance is not the only 
concern when considering the relationship between aid and tax. If there is found to be a 
negative tax revenue effect of aid, donors may find that they are financing tax cuts rather 
than investment. If this is the case, aid may be non-additional but rather crowd-out 
development expenditure. 
I focus on the specific link between aid and tax, and the assertion that different types of aid 
have different tax effects. This claim comes from Gupta et al. (2004), who state that aid 
loans have a positive relationship with tax revenues whereas for aid grants that relationship 
is negative. If this link is established, it implies a clear policy recommendation for donors to 
minimise a possible source of negative governance effects. However, aid loans have a 
problematic history, as they have helped produce heavily indebted countries, and have in 
some cases meant aid meant a net negative revenue transfer. Establishing the strength of 
evidence of a differential tax revenue effect is therefore crucial.  
The broader debate over the relative merits of aid grants and aid loans became both 
controversial and newsworthy in 2001 when there was a disagreement between donor 
nations over the amount that the IDA  ?ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ƐŽĨƚ ůŽĂŶ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ Ăƌŵ ? ƐŚŽƵůĚ
disburse in the form of aid grants (World Bank, 2001). The second chapter deals with both 
the general arguments surrounding the two modalities, and the specific question of their tax 
revenue effect.  
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The third chapter is an extended literature review of various types of research that have 
examined aid allocation. It is important to understand aid allocation because it sheds light 
upon the goal with which aid is given, and informs expectations as to its possible effects. By 
summarising four approaches, the chapter gives a broader view of aid allocation. First, it 
discusses literature that proposes an ideal allocation, as informed by some allocation 
principle. Second are the tools used by donors to calculate appropriate allocations. These 
shed light on the relative importance of different factors, as proposed by donors themselves. 
However, the third literature discussed uses actual allocations to infer the relative 
importance of these factors. These revealed preferences inform discussions of the goals of 
aid. Fourth is the disparate descriptive literature that describes various aspects of how 
donors give aid. Appendix B includes a longer discussion of this literature, including the 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ‘ĚŽŶŽƌĞƌƌŽƌƐ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚey try to capture.  
The fourth chapter is a contribution to the positive aid allocation literature. It examines aid 
allocation practice for seven donors over a 25 year period. The 4P specification is used, as 
the factors that influence donors are assigned amongst poverty, population, policy and 
proximity. The previous specification in general use was originally conceptualised as a 
dichotomy between recipient need and donor interest (the RN-DI model). The chapter 
differs by allowing donor interest to be replaced by a broader notion of proximity. This 
means that donors are not necessarily understood to be selfish for giving aid to countries 
that are geographically closer. Proximity is taken in a broad sense, meaning geographical, 
commercial, historical, cultural and linguistic proximity are all included. Population is by now 
a common augment to this specification, but policy has increasingly become important 
because of the Burnside and Dollar (1998, 2000) research.  
The chapter makes a salient contribution to a specific debate within the literature regarding 
aid selectivity. A number of papers argue that policy has been an increasingly important 
factor in aid allocation (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Dollar and Levin, 2006) whereas others 
report that aid selectivity has been low and static (Easterly, 2007; Hout, 2007a, b; 
Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006). The chapter contributes to the debate in a number of 
important ways. First, we estimate individually by donor, rather than pooling all donors. 
While pooling all donors may seem an appropriate action, it can lead to erroneous 
conclusions. For example, if all major donors are insensitive to policy, but numerous smaller 
donors have become marginally more policy sensitive in recent years, a pooled (non-
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weighted) regression could lead to a conclusion of increased policy selectivity. In this 
situation, it is not that aid has become more sensitive to policy, but rather that aid donors (in 
a non-weighted average) have become more sensitive to policy.  
The fourth chapter finds little evidence that policy selectivity has been practised. While it is 
beyond the scope of this research to fully explain why this might be the case, the 
^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ?dŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂǁĂƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ
by Buchanan (1977) ĂƐ ? ƉƵƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ?  ‘ŚĞůƉŝŶŐ ƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ŵĂǇ ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŽ
ǁŽƌŬ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞĂŝĚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ  ‘ǁŽƌŬ ?Žƌ  ‘ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ?ĂƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚďǇŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?^ǀĞŶƐƐŽŶ
(2000) used this moral hazard problem framework to examine the incentives a donor faces, 
especially in the context of conditionality. To summarise, the donor and recipient first agree 
a contract of reform and aid. In the second period the recipient then reneges on the 
promise, but the donor does not punish the recipient as it does not want to punish the poor 
within that country. It may be that in the long term punishing the recipient would be the 
most effective action, but donors are constrained by their current incentives. This inability to 
withhold aid (which I term Samaritan impulse) in the second period explains neatly why 
conditionality has failed to be used (Collier, 1997). However, there is no reason why moving 
ƚŚĞ ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚƉĞƌŝŽĚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƐŽůǀĞ ƚŚĞ ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ?
This, while not fully explored, hints at why the fourth chapter fails to find evidence for 
increased policy selectivity.  
The fifth chapter ĚĞĂůƐǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇ ‘ƐŽůǀĞ ?ƚŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂ PƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ
selectivity. While the Samaritan impulse deals with the inability to alter the amount of aid in 
response to different levels of governance, pragmatic selectivity introduces the composition 
of aid as a second policy lever. Through policy documents it is identified that while the 
volume of aid may be chosen to satisfy the Samaritan impulse, implicitly the type of aid is 
chosen so as to satisfy the desire for efficiency. The theoretical literature that deals with 
modality choice is reviewed, before an original but simple model is introduced. The empirical 
section tests both the extent (if any) of pragmatic selectivity, but also the factors that 
determine the composition of aid more generally. The results confirm that the relative 
efficiency of modalities is important, and also that this effect is larger than that of 
preference alignment. 
The sixth chapter finishes, with a brief conclusion drawing together the research.   
2- Aid and Tax         Paul Clist 
15 
 
2. THE TAX REVENUE EFFECTS  
OF AID GRANTS AND LOANS 
In the conventional aid effectiveness literature, aid has been judged by its ability to increase 
growth rates in the recipient country. Those expecting a robust and unambiguously positive 
effect from aid have been disappointed (Roodman, 2007), which has led to more attention 
on aid itself. Specifically, it is now widely recognised that aid is not homogenous in goal: 
 “ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ ƐŽůĞ ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ĂŝĚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĂƚĂůů ? ?(Clemens et al., 2004, p.1) At the heart of this shift is the acceptance that 
different types of aid do not just differ in aim but also in effect. It is then important what aid 
finances, implying a need to address fungibility, especially if from productive to non-
productive spending, and broader fiscal effects. Consumption spending is thought to be an 
 ‘ƵŶƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƵƐĞŽĨĂŝĚ ?ĂŶĚĂŝĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐŵŽƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ
have a positive impact on growth (Gomanee et al., 2005a). However, to the extent that 
consumption spending finances the provision of public goods, aid used in this way may 
contribute to increasing welfare, growth and reducing poverty (Gomanee et al., 2005b; 
Mosley et al., 2004). In short this is an issue of fungibility, as aid can be redirected from the 
proposed aim of increasing investment to either increasing consumption or substituting for 
tax revenue. In this case total revenue and expenditure increases by less than the aid  hence 
the potential benefits from aid are not fully realised (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2001).  
Thus donors wish to know what they are funding, be it tax cuts, consumption or investment. 
However, the link between domestic tax and foreign aid is not merely an issue of fungibility; 
the importance of the relationship between foreign aid and domestic revenue can also be 
approached from a political economy perspective. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) find that high 
aid receipts are associated with deteriorating governance. Moss et al. (2006) focus on a 
possible channel for this, arguing that if aid substitutes for tax revenue the citizen-
government relationship can be undermined. Thus while the short-term concern for the 
donor may simply be whether they are funding investment or tax cuts, this aid-tax link has 
broader and longer-lasting implications.  
Recently, an argument that the aid-tax revenue relationship is conditional upon the type of 
aid has surfaced. The idea is that if aid is given in loan form, it does not affect tax revenue 
collection. However if aid is given in the form of grants, there is an adverse effect upon tax 
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revenue collection which may in turn diminish any positive effect of aid. Existing evidence on 
this point is in two parts: cross-country and single-country. The cross-country evidence is 
based upon cross-country econometrics, where a tax revenue equation is augmented with 
the two aid variables. This evidence is, so far, supportive of the idea (Gupta et al., 2004; 
Odedokun, 2003). The single-country evidence however, does not support the conclusion 
that aid reduces tax effort (Morrissey et al., 2007; Osei et al., 2005). This paper contributes 
to this literature by adding to the cross-country evidence for the effect of aid on the tax/GDP 
ratio for a large set of developing countries over the period 1970-2005. 
Section 2 reviews the debate regarding loans and grants. Section 3 outlines the current 
cross-country research and econometric methodology. Section 4 reports the results and 
further evidence. Section 5 discusses, and Section 6 concludes.  
2.2 GRANTS VERSUS LOANS 
This chapter contributes to the wider debate regarding whether aid should be given in the 
ĨŽƌŵŽĨŐƌĂŶƚƐ  ? ‘ĨƌĞĞ ?ŵŽŶĞǇǁŝƚŚŶŽŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƌĞƉĂǇ ?Žƌ ůŽĂŶƐ  ?ĂŶŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƌĞƉĂǇ ?
albeit on concessional terms). The most common argument, dating back to Schmidt (1964), 
ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ůŽĂŶƐ ĂƌĞ ƵƐĞĚ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ƚŚĂŶ ŐƌĂŶƚƐ ? dŚŝƐ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƐĐĂů
behaviour of the recipient governments  W because they have to be repaid, loans encourage 
better fiscal management and greater tax effort than grants while, additionally, the latter 
may substitute for (discourage) domestic revenue efforts (Gupta et al., 2004). In financial 
terms the difference relates to the degree of concessionality of the transfer relative to 
market terms  W for aid the important feature is that the grant element or concessionality is 
at least 25% although it tends to be far higher, especially for the poorest countries 
(Morrissey and White, 1996). Cordella and Ulku (2007) argue that higher concessionality is 
more likely to be growth promoting in poor countries with heavy debt obligations because it 
adds less to the debt burden and so does not increase the likelihood of default. If grants 
replace loans, debt burdens are reduced and the impact on growth is potentially positive. As 
grants are fully concessional they should be favoured for indebted poor countries.  
The report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (IFIAC, 2000) 
recommended that the World Bank should replace its loan programme, specifically IDA, with 
a grant programme aimed at poverty alleviation, and the United States administration 
supported this on the basis of three arguments (Sanford, 2002). First, increased grants would 
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not add to heavy debt burdens in poor countries. Second, loans are inappropriate for 
financing social sector programs, such as education, as the benefits are realised over a long 
time period and do not generate financial returns to service a loan (Salazar, 2002). Third, as 
grants do not burden recipients with the need for repayment they allow greater political 
ƐĐŽƉĞ ĨŽƌ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ƚŽ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŐŽĂůƐ ? ? ŝ ?Ğ ? ƚŽ ŝŵƉŽƐĞ
conditions (Sanford, 2002).1 There are dissenting voices. Some think that the move towards 
grants has already gone too far (Nunnenkamp et al., 2005). Britain was vocal in its opposition 
to the US IDA grants proposal (DFID, 2001), arguing that the current system made effective 
use of the limited resources available.  
None of the arguments on financing, promoting conditionality or managing debt burdens are 
persuasive in choosing between concessional loans and grants. As aid loans are highly 
concessional, there is no strong argument against being fully concessional and providing 
grants. The choice may well come down to the one empirically testable proposition: the 
effect on tax revenue. If Gupta et al. (2004) are correct that loans encourage but grants 
discourage tax effort, then there is an argument against grants. If they are incorrect (and the 
case-study evidence is correct), the balance of arguments favours grants for the poorest 
countries. The paper addresses this directly. 
2.3 METHODOLOGY 
To answer this question, we must engage with the literature on the determinants of tax 
revenue. Unfortunately, cross-country studies of the determinants of the tax/GDP ratio 
(Tanzi, 1992) rarely include aid among the explanatory variables. Teera and Hudson (2004) 
find the coefficient on aid to be insignificant in their estimates of tax performance in 
developing countries. Gupta et al. (2004) find that aid has a negative effect on tax effort, but 
that this varies depending on the type of aid: loans are positively correlated with tax revenue 
whereas grants are negatively correlated with tax revenue, and infer that grants induce 
lower tax effort. A core part of this chapter reinvestigates this relationship distinguishing 
between loans and grants, arguing that the effect of grants has become positive since the 
mid-1980s. This is the period since adjustment lending became the modus operandi of aid, 
                                                             
1
  However, there is no reason a priori to imagine that grants would be a more efficient means for donors to 
influence policy in a recipient country. Loans may provide a better incentive for donors to monitor recipients. 
While grants can be used selectively ƚŽ  ‘ƌĞǁĂƌĚ ? ƚŚŽƐĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ĂůŝŐŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ĚŽŶŽƌ
preferences or proved malleable in the past  W  ‘ŶŽƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?ŶŽĨƵŶĚƐĞǆƉĞŶĚĞĚ ?ĂŶĚŶŽĨƵŶĚƐĚŝǀĞƌƚĞĚƚŽŽĨĨƐŚŽƌĞ
ďĂŶŬ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ? ǀĂŶŝƚǇ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ Žƌ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ũĞƚƐ ?(Lerrick and Meltzer, 2002, p.1)  W concessional loans can be 
deployed in the same way. 
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adding to the evidence that conditional lending tends to be associated with more positive 
effects of aid (see also Mosley et al., 2004). 
To our knowledge, only two previous studies have specifically examined the effect of the 
composition of aid on tax revenue across countries. Gupta et al. (2004), with data from 107 
low and middle-income countries pooled over the period 1970-2000, and Odedokun (2003), 
with data for 72 low-income countries pooled over the period 1970-99, use cross-country 
regression analysis to investigate the response of recipient government revenue effort to 
aid. Specifically, they test whether the tax/GDP ratio differs in response to aid grants and 
loans. Both find evidence to support the hypothesis that aid grants reduce recipient 
government tax effort (as represented by the tax/GDP ratio), and that concessional loans 
increase recipient tax effort. As they carry out a more sophisticated econometric analysis, 
Gupta et al. (2004) is the focus of our discussion and motivates our analysis.  
The empirical approach of Gupta et al. (2004) follows Lotz and Morss (1967) to model the 
tax to GDP ratio as determined by variables chosen to proxy for the tax base structure of the 
economy. The approach is similar to the standard treatment in the literature on the 
determinants of the tax/GDP ratio (Tanzi, 1992; Teera and Hudson, 2004); additional 
explanatory variables are often included, although Gupta (2007)1 shows that few variables 
are robustly significant. Coefficients from a cross-country regression are interpreted as the 
 ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚĂǆ ƌĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ ĞĂĐŚ ƚĂǆ ďĂƐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ ĂŶ ŝŶĚĞǆ ŽĨ
 ‘ƚĂǆĂďůĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌĞĂĐŚĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŚŝĐŚ ?ǁŚĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĂĐƚƵĂůƚĂǆƌĂƚŝŽƐ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŶ
indicator of tax effort (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997). Gupta et al. (2004) augment a 
 ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ? ƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚĂǆ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ďǇ ĂĚĚŝŶŐ ďŽƚŚ ŐƌĂŶƚƐ  ?' ? ĂŶĚ ŶĞƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
loans (L) as a percentage of GDP. Their baseline regression equation takes the form: 
݈݊ ൬ܶܽݔܩܦܲ൰௜ ?௧ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ݃ݎ௜ ?௧൅ ߚଶܫ݊݀௜ ?௧൅ ߚଷܶݎܽ݀݁௜ ?௧൅ ߚସܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ ?௧൅ ߚହܩ௜ ?௧൅ ߚ଺ܮ௜ ?௧൅ ߝ௜ ?௧ (1) 
 
They control for four determinants of taxable capacity. Agricultural (Agr) and Industrial (Ind) 
value added as a percentage of GDP are included as the sector composition of value added is 
viewed as a key determinant of the tax base. A large agricultural sector reduces taxable 
capacity (ߚଵ ൏  ?) as agriculture is largely a subsistence activity in most low-income 
                                                             
1
 The reader should note that Gupta et al. (2004) and Gupta (2007) are not only different papers, but are written 
by different authors. 
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countries, which is difficult to tax directly (Emran and Stiglitz, 2005). A large industrial sector 
is easier to monitor and tax (ߚଶ ൐  ?). Openness (Trade, the sum of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP), is included as trade taxes are relatively easy to collect (ߚଷ ൐  ?) and are 
a major share of tax revenue in low-income countries (Ghura, 1998; Greenaway and Milner, 
1991). GDP per capita (Income) is included as a proxy for the level of economic development 
(ߚସ ൐  ?), to capture increased tax buoyancy (the responsiveness of revenue to income 
growth) and collection efficiency. However, empirical evidence on the relationship between 
the tax/GDP ratio and per capita GDP, controlling for economic structure, is inconclusive 
(Tanzi, 1992).  As the dependent variable is non-negative and skewed, the log 
transformation is used to provide a normal distribution. Nonlinearities in the relationship 
between aid and the tax ratio are allowed for by the inclusion of squared aid variables. 
Gupta et al. (2004) estimate equation (1) using alternative techniques and specifications 
(including other explanatory variables), and the results are found to be quite robust. The 
coefficient on Agriculture is negative and significant while the coefficients on Industry and 
Trade are positive and significant. The coefficient on GDP per capita, however, is consistently 
negative and significant, contrary to expectations.1 The coefficient on Loans is positive and 
that on Grants is negative, including when lagged values are used, and both are almost 
always signifŝĐĂŶƚ ?dŚĞƐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐŝŵƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂĚŽƵďůŝŶŐŽĨŐƌĂŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ
an average of 4 per cent of GDP to 8 per cent of GDP could decrease revenues by just 0.4 
ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ 'W ?(Gupta et al., 2004, p.402).  We make two changes to the 
specification, first by treating imports (M) and exports (X) separately as the revenue 
implications should differ (they are not taxed at the same rate and, in general, under trade 
reforms since the 1980s export taxes were largely eliminated before import taxes were 
reduced). Second, we allow for diminishing returns to the income variable by including its 
square. The resulting specification follows: 
݈݊ ൬ܶܽݔܩܦܲ൰௜ ?௧ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ݃ݎ௜ ?௧൅ ߚଶܫ݊݀௜ ?௧൅ ߚଷܯ௜ ?௧൅ ߚସ ௜ܺ ?௧൅ ߚହܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ ?௧൅ ߚ଺ܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁௜ ?௧ଶ൅ ߚ଻ܩ௜ ?௧൅ ߚ଼ܩ௜ ?௧ଶ ൅ ߚଽܮ௜ ?௧൅ ߚଵ଴ܮ௜ ?௧ଶ ൅ ߝ௜ ?௧ (2) 
 
A concern with this specification is potential endogeneity. Endogeneity bias arises when an 
                                                             
1
 Teera and Hudson (2004) also find the coefficient on per capita income to be negative (when significant), and 
interestingly also find a negative coefficient on the share of manufacturing for developing countries in their 
sample. 
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independent variable (aid in this case) is correlated with the error term, i.e. the variable is 
endogenous (or not orthogonal to the error term). Endogeneity refers to an inherent 
identification problem: either because there is a potential bi-directional contemporaneous 
relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variable of interest, 
and/or because an omitted third variable may co-determine both, the true effect of the 
independent variable on the dependent variable is not identified. To ensure identification 
one needs a predetermined variable, an instrument that is not correlated with the error 
term. In some cases, an appropriately lagged aid term may be predetermined and hence a 
valid instrument (correlated with the endogenous regressor but not with the error term); 
otherwise, one looks for other predetermined variables. 
The instrumental variables (IV) approach is a standard method of dealing with endogeneity: 
one identifies a set of variables that are correlated with the dependent and specific 
independent variables but are not correlated with the error term. The IV approach is 
problematic, especially for the current context. Although the aid allocation literature has 
identified a number of potential instruments that are correlated with aid, these are likely to 
ďĞǁĞĂŬŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐŝĨƚĂǆ ?'WĞǆŚŝďŝƚƐ ‘ŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŽƵƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ aid variables, i.e. 
the effect of aid on tax/GDP across countries is not uniform. The aim is to estimate the 
average response; if the sample contains some countries where tax/GDP responds to aid and 
others where it does not, the IV method would estimate ( ‘ŝŵƉŽƐĞ ? ?ƚŚĞĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚŽŶĂŝĚĨŽƌ
the former group of countries on the entire sample. Furthermore, IVs generally exhibit high 
standard errors and low significance, so when using fixed effects estimation there is too little 
variance to identify the coefficients (i.e. IV does not solve the identification problem). 
However, the fixed effects estimator is an appropriate method for (2) given that unobserved 
country-specific characteristics are likely to help explain cross-country differences in tax/GDP 
ratios.  
Two further problems with the IV approach arise specifically for the specification in (2). First, 
there are two aid terms; while the same instrument set can be used for each, either loans or 
grants or both will not be well identified (the instrument set is likely to be weak).  Second, 
the inclusion of quadratic aid terms implies that these must be instrumented (which imposes 
demands on the limited number of available instruments) or excluded. These concerns imply 
that the standard IV method is not appropriate. Nevertheless, we report IV results in the 
appendix (Table A 1): these results are quite similar to those reported below, and it 
2- Aid and Tax         Paul Clist 
21 
 
transpires that, using annual data, aid lagged twice is a statistically valid instrument (in 
addition to total global aid disbursed and a colony variable). The results support the use of 
lagged aid below; whilst aid may take a number of years to influence tax revenue, and thus 
lagged aid may be correlated with the error terms (and not a valid instrument), suitably 
lagged aid serves the purpose of an instrument and captures the dynamic effect of aid. 
Specification (2) is quite parsimonious, and there may be a problem of omitted variables. 
Gupta (2007) examined some 20 potential determinants of tax/GDP (in a sample of up to 
105 countries); few other than those included as controls in (2) were robustly significant. The 
two exceptions are debt share and the share of taxes from income, profits and capital gains, 
both of which were mostly (but not always) significant. The former is likely to be 
endogenous; ceteris paribus, countries with high debt are likely to have higher taxes while 
countries with a tax shortfall are likely to increase debt. Data on the latter are not available 
for most of our sample.  The analysis of Gupta (2007) suggests that (2) includes the variables 
commonly found to be significant (and unobserved country-specific variables are allowed for 
in the estimation). 
2.4 RESULTS 
We here estimate (2) for a larger sample of countries over a longer time period (details on 
the data sources and definitions are provided in Appendix A). Although the extended dataset 
covers 107 countries over the period 1970-2005, there are many missing observations so the 
number of countries used in each regression is smaller (a maximum of 82). Table 2.1 reports 
the results of estimating (2) using fixed (FE) effects estimators for the full sample; the first 
set of results include current aid, the second set lagged aid (as a control for potential 
endogeneity). The FE estimator has the advantage of allowing for unobserved country 
specific characteristics that do not change over time. If the unobserved effects are 
correlated with the other explanatory variables, failing to take them into account will bias 
the results.1  
The results in Table 2.1 are very similar to Gupta et al. (2004); all coefficients have the same 
sign and are of similar magnitude and significance. Including additional years in the sample 
                                                             
1
 It may be the case that any unobserved effects are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables in any time 
period, in which case random effects (RE) will produce more efficient estimators. If there is a correlation, the RE 
estimators will be inconsistent. It transpires that FE is preferred for our estimation, although RE provides very 
similar results and are provided in Appendix A, Table A 2. 
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(for the same countries) does not alter the results. The distinction between imports and 
exports appears to be vindicated as the coefficients are significant but with opposite signs, 
and even to off-set one another (although in the sample the value of Imports tends to be 
greater than Exports).1 It is not evident why the coefficient on exports should be negative 
(we consider reasons later after seeing if the results persist under alternative estimates). The 
coefficient on Agriculture is negative and significant while the coefficient on Industry is 
positive and significant. For the aid variables, Loans are positively related, and Grants 
negatively related to the tax to GDP ratio and both are significant. The coefficient on Income 
is significant but negative; although this is not what is expected it is a common finding in the 
literature. However, when we augment (2) to include income-squared, the coefficient on 
income becomes insignificant whereas that on income-squared is negative and significant 
(other variables are qualitatively unaffected). This suggests a non-linear relationship 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶĐŽŵĞĂŶĚƚĂǆ ?'WƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚďĞǇŽŶĚƐŽŵĞŝŶĐŽŵĞƚŚƌĞƐŚŽůĚ ‘ƚĂǆĞĨĨŽƌƚ ?ĚĞĐůŝŶĞƐ
ceteris paribus. 
To control for the possibility of endogeneity bias, that donors give more aid in the form of 
grants to fiscally constrained countries (or that an unobserved variable influences both aid 
composition and tax effort), we use aid variables lagged one year, on the assumption that 
the current tax/GDP ratio will not influence the magnitude or composition of previous year 
aid flows (as noted above, this assumption may not hold, but the use of lagged aid may still 
be appropriate). The results using lagged aid variables are given in the final two columns of 
Table 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 This shows that the two should not be combined. Gupta et al. (2004) most probably found a positive significant 
effect because imports are higher in the sample. 
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 Table 2.1 Determinants of Tax/GDP Ratios (FE), 1970-2005 
Variable Current Aid Lagged Aid 
Loans 1.25*** 1.31*** 0.69** 0.82** 
(3.57) (3.88) (1.99) (2.44) 
Loans 2 -0.0028* -0.0028* -0.0012 -0.0016 
(1.78) (1.84) (0.59) (0.81) 
Grants -1.18*** -1.00*** -0.76*** -0.62*** 
(5.42) (4.73) (3.48) (2.92) 
Grants2 0.00033 0.00029 -0.000014 -0.000075 
(1.49) (1.35) (0.05) (0.29) 
Agriculture -1.16*** -0.86*** -1.17*** -0.85*** 
(8.59) (6.37) (8.54) (6.26) 
Industry 0.51*** 0.78*** 0.55*** 0.85*** 
(3.48) (5.38) (3.73) (5.79) 
GDP -0.0054*** 0.0008 -0.005*** 0.0014 
(8.82) (0.92) (8.46) (1.51) 
GDP2 
 
-0.0000004*** 
 
-0.0000004*** 
 
(9.45) 
 
(10.04) 
Imports 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 
(6.10) (5.67) (5.59) (5.11) 
Exports -0.51*** -0.54*** -0.45*** -0.48*** 
(5.17) (5.55) (4.52) (5.00) 
N 1554 1554 1558 1558 
Countries 82 82 81 81 
F-Stat 30.4 37.9 28.0 37.0 
Overall R2 0.34 0.40 0.33 0.38 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of the Tax/GDP ratio multiplied by 100 to assist interpretation. All 
independent variables are measured as a percentage of GDP, except GDP (per capita). Numbers in parentheses 
are t-statistics; ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. N is the total number of 
observations and the number of Countries is also reported. Fixed Effects are shown; results using Random Effects 
are similar and can be found in the appendix, Table A 2. 
As the data cover a 35 year period, the next step of the research is to ascertain whether 
there have been any changes over the period. There is no reason a priori why we would 
expect a consistent relationship over a 35 year period, especially when there have been 
large changes to both tax and aid. Specifically, aid volumes have grown substantially since 
1970, and there has been a general transition from trade-based to income-based taxes (e.g. 
Attila et al., 2009). Table 2.2 reports the results of estimating (2) for the twenty-year period 
1970-1990, and Table 2.3 does the same but for the period 1985-2005. While many variables 
have similar relationships, the difference is clear for the aid variables, as well as exports and 
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agriculture. The change from significant negative coefficients to significant positive 
coefficients for grants suggests that the relationship with revenue may have changed 
dramatically within the period 1970-2005. We now investigate this possibility more 
thoroughly. 
 Table 2.2 Determinants of Tax/GDP Ratios (FE), 1970-1990 
Variable Current Aid Lagged Aid 
Loans 0.23 0.63 -1.48*** -1.16** 
(0.39) (1.10) (2.73) (2.23) 
Loans 2 0.051*** 0.040*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
(3.19) (2.59) (5.90) (5.79) 
Grants -1.99*** -1.66*** -1.28*** -0.98*** 
(6.33) (5.46) (4.06) (3.24) 
Grants2 0.0035 0.0028 -0.00055 -0.0020 
(1.52) (1.29) (0.17) (0.64) 
Agriculture -1.15*** -0.57*** -1.10*** -0.51** 
(5.56) (2.71) (5.34) (2.48) 
Industry 0.54** 0.90*** 0.72*** 1.07*** 
(2.27) (3.90) (3.09) (4.74) 
GDP -0.0078*** 0.0033** -0.0074*** 0.0041*** 
(8.26) (2.12) (7.81) (2.70) 
GDP2  -0.0000004*** 
 
-0.0000004*** 
 (8.82) 
 
(9.35) 
Imports 0.40*** 0.48*** 0.38*** 0.46*** 
(3.51) (4.35) (3.46) (4.33) 
Exports -0.20 -0.20 -0.15 -0.16 
(1.30) (1.34) (1.01) (1.09) 
N 981 981 977 977 
Countries 75 75 73 73 
F-Stat 22.3 29.6 23.5 32.0 
Overall R2 0.39 0.44 0.36 0.38 
Notes: As for Table 2.1. 
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 Table 2.3 Determinants of Tax/GDP Ratios (FE), 1985-2005 
Variable Current Aid Lagged Aid 
Loans 1.93*** 1.92*** 1.69*** 1.70*** 
(5.05) (5.06) (3.90) (3.95) 
Loans 2 -0.0044*** -0.0042*** -0.0031 -0.0031 
(2.86) (2.71) (1.40) (1.42) 
Grants 0.22 0.30 0.80*** 0.88*** 
(0.77) (1.08) (2.80) (3.08) 
Grants2 0.00042** 0.00038* 0.00013 0.0001 
(2.02) (1.83) (0.52) (0.40) 
Agriculture -0.41* -0.24 -0.35 -0.19 
(1.79) (1.03) (1.52) (0.83) 
Industry 0.54*** 0.62*** 0.59*** 0.70*** 
(2.85) (3.27) (3.17) (3.69) 
GDP -0.0022** 0.0041* -0.0019** 0.0037** 
(2.42) (1.92) (2.11) (2.02) 
GDP2  -0.0000006*** 
 
-0.0000005*** 
 (3.24) 
 
(3.46) 
Imports 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.46*** 0.42*** 
(4.20) (4.01) (3.72) (3.38) 
Exports -0.66*** -0.65*** -0.57*** -0.56*** 
(5.35) (5.28) (4.60) (4.54) 
N 885 885 898 898 
Countries 77 77 78 78 
F-Stat 10.2 10.3 11.0 11.2 
Overall R2 0.0063 0.042 0.0027 0.034 
Notes: As for Table 2.1. 
One possibility is that this apparent relationship change is the product of a more general 
time effect. To investigate this, we performed three tests (results found in Appendix A, Table 
A 3). First, we estimated the entire sample with the same specification including annual time 
dummies for each year; this provided no evidence of a general time effect. Second, we 
instead included a time trend variable, which was insignificant. Third, we included a 1985-
2005 (intercept) dummy, but it was insignificant. In each of the tests the other coefficient 
estimates were largely unchanged. There is no evidence that the apparent shift in 
relationship between grants and tax revenue is simply a general time effect.  
The next robustness check was to construct a panel of sub-period averages (eight four-year 
periods, to have balanced panels we start in 1974 and go through to 2005) and estimate (2) 
using this panel. Such sub-period averages offer certain advantages, notably by smoothing 
2- Aid and Tax         Paul Clist 
26 
 
out year-on-year variations in the data, especially for the aid variables that are quite volatile 
(Bulír and Hamann, 2008). Period averages also capture something of the dynamic 
relationship between aid inflows and the tax ratio (it is now previous period rather than 
previous year aid that can impact on tax effort) and reduces possible autocorrelation. The 
results in Table 2.3 provide further evidence that grants have not had a negative impact on 
tax revenues, except in the earliest periods. We report only fixed effects, as the (admittedly 
weak) Hausman test constantly indicates that it is preferred (as previously, RE results are 
similar). The validity of FE depends on whether differences in tax rates between countries 
can be explained by the controls and unobserved country-specific factors. The unexplained 
(log) difference between countries should not vary too much over time; otherwise using 
fixed effects is problematic. This seems a reasonable assumption, given the persistent 
regional heterogeneity in tax rates across the world. On the other hand, the use of sub-
period averages is likely to decrease the significance of variables as it reduces the number of 
observations. This may be why the coefficient on Industry is insignificant in Table 2.3. All 
other variables have the expected sign and are mostly significant. Grants are insignificant 
and while negative in the whole sample, are positive in the last twenty four years (6 time 
periods). This supports the earlier suggestion that grants effect on tax revenue has changed. 
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 Table 2.4 Determinants of Tax/GDP Ratios,  
Period-Averaged Panel (FE) 
Variable 1974-2005 1982-2005 
  Current Aid Lagged Aid Current Aid Lagged Aid 
Loans  1.16 1.27 1.99** 2.18*** 
(1.56) (1.62) (2.51) (2.67) 
Grants -0.79** -0.60 0.79* 0.68 
(1.97) (1.42) (1.71) (1.47) 
Agriculture -0.83*** -0.84*** -0.64** -0.59** 
(3.35) (3.32) (2.13) (1.99) 
Industry 0.52* 0.45 0.34 0.31 
(1.86) (1.54) (1.14) (1.01) 
GDP 0.0038** 0.0034* 0.00089 0.00064 
(2.26) (1.92) (0.43) (0.31) 
GDP2 -0.0000006*** -0.0000005*** -0.0000003** -0.00000021* 
(6.36) (5.88) (2.05) (1.79) 
Imports 0.42** 0.39** 0.18 0.19 
(2.29) (2.11) (0.90) (0.98) 
Exports -0.56*** -0.50** -0.29 -0.30 
(2.81) (2.46) (1.42) (1.44) 
N 493 488 373 372 
Countries 95 95 92 92 
F-Stat 12.5 11.6 4.26 4.36 
Overall R2 0.43 0.43 0.11 0.094 
Notes: As for Table 2.1; panel comprises averaged data for eight four-year periods. Aid squared terms have been 
omitted (if included they are all insignificant). Lagged Aid here refers to the period before, i.e. the four year period 
preceding the current four year period.  
TESTING FOR THE BREAK 
By augmenting the standard regression with composite terms for the standard variables 
ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ƉŽƐƚ ? ? ? ? ?ĚƵŵŵǇ ?ǁĞĐĂŶƵƐĞĂtĂůĚ ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐƚŽƚĞƐƚƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ of 
the composite variable. A constant effect of a variable over time would result in the new 
composite variable possessing a coefficient of zero. If this coefficient is not equal to zero, 
there is evidence that a change in the relationship occurred. It is only when the Wald 
statistic is calculated on the composite variable that we have a true test of whether the 
break is statistically significant. The results are shown in Table 2.5.  
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 Table 2.5 Testing for Breaks in 1984 
 Coefficient 
Variable 
Composite  
Variable  
Loans (L) 
 
0.035 
(0.05) 
1.23* 
(1.45) 
L2 
 
0.158* 
(1.71) 
-0.16** 
(-1.74) 
Grants (G) 
 
-1.521*** 
(-3.9) 
0.99*** 
(2.26) 
G2 
 
0.035* 
(1.84) 
-0.035** 
(-1.83) 
Agriculture 
 
-1.00*** 
(-7.13) 
-0.094 
(-1.11) 
Industry 
 
1.085*** 
(7.04) 
-0.30*** 
(-3.3) 
Income 
 
-0.001*** 
(-13.87) 
0.008*** 
(11.37) 
Imports 
 
0.41*** 
(4.18) 
0.023 
(0.24) 
Exports 
 
-0.326*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.16 
(-1.49) 
Obs (N) 
1554 
F-Stat 
25.24 
Overall R2 
0.37 
Notes: As for Table 2.1. Selected Wald statistics are as follows: All Variables 17.09***,  Grants 5.12***, G2 
5.12***, L and L2 1.61, Industry 10.86***, Income 129.3*** and All Others 1.49.The Wald statistic is a test of 
added explanatory power with a chi squared distribution. It can be defined as ܹ ൌ ൫ߠ෠ଵ െ ߠ෠ଶ൯ᇱ൫ ෠ܸଵ െ ෠ܸଶ൯ିଵ൫ߠ෠ଵ െߠ෠ଶሻ with the subscripts 1 and 2 denoting the set of variables.  ***, ** and * denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively.  
 
There is clear evidence for a break after 1984 for some relationships between dependent 
and independent variables. Specifically, the relationships of tax/GDP with grants, industry 
and per capita income change: grants become less negative (remember, in 1985-2005 a 
variable is subjected to both coefficients), the diminishing/increasing returns disappear, 
industry becomes less positive and income per capita becomes positive. All other effects are 
insignificant. Very similar results are found if other years around 1984 are chosen. Two of 
these results appear particularly relevant: since the mid-80s the coefficient on GDP per 
capita has been positive (suggesting that tax collection efficiency increases with income) 
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whereas grants have had less or no adverse effect on tax revenue (the results here do not 
show a positive effect of grants). 
MEDIUM TERM AID EFFECTS 
Aid is given to countries specifically because they have a deficiency in some sense (income, 
welfare). If this contemporaneous negative correlation (in this case, with tax revenue) is not 
controlled for, the coefficient on aid will be downwardly biased. Lagging aid by one period is 
unlikely to solve this fully, given the persistence in aid levels and the likelihood that tax/GDP 
changes very slowly. This is more problematic for grants than loans: current and lagged 
grants have a correlation of some 90% (for loans it is 72%). Only when the contemporary 
effect is controlled for will the medium-term effect become apparent.  
To try and isolate the medium term effect we augment the standard regression with a 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ‘ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĂŝĚ ?ƚĞƌŵ ?ďǇƚĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨĂŝĚŐŝǀĞŶ ?-10 years previously. We 
can test if serial correlation is a problem, given the relatively high correlation of grants over 
time, following the method of Wooldridge (Drukker, 2003a; Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 274-276). 
In the presence of serial correlation, estimating using differenced data is recommended 
although it tends to have low explanatory power, as country specific effects are deleted and 
the cross-country variation of tax revenue in differenced form is small. This means high 
standard errors are to be expected, and much of the nuance of panel data is lost.  
Table 2.6 presents results using fixed effects estimation and differenced data. The 
Wooldridge statistic repeatedly shows that there is serial correlation, so the differenced 
results are also reported, both for the whole sample and 1985-2005. The Wooldridge 
statistic is essentially a test of whether the time varying error term conforms to the 
properties one would expect if the data were not serially correlated. The results show the 
expected pattern for coefficients on imports, exports, industry and agriculture. Loans are 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞǁŝƚŚ  ‘ĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚŝŶŐƌĞƚƵƌŶƐ ?  ?ƚŚĞƐƋƵĂƌĞĚƚĞƌŵ ŝƐŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ?ďŽƚŚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ
and longer term. The longer term effect is both larger and more significant. 
Contemporaneous grants are negative but insignificant, but over the medium term grants 
found to be positive and significant. The Wooldridge test statistic shows (highly significantly) 
that there is a problem of serial correlation, which implies the differenced equation is 
needed. Of those results, by far the most significant determinant is per capita income, with a 
negative sign. This contradicts theoretical assumptions that tax revenue (collection 
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efficiency) increases as income rises, through both demand for government services and the 
ability of citizens to pay more tax. Most of the other variables are not significant. Industry is 
an exception, but only when the whole period is used.  
 Table 2.6 ǮǯǮǯ  
 
 
1985-2005  
FE 
1970-2005  
Differenced 
1985-2005  
Differenced 
C
on
te
m
p
or
a
n
eo
u
s Loans  
 
1.89*** 
(5.02) 
1.21*** 
(3.44) 
1.84*** 
(4.85) 
Loans2  
 
-0.004*** 
(2.87) 
-0.003 
(1.61) 
-0.004** 
(2.42) 
Grants  
 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-1.10*** 
(4.91) 
0.05 
(0.17) 
Grants2  
 
0.0003 
(1.42) 
0.0003 
(1.14) 
0.0003 
(1.5) 
H
is
to
ri
ca
l 
Loans  
 
5.18*** 
(4.25) 
0.35 
(0.83) 
1.84*** 
(3.61) 
Loans2  
 
-0.24*** 
(3.44) 
Ș 
 
Ș 
 
Grants  
 
2.15*** 
(3.08) 
-0.12 
(0.45) 
0.48 
(1.52) 
Grants2  
 
-0.07*** 
(3.08) 
Ș 
 
Ș 
 
C
on
te
m
p
or
a
n
eo
u
s 
Agriculture 
 
-0.19 
(0.82) 
-1.06*** 
(7.8) 
-0.31 
(1.36) 
Industry 
 
0.59*** 
(3.14) 
0.66*** 
(4.41) 
0.69*** 
(3.66) 
GDP 
 
-0.0007 
(0.79) 
-0.44*** 
(6.55) 
-0.15 
(1.64) 
Imports 
 
0.43*** 
(3.38) 
0.49*** 
(5.38) 
0.43*** 
(3.30) 
Exports 
 
-0.54*** 
(4.33) 
-0.49*** 
(4.92) 
-0.56*** 
(4.46) 
 Wooldridge test 16.62   
 N 873 1468 873 
 F-stat 93 97.13 92.36 
 Overall R2 0.16 0.85 0.90 
Notes: As for Table 2.1 ? ‘ĚŝĨĨ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ?dŚĞtŽŽůĚƌŝĚŐĞƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝĐŝƐ
essentially a Wald test of whether E is equal to -0.5 in the regression ݑ௧ ൌ ߚݑ௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ. The null hypothesis is then 
that there is no first order autocorrelation. The critical value for the 1% significance is 7.01. Historical here is an 
ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨĂŝĚŐŝǀĞŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ?ĂŶĚ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞǇĞĂƌďĞŝŶŐĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ ? ?/ŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐŚĂǀĞ
been omitted: they were insignificant and added no explanatory power (a joint test of their significance gave a 
chi-squared [F2] statistic of 0.1). 
The other significant factors are grants and loans, over the medium term. When lagged 
terms are used with FE for the full sample (the second column), coefficients on loans and 
grants are positive and significant, suggesting that aid does help countries to increase their 
tax revenue. It may be that the aid is associated with conditions including measures to 
2- Aid and Tax         Paul Clist 
31 
 
increase tax revenue, which could be interpreted as a positive impact of conditionality. The 
coefficient on loans is quite robust in sign and significance across specifications, but that on 
grants is not (and is insignificant in most differenced specifications, as these have high 
standard errors). In general the differenced results are weak, at least for the aid variables. 
However, the medium-run estimates suggest that aid is positively associated with tax 
revenue, whether loans or grants. 
DIFFERENCES IN COUNTRY GROUPS 
A final possibility tested is that the relationship may be different comparing low and middle 
income countries; Teera and Hudson (2004, p.796) report that low-income countries have a 
significantly lower tax/GDP ratio and tax effort score than middle income countries, 
although there are few significant differences between the coefficient estimates for 
different groups of countries. To examine if there are differences between countries 
according to their income level we split the sample in low-income (GDP per capita of no 
more than $450 in 1970) and middle-income countries. The results are reported in Table 2.7. 
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 Table 2.7 Splitting the Sample by Income Level, Lagged Aid (FE) 
Variable Middle Income  Low Income 
 1970-2005 1985-2005  1970-2005 1985-2005 
Loans 
 
0.31 
(0.76) 
-0.25 
(0.49) 
 -0.15 
(0.21) 
2.69*** 
(3.05) 
Loans2 
 
-0.0004 
(0.17) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
 0.007 
(0.86) 
0.005 
(0.58) 
Grants  
 
-0.95*** 
(3.45) 
1.82*** 
(4.40) 
 -0.74* 
(1.83) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
Grants2 
 
-0.0004 
(1.16) 
-0.001*** 
(3.92) 
 0.0005 
(0.61) 
0.001 
(1.40) 
Agriculture 
 
-1.91*** 
(10.79) 
-1.40*** 
(4.74) 
 -0.44* 
(1.78) 
0.92** 
(2.02) 
Industry 
 
0.11 
(0.62) 
0.07 
(0.34) 
 1.08*** 
(3.15) 
0.54 
(1.14) 
GDP 
 
-0.63*** 
(10.12) 
-0.23** 
(2.54) 
 0.08 
(0.07) 
0.71 
(0.42) 
Imports 
 
0.34*** 
(3.32) 
0.52*** 
(3.45) 
 0. 78*** 
(4.24) 
0.60* 
(1.75) 
Exports 
 
-0.34*** 
(3.08) 
-0.77*** 
(5.21) 
 -0.51* 
(1.72) 
0.18 
(0.46) 
N 1171 659  387 178 
Countries 71 67  22 20 
F-Stat 25.81 8.86  10.23 6.20 
Overall R2 0.27 0.03  0.33 0.01 
 
Notes: As for Table 2.1. 
There do appear to be differences in coefficient estimates for different income sub-groups, 
especially for the later (1985-2005) period. However, we should acknowledge that the low-
income sample is quite small and the model does not have much explanatory power for the 
later period (for this reason, we did not follow the more detailed analysis of income sub-
samples). The difference for the aid variables is pronounced: loans are insignificant but 
grants are significant (negative over the whole period but positive in the later period) for 
middle-income countries; in contrast, grants are negative (weakly significant) over the whole 
period but insignificant for 1985-2005 while loans are significant (and positive) only in the 
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later period for low-income countries. The positive effect of grants in the later period seems 
to be due to middle-income countries whereas the positive impact of loans appears to be 
due to low-income countries (but note that the coefficient on grants is insignificant). 
The negative coefficient on income seems to be due to middle-income countries as the 
coefficient is insignificant for low-income countries, although clearly there is not much 
variation from which to identify any effect. For middle-income countries the share of 
agriculture is consistently negative whereas industry is insignificant; for low-income 
countries, the signs are as expected over the whole period, but for 1985-2005 agriculture is 
positive, suggesting improved ability to tax the sector, and industry insignificant. 
2.5 DISCUSSION 
The poorest countries tend to receive more aid, the aid they receive is more likely to be in 
the form of grants, and they also tend to have lower tax/GDP ratios. Indeed, it is the poorest 
countries that face the greatest difficulty in increasing tax revenue (Keen and Simone, 2004; 
Teera and Hudson, 2004). If, on average over time, donors give more aid in the form of 
grants to recipients with relatively lower tax ratios (because this is correlated with aid 
 ‘ŶĞĞĚƐ ? ? ?ŽŶĞǁŽƵůĚŽďƐĞƌǀĞĂŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂŶĞŽƵƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐƌĂŶƚƐĂŶĚ
the tax ratio. This is what we tend to observe. To the extent that tax ratios change slowly 
over time relative to aid, this negative relationship would also be observed using aid lagged 
one year (i.e. a one year lag may not adequately account for endogeneity). However, if the 
composition of aid has a systematic causal (or behavioural) impact on the tax ratio, period 
lagged aid variables should have a significant effect on the tax ratio. This does appear to be 
the case, i.e. there is evidence that over the medium term or since the mid-80s, grants and 
loans both appear to encourage tax effort (the results differ for income groups).  
The tax revenue equation (excluding aid variables) is a revenue performance equation and is 
essentially a contemporaneous relationship: current tax/GDP ratios are explained by current 
values of the economic structure (tax base) variables. The annual panels are appropriate to 
estimate this; as it is estimated across countries over time, it captures the relationship that 
holds on average. The results for the structural variables are mostly consistent in alternative 
specifications. Countries with a relatively large agricultural sector tend to have lower tax 
revenue (as that sector ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ŝƐrelatively low and difficult to tax). Countries with 
relatively large manufacturing sectors have higher tax revenue, because this may proxy for 
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the size of the formal private sector, which has higher incomes and is easier to tax; the 
negative coefficient found by Teera and Hudson (2004) does suggest that this may be a poor 
proxy however. Imports are positively associated with revenue, because developing 
countries (especially the poorest) tend to rely on import taxes. Exports are negatively 
associated with revenue, perhaps because most countries reduced or eliminated export 
taxes in the 1980s.1 The coefficient on per capita income was generally negative (but may 
have become positive since the mid 80s), suggesting that poorer countries are collecting as 
much tax as feasible, given the tax base, whereas richer developing countries are not (see 
also Table 2.7). 
'ŝǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ǀĂůƵĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ  ?ƚĂǆ ďĂƐĞ ? ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ? ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ
performancĞ ǁŽƵůĚ ŚĂǀĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ďĂĚ ? ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ǁŽƵůĚ
have negative residuals. When aid variables are introduced and found to be significant, they 
are explaining or correlated with some of the residual (the variation in performance). The 
negative coefficient on grants suggests that such aid is associated with weak performance (a 
negative residual), while the positive coefficient on loans suggests that such aid is associated 
with strong performance. The specification and estimation does not permit the inference 
that aid causes such revenue performance. The correlation found is consistent with other 
interpretations. In particular, is it recipient behaviour (tax effort) or donor behaviour (aid 
allocation and/or conditionality)? 
In the context of recipient behaviour, it may be that the tax/GDP ratio is difficult to alter, as 
argued above, implying that aid is not actually a determinant. Morrissey et al. (2007), in an 
analysis for Kenya that distinguishes loans and grants, find no evidence for an adverse effect 
of grants or a positive effect of loans on tax effort. In fact, the overall results suggest that 
Kenya has limited ability to alter tax revenue (an example of the more general argument in 
Keen and Simone, 2004) or to affect the level of grants. Loans, because the government can 
choose whether or not to seek them, appear to be the more discretionary component of aid. 
However, while grants appear to contribute to growth by financing public spending in a non-
distortionary (relative to taxes) manner, loans appear negatively associated with growth. 
One inference is that this is because loans are sought to finance unanticipated deficits, and it 
is these deficits rather than adverse effects of aid that reduce growth (income).  
                                                             
1
 In the 1970s when there were export taxes, higher exports would have been associated with higher revenue. As 
export taxes were reduced during the 1980s there may have been a reduction in tax revenue that was correlated 
with exports, and after the early 1990s revenue would be lower than suggested by high exports. 
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Donors may be aware that the tax/GDP ratio is difficult to alter. It may be the case that on 
average, over time, donors give a greater proportion of aid in the form of grants to countries 
that are fiscally constrained. This will be the case if donors provide aid to finance tŚĞ ‘ĨŝƐĐĂů
ŐĂƉ ? ?ŽƌĂƚůĞĂƐƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞƚŚĂƚĂŝĚĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĞŐĂƉ ?ĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƚǁŝƐŚƚŽďƵƌĚĞŶůŽǁ-income 
countries with unsustainable levels of debt (hence provide grants). This would yield the 
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ P “ƐŚŽƌƚĨĂůůƐŝŶĂŝĚƚĞŶĚƚŽĐŽŝŶĐide with shortfalls in domestic 
revenue [and] countries that suffer from revenue volatility also exhibit higher volatility in aid 
receipts, perhaps because both revenue and aid fluctuations are driven by domestic policy 
ŝŶƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?(Bulír and Hamann, 2008 p.83). 
/ƚ ŵĂǇ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĂŝĚ ŝŶĨůŽǁƐ ĂƌĞ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?Ɛ ƚĂǆ
base, and that countries that are more aid dependent receive a greater proportion of aid in 
the form of grants. Aid can affect tax bases, and indeed it is likely that the policy reforms 
associated with aid conditions will affect the tax base. For example, trade policy reform is a 
major component of conditional lending  W the conditions attached to aid (but not necessarily 
the level of aid) could affect both the tax base (the volume of trade) and effective tax rate 
(policies included reducing tariffs and eliminating export taxes). Aizenman and Jinjarak 
(2009) show that reforms such as trade liberalization, financial liberalization and 
macroeconomic stabilization (ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐƐĞŝŐŶŽƌĂŐĞ ?ĞƌŽĚĞƚŚĞƌĞǀĞŶƵĞĨƌŽŵ ‘ĞĂƐǇƚŽĐŽůůĞĐƚ ?
taxes such as tariffs (which tend to be most important for poorer countries). Poor countries 
ŚĂǀĞ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚǇ ƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůŽƐƚ ƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ƚŽ ĐŽůůĞĐƚ ? taxes, such as VAT or 
income taxes, which need significant investment in tax collection and resources for 
monitoring and enforcement. Thus, periods of economic policy reform in developing 
countries tend to be associated with reductions in the tax/GDP ratio, especially for the 
poorest countries (see also Baunsgaard and Keen, 2009), but they also tend to be associated 
with aid episodes.  
In this way, aid conditionality may actually generate a negative association between aid/GDP 
and tax/GDP ratios in the short-run. Such complex effects are not captured in the estimation 
we have considered, and are beyond the scope of this paper (especially as such effects will 
ďĞ ŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŽƵƐ ĂĐƌŽƐƐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ŝĨ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƚĂǆ ďĂƐĞ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?
such as trade liberalization are more pronounced in low-income countries that are more 
likely to receive grants, there may be some tendency for grants to be provided to 
compensate for conditions that reduce tax revenue in the short term. On the other hand, 
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some of the policy conditions will have the aim of increasing incomes (the tax base) and tax 
collection efficiency, and perhaps even increasing tax rates (such as consumption taxes). 
These effects may only be observed over the medium term, and our results suggest that 
such conditions have (on average) been effective. 
Our most significant finding is the evidence for a break in the mid-1980s, after which grants 
appear to have a positive impact on tax revenue (and there is some evidence that income 
per capita also had a positive impact in the later period). It is unlikely to be coincidental that 
the mid- ? ? ? ?Ɛ ŝƐ ǁŚĞŶ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶ  ‘ĨƵůů ƐǁŝŶŐ ?  Walthough in many 
countries the programmes began in the early 1980s, it would take a few years for effects to 
be observed, and by the late 1980s most developing countries had recently had adjustment 
programmes. This was a period associated with increasing aid, temporary declines in trade 
tax revenue, and various policy reforms. Osei et al. (2005) demonstrate that this was 
associated with improved fiscal management and tax revenue in Ghana, and Attila et al. 
(2009) report early evidence that foreign aid was responsible for quickening this tax 
transition across many countries. Our results concur that this positive effect was 
widespread. 
The policy reforms associated with conditional aid include many that should contribute to 
increasing tax revenues  W specific tax and fiscal reforms, especially regarding administration 
and collection efficiency, and general reforms contributing to increasing incomes (i.e. 
expanding the tax base). The policies may also increase the incentives for governments to 
increase tax/GDP. In an environment of falling trade tax revenue, the marginal cost of 
increasing tax revenue will be high (in both monetary and political terms). Countries with 
higher aid receipts may be better able to invest in new systems of collection, or even finance 
projects that increase popular support enough that they may undertake unpopular tax 
reforms. Aid, in either form, also brings with it the advice and perspective of donors. 
Therefore higher aid may mean recipients are more likely to have absorbed repeated donor 
messages regarding the importance of building a strong tax base.  
More generally, higher income increases both the ability and desire to collect taxes (Tanzi, 
1992), so one would expect to find a positive coefficient (we find this only after 1985). 
Possible explanations for the general negative relationship between income per capita and 
tax revenue is that low taxes are good for growth (the countries with lower tax burdens 
become those with higher incomes) or that a wealthy elite may suppress taxes in order to 
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minimise their own taxation burden. This is an issue worthy of further research, but is not a 
direct concern of our analysis. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter investigates the recipient tax revenue response to the composition of aid, i.e. if 
loans and grants have a significantly different effect on the tax/GDP ratio. The core of the 
paper examines the relationship between the composition of aid and tax revenue using two 
different panel data sets (annual and sub-period averages) for a large sample of developing 
countries over 1970-2005. Using annual data, even with lagged aid, suggests that loans are 
positively related and grants negatively (but weakly) related to the tax to GDP ratio. In the 
sub-period panel the relationship between aid and the tax ratio is not robust (and often 
insignificant). However, when we focus on the 1985-2005 period the results are very 
different for grants, which are found to have a positive effect on tax revenue (at least for 
middle-income countries, it appears insignificant for low-income countries). We excluded 
the possibility that it is due to a general time effect, using three separate tests. In further 
support of this we also find that the effect of grants is positive over the medium term (for 
the differenced data we can conclude that the evidence for a negative effect of grants on tax 
revenue is not robust). We tested for breaks for all variables and found that grants are not 
the only variable to have changed relationship with tax revenue over the period. Per capita 
income (also turning positive) and industry (becoming insignificant) also have a statistically 
significant break around 1985. There is evidence that the nature of these breaks was quite 
different for low-income as compared to middle-income countries, although the samples 
here are smaller. As the mid-80s represents the time when conditional lending was 
becoming widespread, this may be evidence of successful conditionality, at least by fiscal 
criteria. 
Of the two effects found in the paper (the series break and the different short and medium 
term effects of grants) the latter seems to dominate the former. However, they hold similar 
implications for the donor community. The evidence here does not negate other evidence 
regarding the possible advantages of loans. It does however shed considerable doubt on any 
negative fiscal impact of grants, and in this sense supports advocates of a shift towards 
increasing the share of grants in aid. One interpretation of our results, for the period since 
the mid-80s, is that in middle-income countries with a better fiscal system (higher revenue 
and better management) grants are positively associated with tax revenue, whereas in low-
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income countries with weaker systems and limited ability to increase tax revenue, grants 
(which are a relatively important source of revenue) have no adverse effect on tax revenue. 
If one accepts that the effect of aid composition on tax revenue is, at most, weak, then the 
effect on debt may be a more important concern (Cohen et al., 2007) and debt concerns 
have influenced the choice of loans/grants mix since at least 2005 (IDA, 2005). One problem 
is defensive lending, where new loans are pushed with the aim of paying off the old loan 
given that development banks face internal pressure to continue lending (Bulow and Rogoff, 
2005). There is general agreement that loans should not be given to countries that cannot 
afford to repay, or where a debt overhang would reach unsustainable levels; unless 
countries have demonstrated their ability to achieve growth (hence service debt), grants are 
preferable to loans (Radelet, 2005). In this context, the role of IDA is to provide concessional 
loans for countries that do not have access to loans at market rates.  
The revenue response to aid remains an important issue. Governments in developing 
countries face a formidable challenge creating an effective and efficient tax system (Tanzi 
and Zee, 2000). If it can be demonstrated that aid flows systematically reduce government 
revenue efforts, then this can be viewed as reducing the effectiveness of aid. Gupta et al. 
(2004) argue that this is the case for aid in the form of grants but we question this: the 
evidence for a negative coefficient on grants in the tax ratio equation is not robust and 
where it exists is consistent with alternative explanations. When we account for the effect in 
the medium term or the post-1985 period it transpires to be positive or insignificant.  
We noted in the introduction that much of the debate between grants and loans revolves 
around their effect on tax effort and/or growth. We have concentrated on the effect on tax 
effort, and argued that the evidence for grants discouraging tax effort is at best weak, and 
the effect transpires to be positive or absent (insignificant) on closer examination (at least in 
the recent period). There are many reasons why it is very difficult for poor countries to 
increase tax/GDP ratios so an observed negative relationship between grants and tax effort 
is unlikely to be causal. In fact, there is some evidence that grants may be more conducive to 
growth than loans, because they do not add to indebtedness and therefore support stable 
fiscal policy. Cordella and Ulku (2007) find that more concessional aid has a greater impact 
on growth on poorer countries with weak policies and high debt. For the most vulnerable 
countries, this suggests that at the margin grants are preferable to loans. For the poorest 
countries most in need of aid the case for giving this in the form of grants remains strong.   
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW:  
AID ALLOCATION 
The study of aid allocation is almost as old as aid donors themselves. Aid represents a major 
source of finance for many developing countries, and the most tangible instrument of 
development policy by developed nations. For these reasons alone, it is a topic worthy of 
study; however there are also more recent motives for doing so. Within the last decade, 
cross-country studies have tried and failed to find robust evidence that foreign aid has had a 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽŶ ŝƚƐ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ(e.g. Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; 
Roodman, 2007)1. This is both potentially affected by, and affects, aid allocation policy. The 
first relationship is simple. If aid is not given with the intention of increasing economic 
growth, then perhaps the weakness of aid is not inherent, merely a function of current 
allocation principles: it may be that aid has been effective in its aim (e.g. increasing the 
welfare of the donor country) but unsuccessful when measured against a different criterion 
(e.g. increasing the economic growth of the recipient). In this circumstance it would be 
difficult to make a judgment upon the potential of aid to increase growth, as only the effects 
of current allocation practice can be observed. The second relationship is related to the 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŝƐ Ă ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ďĞůŝĞĨƐ ƌĞŐĂƌding the 
potential effects of aid. For example, if a donor stops believing aid to be growth promoting, 
it is likely to pay more attention to non-development aims when allocating its aid. If, on the 
other hand, aid is believed to be growth promoting in good policy environments, donors may 
increase the importance of poverty and policy in allocation.  
Consequently, understanding the allocation of aid underpins the analysis of aid 
effectiveness. Many commentators deplore current practice and argue that there is a better 
way of allocating aid, a more efficient use of scarce resources. There are two parts of any 
argument to improve aid allocation. The first focuses on defining or describing better aid 
allocation, the second focuses on current practice. The first can be seen as a normative 
approach, in that it deals with defining desirable principles and allocations. The second can 
be seen as a positive approach, seeking to understand what currently happens. The 
literature can be divided along these lines, but within these two streams there are of course 
                                                             
1
 Some studies do, however, find a positive effect, see Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) for a comprehensive 
review. 
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further distinctions to be made, most often by the technique employed. Sections 2 and 3 
both deal with research on how aid should be allocated, but they employ distinct 
approaches. The former starts with a desirable principle in aid allocation (e.g. poverty focus) 
in order to comment on actual allocations. The latter uses practical tools used by donors to 
give rule-of-thumb allocation volumes. We then move to the question of how aid is 
allocated: the positive literature. Section 4 outlines papers that employ regression 
techniques to examine which factors determine the volume of aid allocated among different 
recipients. Section 5 stands apart by focusing on the wider critique of aid allocation practices 
afforded by the descriptive literature. Section 6 concludes.  
3.2 NORMATIVE LITERATURE: WHO SHOULD GET AID? 
The normative approach typically begins by proposing an optimal allocation (maximising an 
ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŶ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽĂ  ‘ƌĞĂů ǁŽƌůĚ ? ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ Ăccording to 
certain constraints and assumptions. This ideal allocation is very sensitive to the 
assumptions made. Here, the brief discussion is restricted to the ideas behind the allocations 
(see McGillivray, 2004a, for a more technical review). In a recent prominent example, Collier 
ĂŶĚŽůůĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĚĞƌŝǀĞĂ ‘ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ-ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŝĚ ?ĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚďĞůŽǁ ? 
Maximise Poverty Reduction   ? ܩ௝ߙ௝ ௝݄ ௝ܰ௡௝ୀଵ  
Subject to    ܣҧ ൌ  ? ܣ௝ݕ௝ ௝ܰ௡௝ୀଵ  ,      ܣ௝ ൒  ? 
Where G is income growth, ߙ the elasticity of poverty reduction (with respect to income), h 
is a poverty measure, N is population, A is aid, y per capita income and the subscript j 
indexes (potential) recipient countries. From this, the first-order condition is: 
ܩ௔ ?௝ൌ ߣݕ௝ߙ௝ ௝݄ 
Where ܩ௔ ?௝ is the marginal impact of aid on growth, and ߣ is the shadow value of aid (the 
marginal poverty reduction of an additional dollar of aid). A cross-country growth regression 
in the style of Burnside and Dollar (2000) is then used to estimate some of the parameters. 
The postulated aid volume (given by the estimated aid effectiveness) increases with policy, 
poverty and poverty elasticity, and decreases with per capita income. Lensink and White 
(2000) criticise the work on three main grounds. First is the assumption that aid can only 
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affect poverty through its effect on economic growth. Most obviously, a poverty headcount 
is related to the level of income in a country, and its distribution. Thus if aid changes this 
distribution of income the assumption does not hold. They also explicitly exclude the 
possibility that aid has an effect on poverty through changes in policy (Collier and Dollar, 
2002, p1476), which is a contentious assumption. For example, Mosley, Hudson and 
Verschoor (2004) report evidence that aid does exhibit poverty leverage, by increasing pro-
poor expenditure  W influencing both policy and distribution. Second is the assumption that 
the effect of aid on economic growth is conditional on policy. It has been well documented 
that this assumption comes from the regressions in Burnside and Dollar (1998, 2000), whose 
results have been almost impossible to replicate (Easterly et al., 2004; Roodman, 2007). 
McGillivray (2004a, p.282) argues these econometric estimates are used to justify a 
relatively low weight for poverty relative to policy. Third is the assumption that there are 
diminishing returns to aid. Lensink and White (2000, pp. 404-405) catalogue the problems 
with this assumption, which must hold otherwise the model cannot be calculated. Most 
problematic in this instance are the use of an estimated coefficient from a regression based 
upon a different sample to the other coefficients, and the very low implied turning point for 
diminishing returns. Anderson and Waddington (2007) used various different estimates of 
the diminishing returns, and their work inadvertently illustrates the degree of disparity in 
implied allocations when using different estimates of the strength of diminishing returns. 
Llavador and Roemer (2001) approach the question from a very different perspective by 
seeking to equalise opportunities of recipient countries for growth, in contrast to Collier and 
Dollar (2002) who equalise actual aid-funded economic growth. Their model divides the 
effects on the growth rate into three: conditions, effort and aid. They argue that aid should 
be an increasing function of effort and decreasing function of conditions. This is motivated 
by the equal opportunity rationale  W that aid should equalise the possibility of growth by 
compensating for adverse conditions but not low effort. The model is a formalisation of an 
idea within aid allocation discussion for many years, for example  Maizels and Nissanke 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞĚ  “ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚĞ ĨŽƌ ƐŚŽƌƚĨĂůůƐ ŝŶ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ?In 
order to operationalise the model, and provide an example of optimal allocation behaviour, 
variables are assigned to country conditions and country effort in a cross-country growth 
regression. This decision is crucial, as it means deciding the sign with which a variable should 
influence aid allocation. The variables found in Burnside and Dollar (1998) are chosen to 
represent conditions, except for the policy index (budget surplus, inflation and openness) 
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which is chosen to represent effort. The demarcation between effort and conditions is 
guided by that which can be controlled by a country, and that which cannot. Using this test, 
the variables of initial income, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, assassinations and regional 
dummies are justifiable as pre-determined or out of the direct control of the government. 
However, the variables measuring institutional quality1 and the money supply are directly 
influenced by the government. In fact, it is not clear that these variables are less controlled 
by the government than inflation and the budget surplus, which are included as effort 
variables. For example, Llavador and Roemer (2001) deem the money supply as effort and 
inflation as a condition, however as the former affects the latter the distinction seems 
illogical. Yet, it is argued that allocation should punish low levels of effort, and compensate 
for low levels of conditions (unfavourable circumstances).  
Cogneau and Naudet  (2007) argue that Llavador and Roemer (2001) does not accurately 
represent the theory of equality of opportunity, as the model favours better past macro-
economic performance, growth and conditions. This resulted in a recommendation for the 
richest countries to get 72% of all aid, and poorest only 4%. They also criticise the view of 
Collier and Dollar (2002) that aid effectiveness is solely a function of policy, and thus should 
drive aid allocation, without allowing for aid effectiveness to also be influenced by structural 
conditions. Cogneau and Naudet (2007) set out their own application of the equality of 
opportunity theory, using CPIA as the effort variable and allowing conditions to affect effort. 
When growth prospects are included, proposed allocation resemble actual allocation more 
closely. This result is similar to Wood (2008), who extends the Collier and Dollar  (2002) 
approach to include a time horizon. Donors, under this assumption, care about poverty 
reduction without aid, and then seek to maximise poverty reduction by augmenting that 
with aid induced poverty reduction. This innovation makes proposed aid allocation resemble 
actual allocations more closely. The formal presentation of an equal opportunity approach is 
elegant and reasonable. However, the operationalisation is hampered by the lack of clear 
distinction between which variables should represent conditions and which should represent 
effort, a distinction made even more troublesome by the connections between variables.  
 
                                                             
1
 ICRG- the International Country Risk Guide, presented in Knack and Keefer (1995). 
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3.3 FINANCIAL PROGRAMMING RULES AND  
PERFORMANCE BASED ALLOCATION (PBA) FORMULAS 
Similar to normative studies in method, if not aim, are the financial programming rules that 
were popular in the 1960s. The most cited example is the two-gap model of Chenery and 
Strout (1966). The two-gap model builds upon the Harrold-Domar framework where growth 
ŝƐĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ŝŶƚƵƌŶĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐƌĂƚĞ ?dŚŝƐ ŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ĨŝƌƐƚ
ŐĂƉ ? PƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂĐƚƵĂůƐĂǀŝŶŐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽƐƵpport investment 
ĨŽƌ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŐƌŽǁƚŚ ƌĂƚĞ ? dŚĞ  ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ŐĂƉ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ Ă ƐŚŽƌƚĨĂůů ŝŶexport 
earnings required to finance needed capital good imports. Chenery and Strout  (1966 
pp.728-729) use this to suggest certain performance criteria to employ when allocating aid, 
including the investment rate, marginal savings rate, marginal tax rate, balance of payments 
and the incremental capital-output ratio. Easterly (1999) argues that these ideas still 
influence discussion of aid allocation policy, using examples from the policy documents of 
multilateral agencies. Cline and Sargen (1975) built upon the work of Adelman and Morris 
(1968) and suggested a simple allocation rule where aid is allocated on the basis of income 
per capita and population, and then ĂĚũƵƐƚĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?Ɛ ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?
These rules were generally designed to be illustrative in nature, and give some indication 
regarding the absorptive capacity of a country. PBAs (Performance Based Allocation 
formulas) now perform a similar task, by producing an indicative figure of the amount of aid 
that is proportional to the need and population of a country, adjusted for performance. They 
are also highly informative regarding ƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞǁĞŝŐŚƚƐĨŽƌĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĞǀĞŶ 
if they are only guidelines.  
The IDA (International Development Association, the World Bank arm that focuses on 
poorest countries) has been using PBAs since 1977, and other donors are increasingly 
following suit. Their formulation has been heavily influenced not only by financial 
programming rules, but also by positive and normative approaches discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter. Other agencies known to use PBA formulas are mainly multilateral (including 
the African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks) but do include bilateral agencies 
(e.g. DFID, UK and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USA). The associated policy papers 
and discussions reveal how policymakers have decided to reconcile competing points of 
view, arriving at models that guide and shape their actual behaviour. Take for example 
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&/ ?ƐǇĞƌĨŽƌŵƵůĂ(Dyer et al., 2003), which forms the basis of allocations to low income 
countries: 
ܣ݈݈݋ܿܽݐ݅݋݊ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ ൌ ൬ ܥܲܫܣܩܰܫ݌ܿ൰ ȉ ܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊଴ ?଺ 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƌĞĂƐĂƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞƐƵŵŽĨĂůůĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽƌĞƐ ƚŚĞŶ
forms the percentage of aid budget the country could receive. No econometric methodology 
previously used in the explanatory stream could have revealed this as the true formula, 
given its multiplicative nature. To compound the difficulties, only around 30% of DFID aid 
was allocated this way, given its previous commitments. This means there have been 
multiple data generating processes inherent in any allocation. It is interesting to note just 
how simple the above formula is; indeed this was one of its aims.  
The Development Banks of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean use formulas that are 
multiplicative in nature, and combine needs and performance factors. Need in each case is a 
product of population and per capita income, but each formula weights these differently by 
using different exponents. The SDF (Caribbean Development Bank) also includes here a 
vulnerability index. The performance factors are then generally a variation on three factors: 
CPIA, a Governance index and portfolio performance where the performance index is 
created using various subjective indices of government performance. The Inter-American 
Development Bank differs by using an additive formula, which is 40% based upon Needs, and 
60% upon Performance. It is allocated on the basis of the amount of population, inverse per 
capita income, debt, and policy when measured as a percentage of the sum of all eligible 
countries.  
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (USA) uses a very different process. Countries are 
first split into two income groups, and then data collected on each country within three 
different categories (ruling justly, investing in people and encouraging economic freedom) 
from many different independent sources. If a country performs above the average for their 
income group in each of the three spheres it is eligible for funds. This splitting of countries 
into groups is common in PBAs, as it was in financial programming rules. For the latter, the 
justification was related to ideas regarding the stages of growth, whereas the current 
reasoning is that performance should be understood relatively.  
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CRITIQUE OF PBAS 
It is perhaps too far to argue that PBAs are the inevitable result of the positive and 
normative literatures. However, it is without doubt that PBAs have been heavily influenced 
by the literature both on aid effectiveness and aid allocation. Indeed, DFID (2005, p.4) states 
that PBAs are based on three pieces of evidence: 
x Aid positively affects poverty through growth 
x The size of the impact depends upon the policy environment 
x Aid exhibits diminishing returns  
The source of these three points is of course the much maligned work of Burnside and Dollar 
(1998, 2000). Merely extending the original dataset by one time period (and including data 
that was previously missing) results in ambiguity regarding the impact of aid (Easterly et al., 
2004). Many recent papers demonstrate the fragility of the above conclusions (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Roodman, 2007). Moreover, Roodman (2008) concludes that the 
average effect of aid is likely to be so small as to be statistically undetectable. This new 
found humility regarding cross-country regressions is matched by broader studies of policy 
and growth. The error ŽĨ ĂŶ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ ƵƉŽŶ  ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ŝŶ ĂŝĚ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ
underlying assumption that we already understand which factors cause growth and/or 
poverty reduction, when many economists are pessimistic regarding this (Rodrik, 2006). 
PBAs solidify and formalise the contemporary understanding of growth factors, internalising 
this weakness. A further problem of using PBAs is that they make use of subjective indices of 
policy such as the CPIA, which is argued to be Granger-caused by growth (Dalgaard et al., 
2004).  
Another weakness in PBAs is not related to their existence, but rather their implementation. 
They have inherited the weakness of explanatory research and focus upon how much money 
to give, ignoring how it should be given. Thus PBAs do not allow for different policy 
environments to be met with different types of aid, merely different amounts. Furthermore 
PBAs, like programming rules before them, are intended to guide the amount of aid given, 
and be adjusted pragmatically. Many factors couldn ?ƚďĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĞĂƐŝůǇŝŶĂW ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂ
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ŝŶ Ă ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŝŶ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ Žƌ ŶĞǁ
leadership.  
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3.4 POSITIVE LITERATURE: WHO DOES GET AID? 
This section provides an overview of the positive literature. McGillivray and White (1993) 
comprehensively survey the early literature, Neumayer (2003b) surveys the newer research 
and the next chapter offers a more focused and technical discussion of key papers. This 
section is designed to give an overview so it can be understood within the context of the 
various approaches used. The common approach in explanatory work is to model various 
factors which are thought to influence allocation decisions and then test the model using 
regression analysis. As the techniques have developed, this approach has gained in 
popularity, sophistication and use. McKinley and Little (1979) posited a dichotomy between 
donor interest and recipient need, and Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) argued that a 
hybrid model was the most accurate reflection of reality. Now, it is generally accepted that a 
trichotomy is more appropriate: need, policy and proximity. Need refers to any factor that 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞƐƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂůƚƌƵŝƐƚŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?/ŶĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵŽŶĞƚĂƌǇŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĂƌĞƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚďƵƚ
infant mortality data have also been used. Policy refers to any factor that influences the 
ability to turn aid into growth or poverty reduction (similar to Collier and Dollar, 2002). 
Proximity ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ  ‘ĚŽŶŽƌ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ?
cultural, historical or commercial ties between donor and recipient.  
Having decided on which variables to represent these three factors there remain three main 
complications, each with a number of possible solutions. First, the data is left hand 
censored, as donors first decide who to give aid to, and then how much (i.e. some potential 
recipients receive no aid, meaning a cluster of aid commitment data at 0). The possible 
econometric techniques include Tobit, Heckman, and two-step (i.e. the Cragg model). 
However, Alesina and Weder (2002) argue that the number of zeros is relatively small, thus 
despite the truncated nature of the data OLS will be considerably biased. This is likely to vary 
considerably by donor, and the common resolution is to choose one method, and use at 
least one other as a robustness check. For a more technical discussion of the various 
estimators, see chapter four.  
The second complication is due to the well known population bias in aid allocations. That is 
to say that if, ceteris paribus, a country doubled in population its aid receipts would increase 
but not double. Allowing for this in estimation has tended to include population, logged 
and/or its square, on the right hand side. Furthermore, some researchers choose to omit or 
truncate large populations like China and India so as to circumvent the problem. Berthelemy 
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(2006, p.182) argues that, if per capita is used, the population bias is adequately dealt with 
by simply including population as a regressor. However, this debate has been taking place 
for some time (McGillivray and Oczkowski, 1992; Neumayer, 2003b) and the most suitable 
approach is still under discussion. The third complication is due to the fact that different 
recipients are in essence competitors for the fixed budget of a given donor. This has often 
ďĞĞŶĂůůŽǁĞĚĨŽƌďǇƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŽƚĂůĚŽŶŽƌďƵĚŐĞƚĂƐƚŚĞĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ
variable, as opposed to nominal or per capita commitments.  
Table 3.1 summarises some of the key papers in the recent literature. The focus is on 
relatively recent research that looks at more than one bilateral donor, with a selection that 
represents the major authors and approaches. The papers chosen show the variety in 
deciding how to solve the three complications aforementioned. Within these six studies 
there are five different dependent variables, five different estimators and a plethora of 
different independent variables employed. Given the disparate approaches taken, there is a 
surprising degree of agreement over donor behaviour. Most donors are found sensitive to 
recipient need and their own interest. Japan, the United States and France are often found 
to be more selfish in terms of the importance of proximity and less selfless in terms of the 
importance of need. Scandinavian donors and the Netherlands are sometimes joined by the 
United Kingdom when identifying selfless donors. There does not seem to be the same 
consensus over policy variables, perhaps due to the lack of agreement over which policy 
variables to use, and issues of multicollinearity. Papers that allow for a quadratic relationship 
for aid with population and/or need generally find the decision justified.   
  
 
 Table 3.1 Selection of Existing Literature 
Authors Estimation and 
Dependent Variable  
Need and 
Population 
Policy Proximity Conclusions 
Berthélemy 
and Tichit 
(2004) 
Tobit,  
Random Effects, 
1980-1999, 
Aid Commitments 
per Capita 
GDP pc 
(GDP pc)²  
Pop  
(Pop)² 
Growth[t-1] 
FDI/GDP 
Primary Enrolment 
Infant Mortality Ǯ
	ǯ1 
Others Aid Commitments 
Trade/GDP 
Colony Dummy 
USA-Egypt 
Increasing policy sensitivity and importance of 
trade. Aid related to lower per capita income, 
higher FDI flows, better school enrolment, higher 
infant mortality, higher trade with donors and 
former colonies, with diminishing returns to 
population 
Berthélemy 
(2006) 
Two-part or 
Heckman model, 
1980-1999, 
Ln (Aid pc) 
Ln(GDP pc) 
[-1] 
Ln(Pop) 
Debt Burden 
Others Aid Commitments Ǯ
ǯ 
External conflict 
Internal conflict 
Colony Dummy 
USA-Egypt 
USA-Latin America 
Japan-Asia 
Exports 
Countries deemed Altruistic, Average or Egoistic, 
on the basis of the size of the coefficient for 
exports. 
Alesina and 
Weder 
(2002) 
Tobit Averaged,  
1970-1995,  
Ln(Aid pc) 
Ln(GDP pc)  
Ln(Pop) 
Openness 
Political Rights 
Democracy Corruption 
Colony (Years) 
UN Friend Ȃ Japan or USA 
Israel Dummy 
Most donors do not have any significant 
relationship with corruption. Scandinavian 
donors are an exception, giving less aid to 
corrupt countries. 
Alesina and 
Dollar (2000) 
OLS or Tobit, 
1970-1994, 
5 year averages, 
Logged Aid 
disbursement 
GDP pc 
GDP pc²  
Pop  
(Pop)² 
Openness 
Democracy 
Civil Liberties 
FDI 
Rule of Law 
Colony (years) 
UN friend Ȃ USA/Japan 
Egypt / Israel 
Muslim /Roman Catholic 
Donor behaviour is biased for the USA, France 
and Japan by Israel/Egypt, Colonies and UN 
Voting respectively. Japan and France are more 
selfish than other donors, and the USA are 
especially concerned with democracy. 
Dollar and 
Levin (2006) 
Pooled Tobit,  
1984-2003, 
Ln(Aid) 
Ln(GDP pc)  
Ln(pop) 
Democracy 
Rule of Law 
Colony 
Exports 
Ln(Distance) 
Multilaterals becoming more policy sensitive. 
Colonial history is important for many, as is 
trade for France, Japan and Portugal.  
Neumayer 
(2003a) 
Two Part Model 
(Probit and OLS), 
1985-1997,  
Aid as share of Aid 
budget 
GDP pc 
Pop 
Political/Civil Rights 
Personal Integrity Rights 
Colony  
Exports 
US military grants 
Distance 
Poverty and Proximity important for most 
donors. Rights important for most donors at first 
stage, and for a few in the second.  
                                                             
1  ‘'ůŽď&ƌĞĞ ?ŝƐĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚĐŝǀŝůůŝďĞƌƚǇĚĂƚĂ ?ďŽƚŚĨƌŽŵ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵ,ŽƵƐĞ ? 
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Alongside the approach of papers in Table 3.1 are papers that seek to answer specific 
questions, often without a full econometric specification of the different factors involved. 
Easterly (2007) looks for changes over time and finds the increased poverty sensitivity to 
hĂǀĞŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚĂĨƚĞƌ ‘ƚŚĞDĐEĂŵĂƌĂƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ǁŝƚŚůŝƚƚůĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŶ ?
,Ğ ĂůƐŽ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “dŚĞ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ ůŝƚƚůĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ĂƌĞ
learning to be increasingly selective with respect to policies in the recŝƉŝĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? “ ?ŝďŝĚ ?, 
p. 654) Canavire et al. (2006) report correlations and basic regressions from a similar 
exercise in support of the conclusion that aid is poverty but not policy-sensitive. Specifically 
poor are Japanese and French aid, with the US not faring particularly well. The poverty focus 
is found particularly strong for Scandinavian countries, Germany, Holland and the UK. These 
donor differences are often found, but one group seems to have particularly distinct 
behaviour. Gates and Hoeffler (2004) explicitly test and confirm the popular notion that 
Nordic donors (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland) are more influenced by democracy 
and less influenced by economic ties, compared with other donors.  
A common preoccupation is to question whether a specific variable has any influence in 
allocation decisions. The end of the cold war has been thought to have changed the 
allocation of aid in a large way, with economic partners becoming more important than 
geopolitical concerns (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004). However, Easterly (2007) finds that the 
cold war changed little, in terms of sensitivity to democracy. Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) 
concur that the cold war changed relatively little, but find it may explain the decline in aid 
volumes. Other factors found to be to some extent irrelevant are debt and human rights. 
Despite the importance placed upon debt in the literature Birdsall et al.  (2003) find that the 
debt burden has no bearing on aid allocation decisions. Neumayer (2003a) tests the 
significance of human rights, donor by donor. He finds only limited evidence for its 
significance, and no systematic response to poor human rights.  
The geopolitical significance of a given country for another country is difficult to measure 
accurately. However, one source of quantifiable data on bilateral cooperation are the UN 
voting records of different countries. It is understandable that bilateral aid may be 
correlated with UN voting records, indeed Dreher et al. (2008) find evidence that US aid 
 ‘ďƵǇƐ ?hEŐĞŶĞral assembly votes. They find no evidence of similar relationships with other 
donors. However, remarkable results are found in the relationship between similar UN 
voting records and multilateral donors: Andersen et al. (2006) study IDA allocations (the 
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World Bank arm focused on the poorest countries) and find that countries that vote in 
similar ways to the US receive more aid from the IDA. They also find aid allocation is affected 
positively by human rights and population (the latter with diminishing returns), negatively 
with political freedom and no significant income effects. Interestingly, Neumayer (2005) 
finds evidence that food aid is free from these types of geopolitical concerns.  
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE LITERATURE: A WIDER CRITIQUE 
Given the disparate nature of the descriptive literature, a full review is provided in Appendix 
B, which covers in detail both several recent indices and the donor errors which they 
identify. The reason for the diversity of research within this field stems from a simple fact: 
the research reviewed in the previous sections all took the volume of aid as the unit of 
analysis and the descriptive literature diverges from this. By focusing on donor performance 
as measured by narrow allocation concerns, the literature has perhaps been culpable of 
allowing donors to continue in poor practices of a different kind. Many voices have criticised 
the allocation of aid more broadly since its inception, a recent eloquent example is from the 
Commission for Africa (2005): 
ǲe system for allocating aid to African countries remains haphazard, 
uncoordinated and unfocused. Some donors continue to commit errors that, at best, 
reduce the effectiveness of aid. At worst, they undermine the long-term development 
prospects of those thaǤǳ 
The purpose of this section is to highlight different ways of measuring the performance of 
aid donors, which necessitates an understanding of what is good and bad practice among 
donors. I catalogue some of the commonly cited errors in Appendix B, and the most popular 
measures of them here. The positive and normative literature focuses attention upon how 
much aid is allocated, and the forces that decide that amount. However, this approach 
argues a set amount of money can be given well or badly: how aid is given matters, not just 
how much. Studies that focus more on this kind of question have been called descriptive, in 
that they do not seek to explain the totality of donor behaviour; rather they describe one 
aspect of their behaviour.  
EARLIEST DESCRIPTIVE WORKS 
Descriptive works can at times resemble explanatory ones in methodology: both could 
employ a regression of aid allocated on poverty for example. It is in their aims that they 
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differ, as explanatory work models the entire behaviour of a donor, descriptive studies can 
be more focused on only one aspect. As such they are more pragmatic, and do not claim to 
know the data generating process. Mosley (1985) attempted to shift towards a more 
rounded judgement of aid, including how aid was given rather than solely to whom. The 
resulting aid quality index measured aid donors on four criteria: poor-country focus, 
proportŝŽŶ ƚŽ  ‘ůŽǁ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ĨƌŝĞŶĚůǇ ? ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ? ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚǇŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŐƌĂŶƚ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ? dŚĞ
index was then an average of those four measures as percentages. More widespread was 
the focus on equity as a guiding principle: aid should be directed by need, with income per 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚǁŝĚĞůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ?DĐ'ŝůůŝǀƌĂǇ ?ƐŝŶĚĞǆŝƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ
example of this, which rates donors on their response to per capita income (McGillivray, 
1989). Clark (1992) uses the more statistically informed Suit index to measure the global 
distribution of aid (it is similar to the Gini index). 
A good survey of this period is provided by McGillivray and White (1993). It places allocation 
within the context of four readily quantifiable aspects (similar to Mosley): volume, 
concessionality, tying and allocation. They propose separating the allocation dimension from 
the other aspects in order to avoid introducing arbitrariness. Rao (1994) amends the work by 
McGillivray and White (1993) by correcting population-related problems with the index, and 
allowing recipient per capita income to be affected by the aid given to that country. This 
second point is effectively acknowledging that if the poorest country receives all aid, it may 
no longer be the poorest country. It works on the basis that per capita income is increased 
on a one to one basis by aid per capita, rather than more optimistic readings of aid 
effectiveness. Rao (1997) operationalises the index that was previously proposed. 
In a similar vein, White and Woestman (1994) use four criteria to assess aid, but widen this 
by trying to include policy ties as well as procurement ties. Eschewing the more standard 
aggregate index, they promote the graphical alternative used by Åshuvud (1986). This avoids 
the obvious difficulties of deciding which weights to use, and is readily interpreted. This may 
not be the case if there are more than the four axes used in this example. It is interesting to 
note that some aspects are aggregates in themselves though. Tying includes policy, purpose 
and procurement conditions. The problem with this is that even if research agrees that the 
individual points can be aggregated, the evidence base may change. Thus it may be thought 
one year that it is right to punish donors for attaching purpose conditions, whereas the 
following year it may be shown beneficial. Therefore it becomes important that an index 
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reflects the consensus regarding good donor behaviour. As such, errors must be robustly 
established before they can be included in a rating of donors.  
LATEST DESCRIPTIVE WORKS 
The CDI (Commitment to Development Index) is noteworthy because of its large impact on 
policy: it is used explicitly by Dutch and Finnish governments, has influenced Australian, 
Canadian and Norwegian policy, has angered Japanese officials, and is supported financially 
by ten bilateral donors  (Roodman, 2006). It is a broad index that seeks to rate the effect of 
donor countries on developing countries in many different areas, and the Index of Donor 
Performance (IDP) is the most relevant part here. It is essentially a measure of aid/GDP from 
donor but aid is discounted for poor practices, for example tied aid is discounted by 20%. 
The driving force behind the IDP is the amount of aid given, as quality does not vary as much 
as quantity. The biggest changes are that Japan is penalised for its high inflows from debt 
interest, and the proliferation of Australia and Italy are penalised. It is interesting to note 
that each multilateral institution is given a ranking, and scores for donor-countries are 
adjusted to take account of their contributions to these agencies. The index incorporates a 
high degree of whimsy and decisions are often taken without a theoretical justification. For 
example, there is no real conceptual framework to explain why all administration costs are 
discounted, as it could be argued higher administration costs signify a greater level of 
efficiency and efficiency in disbursal (McGillivray, 2003b). It is certainly clear that aid 
completely without administration costs seems unrealistic and undesirable. 
A number of other indices exist that either create or collate data with a view to making 
judgements on donor practices, these are discussed in more detail in Appendix B. Easterly 
and Pfutze (2008) rank donors on a number of different criteria, giving a composite rank that 
ŝƐ ĂŶ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞĚ ƌĂŶŬ ? dŚĞǇ ƉĞŶĂůŝƐĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ ?
modalities as well as fragmentation, low transparency and so forth. The OECD in its 
Development Co-KƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ  “Ădozen measures of a common-sense kind 
for measuring the contribution that development co-operation is making to development 
ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?  ?K ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? dŚĞ K ĂůƐŽ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂ ĚĂƚ ďĂƐĞ ŽĨ  ‘WĂƌŝƐ ĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ
/ŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ ? ? Ă ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƐ ƚŚĂt seek to measure progress on the 
harmonisation agenda. The data generated by the Strategic Partnership with Africa is novel 
in that its ratings are decided by bilateral aid recipients themselves. They include ratings on 
issues such as timely disbursement and the number of conditions. These insights are 
3- Literature Review        Paul Clist 
53 
 
undervalued and not well publicised, but give great insight into the important technical 
details that help decide the effectiveness of aid.   
CRITIQUE OF INDICES 
Aggregated indices enjoy one of the benefits of PBAs: they are easy to understand and 
interpret, and seem to be based upon sound research principles. Their attractive simplicity 
means that they are more transparent for both recipients and the wider community. 
However, they are only valid insofar as they are believed. Indices must choose what to 
incorporate, and making use of one questionable element may invalidate the entire index in 
the eyes of a donor. Thus there is a tension between accessibility and credibility. Any 
attempt to measure what is in essence a subjective or abstract concept is of course innately 
flawed. One major problem is how to code the index, given the ordinal nature of many of 
the concepts being measured. While one may be able to rate policy as better or worse than 
another, the relative level of policy is a subjective decision. When a number of different 
variables are then involved, this problem is only magnified. Furthermore, the relative 
importance of the different dimensions involved is not clear. Weighting is often left at 1:1 
but this is due to insufficient theoretical and empirical research. Given that the objective is 
to rate donor behaviour, this inaccuracy can undermine the entire exercise.  
Indices by nature have to make simple judgments about what to punish and reward in their 
statistics, a problem compounded by aggregation. However, many donor actions cannot 
ƐŝŵƉůǇďĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?Žƌ  ‘ďĂĚ ? ?&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĂƐƚĞƌůǇĂŶĚWĨƵƚǌĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ĨŽŽĚ
aid and technical assistance as indicators of the use of inefficient aid channels (along with 
ƚŝĞĚ ĂŝĚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐ Ăůů ĨŽŽĚ ĂŝĚ ĂŶĚ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŝƐ  ‘ďĂĚ ? ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƚŚŝƐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĐŽƐƚƐĂƌĞĂůƐŽĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŽďĞ ‘ďĂĚ ?ďƵƚ
non-existent administrative costs are virtually impossible and are likely to be undesirable. 
dŚĞ ĚĂƚĂ ĐĂŶŶŽƚ ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ďĂĚ ? ĨŽŽĚ ĂŝĚ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ Ă ƐŝŵƉůĞ
measure of the amount of food aid provided makes the final index more difficult to defend.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The discussion has included four approaches to aid allocation research. It is important to 
realise that these approaches are not inevitably rivals or substitutes, but instead ask 
complementary questions. This relationship is given by their comparative advantages. The 
normative literature proposes an ideal allocation principle which can be used to challenge 
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current allocation practice. It can show the distance of current allocation from some 
idealised principle. The corollary of a simple principle can be especially useful when 
identifying which recipients gain or lose heavily in the malaise of fragmented donors. These 
countries are popularly referred to as aid orphans and aid darlings, and the normative 
approach can be used to identify these countries (see, for example, McGillivray, 2006). The 
literature on PBAs is more pragmatic and policy-focused. Donors use them to guide 
allocations, and aim to base these suggestions on recent research. A major advantage is that 
recipients can predict more accurately which factors are important to a donor. This 
transparency can help incentivise the variables most important to a donor, as well as 
increasing the predictability of aid flows. Both of these strands focus on future aid allocation, 
projecting and suggesting principles to guide future allocations.  
The positive and descriptive literatures are both concerned with describing past allocations. 
They both show that actual allocations are more complicated than pure prescriptions based 
on a handful of guiding principles. The positive literature has the advantage of modelling 
these different factors concurrently, enabling different factors to be controlled for. This 
means different effects that could not be discovered using the descriptive approach can be 
disentangled and measured. The descriptive liteƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?Ɛ ĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ŝƐ ŝƚƐ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? tŚŝůĞ
constrained by data availability, it does not need to posit an entire model to obtain an 
indication on a given topic. In the aid allocation context, it is unique in that it can broaden its 
unit of analysis to include more than just the amount of aid given.  
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4. 25 YEARS OF  
AID ALLOCATION PRACTICE:  
COMPARING DONORS AND ERAS 
Both aid and its allocation have been much maligned in recent years. Criticism of the former 
has extended from econometric studies that fail to find a positive effect of aid on growth 
(see Roodman, 2007 for a review), to more popular works that argue reductions in aid would 
promote development (Calderisi, 2006; Glennie, 2008; Moyo, 2009). An obvious 
consequence of these critiques is to examine aid allocation itself. If aid is not found to 
promote development, is this an inherent feature of aid or the consequence of poor 
allocation practice by donors? Early research on Aid Allocation commonly proposed a 
dichotomy between donor interest and recipient need, and generally found the former 
dominated the later (e.g. McKinley and Little, 1979), showing a possible source of distortion. 
However, there are three major reasons for thinking that aid allocation may have changed 
since that research was published. First, the end of the Cold War may have freed donors 
from security concerns to pursue a more development-centred allocation approach. Meernik 
et al. (1998, p.79) reported early evidence of an increased importance of poverty in 
allocation decisions in place of security concerns. In that same year it was reported policy-
makers were still debating the proper role of aid in the post Cold War era (Schraeder et al., 
1998). Second, influential research (Burnside and Dollar, 1998, 2000) argued that aid worked 
in a good policy environment. The associated recommendation was that aid should change 
to reflect this conclusion, with a move from conditionality to policy selectivity (Collier and 
Dollar, 2002). Third, the terrorist attacks of September the 11th 2001 in the USA saw large 
increases in American aid budgets and potentially large changes in allocation principles 
(Moss et al., 2005).  
In light of this, this research seeks to answer four questions. First, what are the donor 
differences? This is a static comparison of donor behaviour, to understand which factors 
guide which donors. In contrast with much of the literature, a formal approach is used to 
quantify differences between donors. This allows comparisons between donors, and 
between different factors that are thought to influence allocation practice. Second, what are 
the changes over time? As aforementioned, there is considerable reason to suspect general 
changes in allocation practice. Again, we employ a formal technique to identify any 
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significant changes. The third and fourth questions are whether selectivity has increased 
with respect to poverty and policy respectively. We employ different specifications in order 
to understand if the expected change has indeed occurred.  
This chapter is both novel in technique and contribution to current debates. It applies an 
existing systematic approach to identifying differences in allocation behaviour between 
donors and over time within the more recent theoretical framework. This allows 
comparisons to be of a more formal nature. The econometric section includes an evaluation 
of the different techniques used and a strategy to test between them, which is surprisingly 
atypical. The chapter also corrects for the problems of serial correlation and aid volatility 
which are expected to be commonplace but seldom discussed. The salient contributions to 
our understanding of aid allocation are three fold. First, we are able to re-examine the effect 
of the end of the Cold War on allocation. Results suggest that early evidence for increased 
policy and poverty sensitivity are not easily replicated. Second, we find the evidence of a 
move from conditionality to selectivity doubtful. Third, the terrorist attacks of September 
11th 2001 are shown to have had limited effect on aid allocation practice.  
The chapter continues in section 2 with a review of the literature. The econometric 
approach, including the extensive discussion of the various estimators, is in section 3. 
Results, discussion and conclusion are in sections 4,5 and 6 respectively.  
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The preceding chapter included a review of aid allocation literature, encompassing various 
approaches and aims. This chapter employs the positive approach, and a small review of 
literature directly relevant to the four questions proposed is included here. 
DONOR DIFFERENCES 
There has been surprisingly little attempt to formally test differences between donors, the 
common approach instead being a narrative description including some parameter 
differences. Berthélemy and Tichit (2004, pp.269-270) report the sign and significance level 
of the coefficients in their model for 18 bilateral donors. They find mixed evidence in 
support of the importance of recipient need, and find infant mortality to be a better 
predictor than income for many donors. Policy is significant for most donors, but the USA 
and Australia exhibit a special preference for democracy whereas France and Belgium both 
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have a negative coefficient estimate. They do not report major differences in their Donor 
Interest variables, but state smaller donors focus regionally. Berthélemy (2006) divided 
donors into three categories on the basis of the estimated coefficient for the trade-aid 
relationship. Selfish donors (Australia, France, Italy, Japan and the UK) have a positive 
relationship between aid and trade whereas Altruistic donors (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland) have a negative relationship. Trade here is measured 
as the logged and lagged sum of imports and exports between the donor and recipient as a 
ƐŚĂƌĞŽĨŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ'W ?ůĞƐŝŶĂĂŶĚŽůůĂƌ(2000) report that for 3 donors their allocation is 
distorted by a single factor: for the USA it is Israel and Egypt, for France it is colonies and for 
Japan it is UN voting records. They find France and Japan to be insensitive to Poverty 
whereas the USA and the Nordic countries give more to poor, democratic and open 
countries.  
The most robust finding when comparing donors is that Nordic donors are distinct. Alesina 
and Weder (2002) focus on the link between corruption and aid allocation over the period 
1975-1995, both in aggregate and by individual donors. Using the Tobit estimator for 
individual donors, they find Nordic donors tend to give less to corrupt recipients, whereas 
for other donors there is no robust relationship. They postulated that Nordic donors are 
freed from colonial ties and can thus be more sensitive to other considerations. Gates and 
Hoeffler (2004) explicitly test and confirm the idea that Nordic donors (Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland) are different, finding them to be more influenced by democracy and 
less influenced by trade, compared with other donors.  
DIFFERENCES OVER TIME 
When examining the differences in donor behaviour over time, the influence of the Cold 
War (CW, hereafter,) and 9/11 are particularly salient. Meernik et al. (1998, p.79) reported 
early evidence that the end of the cold war meant a declining importance of security 
concerns, a large drop in aid transfers in aggregate and an increased importance of poverty 
in allocation decisions. Boschini and Olofsgård (2007) concur that the CW may explain the 
decline in aid volumes, but argue that it changed relatively little in allocation practice. 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) argue that the geopolitical concerns of aid allocation during 
the CW have been replaced not by increased poverty concerns (which they actually find 
decrease)  but by trade relationships. Easterly (2007) finds that the CW changed little in 
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terms of sensitivity to democracy, and Neumayer (2003a) finds it had no effect on the 
relationship with human rights. 
Moss et al. (2005) study the effect of Global War on Terror (GWOT) on US aid allocation 
using various variables thought to capture a priori expectations. They find that essentially 
the effect of the GWOT was to substantially increase the aid for four countries (Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Jordan and the Palestinian territories) which was financed mainly by an 
augmented aid budget but also by reductions for three countries (Israel, Egypt and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina). Fleck and Kilby (2010) find that the GWOT coincides with increased aid 
volumes for the USA, and that poverty sensitivity has decreased in this period. Others have 
tried to capture the effect of the GWOT simply by employing a dummy for the period. This is 
only a satisfactory modelling solution if the effect of the GWOT was a universal one time-
shift in aid allocation transfers for all recipients. While the research implies the role of the 
GWOT is smaller than might have been expected for the US, this does not seem a suitable 
solution.  
POVERTY AND POLICY SELECTIVITY 
dŚĞ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ  ‘ĂŝĚ ǁŽƌŬƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ŐŽŽĚ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ƋƵŝĐŬůǇ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶ ĂŝĚ
allocation principles (Collier and Dollar, 2002) and, it is thought, into policy implementations 
(Easterly, 2003). It would be expected that this would lead to a greater weight for policy in 
allocation decisions, but also a greater focus on poverty as aid is seen as a possible solution. 
This move from conditionality to selectivity was being discussed surprisingly early in policy 
circles (Hout, 2007a), but it is unclear whether this move was rhetorical or actual.  Hout 
(2007b) examines the allocations of the Netherlands, USA and World Bank and provides 
evidence that policy selectivity has not increased within the last few years. Looking at 
selectivity over a longer time horizon, Easterly (2007) finds increased poverty sensitivity to 
ŚĂǀĞŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚĂĨƚĞƌ ‘ƚŚĞDĐEĂŵĂƌĂƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ1970s, with little change since then. 
ZĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ  “dŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ ůŝƚƚůĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ
donors are learning to be increasingly selective with respect to policies in the recipient 
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? “  ?ŝďŝĚ ? Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? EƵŶŶĞŶkamp and Thiele (2006) report correlations and basic 
regressions from a similar exercise in support of the conclusion that aid is poverty but not 
policy-sensitive. Specifically policy-insensitive are Japanese and French aid, with the US not 
faring particularly well. The poverty focus is found particularly strong for Scandinavian 
countries, Germany, Holland and the UK.  
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In contrast to the aforementioned research, are two papers that claim policy selectivity has 
increased, specifically since the 1980s. Examining 22 bilateral donors over the period 1980-
 ? ? ? ? ?ĞƌƚŚĞůĞŵǇĂŶĚdŝĐŚŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ?ĨŝŶĚĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ P “ QĚŽŶŽƌƐ
ŐŝǀĞŵŽƌĞƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶĨŽƌŐŽŽĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐƚŚĂŶŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ?dŚĞǇƵƐĞ
aid per capita as the dependent variable, arguing that this helps to examine the small-
country bias, and a panel Tobit as the estimator, to capture fluctuations in the donor budget. 
The conclusion that aid allocation is more selective (in terms of economic policies) is based 
on the coefficient on lagged economic growth becoming positive and significant in the 
1990s, whereas it was negative in the 1980s. FDI is also included in the specification: in the 
1980s its coefficient was significant and positive, and in the 1990s it became insignificant 
and very small. Thus it is highly possible that the results are misleading, due to co-linearity 
(as FDI and growth are correlated). Leaving this aside, the use of lagged economic growth is 
ŚŝŐŚůǇƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂƐĂǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƚŽĐĂƉƚƵƌĞ ‘ŐŽŽĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐǇĞĂƌ ?
dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂŝĚ ‘ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ?ŐƌŽǁƚŚƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂƐĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐĂƐŝƚ
signifying a concern for economic policy. For example, it may be desirable for a donor to be 
associated with a country that is growing relatively quickly. Alternatively, a selfish donor may 
use aid to promote its own exports, by allocating more aid to countries with an expanding 
market. Then again, it may be that donors imagine that a country with a recent growth 
record is able to absorb more investment in the form of aid, or conversely that countries 
that have experienced a negative shock (such as a natural disaster which led to an economic 
downturn) require higher aid commitments. In short, the evidence does not seem to fully 
justify the conclusion.  
Dollar and Levin (2006) examine a large number of donors, both bilateral and multilateral. 
They estimate using a Tobit, with logged Aid disbursements as the dependent variable. They 
use two variables as proxies for policy: the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) rule of 
ůĂǁ ŝŶĚĞǆ ĂŶĚ &ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ,ŽƵƐĞ ?Ɛ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ŝŶĚĞǆ ? ĂŶĚ'W ƉĞƌ ĐĂƉŝƚĂ ĚĂƚĂ ƚŽ ŝŶĨŽƌŵ
conclusions on poverty sensitivity. They conclude, on the basis of their statistical analysis, 
ƚŚĂƚ P  “/Ŷ ƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ƚǁŽĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ ? ĨŽƌĞign aid overall has become more selective [in terms of 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?  ?ibid. p.2044) They find this increased selectivity is driven by 
multilateral agencies, whereas for bilateral donors economic governance has no statistically 
significant relationship with aid allocation. They conclude that foreign aid overall is more 
ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ  ? ? ?Ɛ ƚŚĂŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ?Ɛ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŵŽƌĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ĂƌĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ
selective. However, this picture is highly misleading as in 2006 Multilateral Agencies 
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represented only around 14% of all ODA commitments1. Aid donors may have become more 
selective on average, but has aid? This paper examines the strength of policy selectivity over 
the last twenty-five years, for the most important donors. By modelling only the most 
important donors, we hope to ascertain more closely the overall policy selectivity of aid. We 
thus hope to discover which set of papers reports the most robust result: Hout (2007a, b) 
Easterly (2007) and Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) who report static and low policy 
selectivity, or Dollar and Levin (2006) and Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) who report 
increasing policy selectivity.  
4.3 ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
The early dichotomy of recipient need and donor interest gave way to the hybrid model, 
where both factors (Recipient Need and Donor Interest) had some influence over aid 
allocation, given by ܣ௜ ൌ ܨሾܴ ௜ܰ  ?ܦܫ௜ሿ. I estimate the modern counterpart of that by donor, 
which is the following: ܣ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܲ݋ݒ݁ݎݐݕ௜ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚଷܲ݋݈݅ܿݕ௜ ൅ ߚସܲݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜ ൅ ߝ௜  
This is similar to Neumayer (2003), and hereafter referred to as a 4P specification. As in the 
RN-DI approach, Poverty describes the level of need in a potential recipient country. As 
poverty is thought to be a major motivation for aid, the a priori expectation is for this to be 
positive (ߚଵ ൐  ?). Population is another standard variable that is expected to be positive 
(ߚଶ ൐  ?) and discussed in more detail later. As discussed, Policy is a relatively recent addition 
to the theory of aid allocation and can be understood in a number of ways. Here it contains 
two main strands. The first is the ability of a recipient to turn a given amount of aid into a 
desirable outcome in the mind of the donor. This conceptualisation is similar to the 
normative proposal of Collier and Dollar (2002). The second aspect includes desirable 
characteristics of a recipient that are not need-related, in the mind of a donor. For example, 
it may be argued that the USA values democracy inherently and for ideological reasons 
rather than any effect on poverty reduction. Both parts of policy would be expected to have 
a positive relationship with aid allocated (ߚଷ ൐  ?). 
Donor Interest was conceived as essentially incompatible with recipient need, a formulation 
still used (e.g. Berthélemy, 2006, who uses the hybrid approach). In the original framework, 
                                                             
1
 Author ?s calculations, based on OECD data, where all commitments are included. The more common statistic 
that puts multilateral aid at around 30% is only arrived at only when excluding organisations such as the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. 
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Recipient Need and Donor Interest are mutually exclusive and a donor must choose between 
increasing their own welfare and that of a recipient. Proximity by contrast includes DI but 
can take many forms including religion, language, culture, history, geography and 
commerce. This wider understanding means factors that are less obviously in the direct 
interest of a donor can also be included. For example, it may be altruistic for a donor to give 
to recipients if they share a common language if doing so would decrease transaction costs 
and increase the value of aid. Indeed, given the critique of aid on the basis of fragmentation, 
it is perhaps the most sensible way for donors to choose which recipients to focus upon. 
Neither Poverty nor Policy change by donor but rather by recipient. If donors weight these 
factors in similar ways, there is no guidance of how to choose which recipients to focus 
upon.  Instead, Proximity may suggest which recipients a donor should focus on, with 
possible efficiency gains due to lower linguistic or cultural barriers. Whether the motivation 
for allocations being influenced are good or ill, the expectation is that the relationship will be 
positive (ߚସ ൐  ?).  
There has been surprisingly little work done which formalises the relative importance of 
ĞĂĐŚ ĨĂĐƚŽƌ ŽŶ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? KĨƚĞŶ ƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚŽ ĂƐĐƌŝďĞ ůĞǀĞůƐ ŽĨ
effect to specific variables, rather than the factor which may be represented by a number of 
variables. One exception to this is the work by McGillivray (2003c, pp.8-9) on comparing DI 
and RN models, which is easily extended from RN-DI to the 4P setting (Hoeffler and Outram, 
2008). He argues that the fairest test between competing models is simply a joint test of 
significance on the group of variables representing that factor after a regression of the full 
model. This test is a test of the following as the null hypothesis, for all of the coefficients that 
represent the factor (e.g. for Proximity that might include variables for trade, colonial history 
and shared language): ܪ଴  ?ߛଵ ൌ ߛଶ ൌ ڮ ൌ ߛ௫ ൌ  ? 
The rationale of the test is to apportion explanatory power to the various competing 
hypotheses. Each may be significant, but at different levels. It is also informative when a 
number of variables represent a single factor, as the test provides information on the factor 
level, not just the variable level. Having decided the general approach, there remain two 
main decisions: estimator and specification.  
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WHICH ESTIMATOR? 
Data on aid flows are left-hand censored, i.e. many data points on aid transfers are zero.  As 
such, OLS estimation would be biased, as the data is not normally distributed but instead 
clustered at the zero bound (see Figure 4.1).  There are various estimators that can be used; I 
will discuss these in turn, along with their assumptions and some relevant tests. For a more 
technical presentation of the estimators, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, chp.16) or 
McGillivray (2003c, with application to aid allocation).  
 Figure 4.1 OLS and Latent predictions of Aid Allocations 
 
OLS 
The simplest estimator, used recently in the aid allocation context by Alesina and Dollar 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ŝƐ ƐŝŵƉůǇ K>^ ? dŚĞǇ ƵƐĞ ƚŚŝƐ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŽƌ ŽŶůǇ ǁŚĞŶ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚŝŶŐ  ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǌĞƌŽƐŝƐƐŵĂůůĞŶŽƵŐŚĨŽƌƚŚĞďŝĂƐƚŽďĞ of little 
consequence (Alesina and Dollar, 2000, p.42). While this may be possible when the 
percentage of data censored is small, this is unlikely to be the case when estimating by 
donor. Figure 4.1 shows the predicted line when estimating using OLS, if all data are 
included. The shaded dots show observed aid, whereas the hollow points show aid if it were 
allowed to be negative. The use of OLS then biases the predictions of beta toward zero, as 
the observed dependent variable understates the effect of the independent variables. 
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CENSORED MODELS 
There are a number of different estimators that have been conceived with censoring in 
mind. Terminology is inconsistent in the literature, as the main authors use different names 
for the same estimator. Semantic broadening has further complicated matters, as Tobit is 
now often used to denote any parametric model that deals with censored data. Here we 
present three models that by that definition are Tobit models, each of which has been used 
to examine aid allocation behaviour in some form. Tests are presented alongside the 
estimator, and then the testing strategy is implemented. To briefly summarise, one major 
difference between the three types of Tobit is their assumption of the relationship between 
the two stages of the allocation process (eligibility and level).  Tobit type 1 assumes each 
independent variable has the same effect in both the first and second stages. This allows the 
two stages to be estimated together, as if one were a continuation of the other. The Two-
Part Model assumes that the two stages are completely independent, allowing the two 
stages to be estimated completely separately. The Heckman model normally assumes that 
there is at least one variable that strongly influences at the selection stage, but not at the 
level stage, allowing identification and correction of the bias.  
TOBIT TYPE 1 
The basic (Type 1) Tobit model has a dependent variable that is left-hand censored, with 
homoskedastic, normally distributed and additive errors.  
 ݕכ ൌ ߙ ൅ ݔᇱߚ ൅ ߝ   (1) 
Where 
 ݕ ൌ ቊݕכ݂݅ݕכ ൐  ?Ȃ ݂݅ݕכ ൑  ?    (2) 
And 
 ߝ ? ሾܰ ? ? ߪଶሿ   (3) 
 
Where ݕכ ŝƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌƵĞ ?ŽƌůĂƚĞŶƚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?ĂƐŝŶFigure 4.1). Censored data is denoted by -, in 
this case at the zero bound, meaning ݕכ is only observed when positive. The error terms are 
assumed to be normally distributed. The Tobit (type 1) then in effect estimates the chance of 
censoring at the same time as estimating the value of y, if not censored. This is commonly 
estimated using maximum likelihood theory, and has been used extensively in the aid 
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allocation context in both pooled and panel data contexts (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina 
and Weder, 2002; Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Dollar and Levin, 2006). The Tobit, despite its 
popularity, does suffer from two rather strict assumptions that should at least be tested. The 
first is that the error terms, as shown in (3), are normally distributed. Specifically 
problematic is the assumption that the errors are homoskedastic. In the presence of 
heteroskedasticity estimates become inconsistent and the model performs poorly in Monte-
Carlo tests (Arabmazar and Schmidt, 1982; Khan and Powell, 2001). Skeels and Vella (1999) 
derived a test, suggested in Pagan and Vella (1989), which tests this assumption. The 
alternative conditional moment test is shown, by Drukker (2002), to have essentially no size 
distortion and reasonable power and is thus the one used in the diagnostic section.  
The second assumption is that the effects of independent variables are constant for the 
selection process and the outcome of interest (Smith and Brame, 2003). This means, in this 
context, that not only do the same variables affect both which countries receive aid, and 
how much, but that the relative size of their effect is the same. A lesser concern in the aid 
allocation context is the assumption of normality, as the model can easily be extended to 
include a more appropriate lognormal formulation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.531). 
THE TWO-PART MODEL  
This presentation of the Two-Part model follows Amemiya (1985, p.387), but it is 
alternatively described as a Cragg, Type 2 Tobit or (double) hurdle model. It is given by  
 ݕଵכ ൌ ߙଵ ൅ ࢞૚ᇱߚ૚ ൅ ߝଵݕଶכ ൌ ߙଶ ൅ ࢞૛ᇱߚ૛ ൅ ߝଶ (4) 
Where  
 ݕଵ ൌ ൜ ?݂݅ݕכ ൐  ? ?݂݅ݕכ ൑  ? ݕଶ ൌ ൜ݕଶכ݂݅ݕכ ൐  ?Ȃ ݂݅ݕכ ൑  ? 
  
(5) 
 
In contrast to the Tobit (type 1) model, this formulation shows the two stages to be 
independent, with ݕଵכ describing the censoring decision, and ݕ ?כ  the level decision. The Two-
Part Model adds the assumption that ܥ݋ݒሾߝଵ  ? ߝଶሿ ൌ  ?, which means the two equations 
found in (4) can be estimated completely separately. The second stage includes only positive 
values (i.e. the censored data denoted by  W is excluded), and thus results should only be 
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used to make inferences for those countries receiving aid (as only aid recipients are included 
in the equation). Neumayer (2003a) and Berthélemy (2006) follow Dudley and 
Montmarquette (1976) in using this estimator. As the two equations are assumed to be 
independent no exclusion restriction applies, thus circumventing the problem of identifying 
a regressor that influences only the first equation (which applies in the Heckman case). The 
validity of the estimator relies on the assumption of independence of the error terms, and 
can be tested directly. However, Neumayer (2003a, p.38) cites evidence that the bias leading 
from breaking this assumption is small (Manning et al., 1987). 
HECKMAN 
Berthélemy (2006) uses the Heckman estimator (or sample selection model) in the context 
of aid allocation1. Essentially, the Heckman approach differs by treating the selection bias as 
a problem of omitted variable bias. It estimates in two stages, the first a selection equation 
and the second a level equation. Puhani (2000) provides a survey of the Monte Carlo 
evidence regarding the decision between Heckman and Two-Part models. He concludes that 
Heckman is particularly inefficient where there is either a large proportion of censoring or 
correlation between the errors of the two-stages. Also, he points to problems when the 
regressors of the two stages are correlated, which would result in the inverse Mills ratio 
being collinear with the other regressors. The model is also criticised for making strong 
distributional assumptions (Little and Rubin, 1987, p.225). More problematic still is the need 
for an exclusion restriction, meaning there must be some variables that are only included in 
ƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƐƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?tŚĂƚŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚŝƐ “ĂǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ?Ɛ ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞŶŽŶƚƌŝǀŝĂů
variation in the selection variablĞ ďƵƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ?
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, p.543). While the Heckman can be calculated without this 
restriction, it would be done so using only the nonlinearity of the functional form (Puhani, 
2000, p.57). In practice, it is often difficult to find a variable that influences the selection 
without influencing the level. In the aid allocation context, it is likely that any variable that 
influences whether a country receives aid will also influence how much aid they receive.  
DIAGNOSTICS 
The easiest estimation technique to exclude in this case is the Heckman model. As discussed, 
Monte Carlo evidence suggests general problems with the technique. However, the main 
                                                             
1
 However it is not clear which, if any, variable is used as an exclusion restriction as the eligibility stage is not 
reported. 
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reason for rejecting the model is instead the lack of an obvious exclusion restriction and 
resulting problems if one cannot be found. Tests of the aforementioned assumptions must 
then decide between the Tobit type 1 and Two-Part Models. The diagnostics to be calculated 
are then evidence of independence between the two stages, as well as normality and 
homoskedasticity tests. Testing the Two-Part model is relatively easy, as the same normality 
and homoskedasticity tests on the second stage can be used as for any standard OLS 
regression. The Tobit normality and homoskedasticity tests are due to Drukker (2002) and 
Cameron and Trivedi  (2009, p.534-538) respectively. To illustrate the testing strategy, I use 
data previously used in aid allocation (Neumayer, 2003a). I have chosen to use this data for 
testing as opposed to my own, for one major reason: calculating the Rho statistic was not 
computationally possible with my data. This is most likely because of the problems with the 
Heckman estimator discussed elsewhere. In order to maintain consistency, the same data 
was then used for each test, informing us as to the best estimator for this situation. 
Qualitatively, the results are similar with my data for those tests which I could perform (i.e. 
normality and homoskedasticity tests for both Tobit and Two-Part models). 
 Table 4.1 Diagnostics To Choose Between Estimators 
Estimator Two-Part Model Tobit Between 
Test for Normality Homoskedasticity Normality Homoskedasticity Rho=0 
Test Stat 60.54            1.07 15.86 1155.34 0.31 
Prob. 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.58 
Note: The first test for normality has a chi-square distribution, with two degrees of freedom. The second test is the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test, with the null hypothesis is that error variances are equal. It has a chi-square 
distribution, with one degree of freedom. The third test is the conditional moment test from Drukker (2002) and 
the fourth test is from Cameron and Trivedi  (2009, p.534-538), and both have a large sample chi squared 
distribution. The fifth test is a likelihood ratio test of the independence of the two stages, and has a chi-square 
distribution, with one degree of freedom. 
In the Tobit case, the results lead to strong rejections of homoskedasticity and normality. For 
the two-part model, normality is rejected and homoskedasticity accepted. However, in the 
two-part model neither is a necessary condition for consistency (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, 
p.541). The last column reports a test of the independence of the two stages, which involves 
testing the covariance between errors in two stages. It was calculated by running a Heckman 
model without an exclusion restriction and testing whether rho is equal to zero (which 
would indicate independence), and independence (a key assumption of the Two-Part Model) 
cannot be rejected. These results point toward the Two-Part model as being the most 
appropriate.  
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PERIOD AVERAGING 
A further decision regarding the econometric approach is whether to use annual or period 
averaged data. Neumayer uses annual data in his estimates and calculates clustered 
standard errors in the first step, and Huber/White/Sandwich estimator of variance in the 
second steƉ ? ,Ğ ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ĞƌƌŽƌƐ  “ĂƌĞ ƌŽďƵƐƚ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇ
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation ? (Neumayer, 2003a, p.50; 2003b) It does not 
appear that these decisions regarding standard errors are in fact adequate to deal with serial 
correlation, as the Huber/White/Sandwich estimator is designed to deal with 
heteroskedasticity not serial correlation. The clustering of residuals is a complex topic, but 
does not by itself guard against bias from serial correlation. Tests for (first order) serial 
ĐŽƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƵƐŝŶŐEĞƵŵĂǇĞƌ ?Ɛ(2003b) data and specification reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation for every bilateral donor1 (see Drukker, 2003b for information regarding 
this test). This is unlikely to be a problem confined to one paper, as much of the research is 
likely to suffer from this problem. The main strategy employed here to circumvent the 
problem of serial correlation is to use 5-year period averages. 5-year averages can be 
ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŽĨ ĂƐ  ‘ƐŶĂƉ ƐŚŽƚƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ period. As annual data is not 
included, there is less opportunity for persistent independent variables to bias the estimated 
betas. This approach also diminishes the potential problem of high volatility in aid transfers, 
and divides the time period neatly ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ ‘ĞƌĂƐ ?ƵƐĞĚ ? 
THE MAIN SPECIFICATION 
It is worth noting throughout the discussion the trade off between data availability and 
specification accuracy. For example, when examining policy, many variables are not available 
for the first years of the data. It might also be desirable to use information on poverty rather 
than income, but sufficient data simply do not exist. Throughout the discussion there are 
similar trade-offs. A parsimonious specification is first chosen, with more information being 
used in robustness checks or to answer specific questions. The panel covers 1982-2006 in 
five 5-year time periods. A full description of the data can be found in Appendix C. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The choice of dependent variable is more contentious than might be expected. In the 
framework used here, a government allocates a proportion of its budget in time t to aid. The 
                                                             
1
 Tests performed on the level specifications found in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 (Neumayer, 2003b pp.63-64). 
4- Aid Allocation         Paul Clist 
68 
 
income of the country, the proportion of that which becomes the government budget and 
the resultant allocation to the aid agency is all thought exogenous. From this budget a donor 
first decides between multilateral agencies and bilateral recipients. It then allocates 
between different recipient countries, and is influenced by four factors: poverty, population, 
policy and proximity. The paper models only the last step, thus treating all previous steps as 
exogenous. The dependent variable is then the logged ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƐŚĂƌĞŽĨĂĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ƚŽƚĂů
aid budget commitments in a given year to a given recipient, that is  ቀଵ଴଴כ௔௜ௗ೔ೕ௔௜ௗ೔ ቁ where the 
subscript ݅ refers to the donor, and ݆ to the recipient. In this state it is normally distributed, 
which is desirable for the estimator used. Commitments are used as they more accurately 
portray the wishes of the donor. Other papers have used aid per capita, aid as a share of 
GDP and value of aid as the dependent variable. The first does not reflect the decision that 
the donors make as closely, as donors commit aid in nominal terms for a specific period of 
time. The second approach means that the dependent variable is a function of aid 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ Ă ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ? dŚŝƐ ŵĂǇ ŽǀĞƌƐƚĂƚĞ Ă ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ďŝĂƐ ? ĂƐ ƉŽŽƌĞƌ
ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐǁŝůůďǇĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ‘ŚŝŐŚĞƌ ?ĂŝĚĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚǀĂƌŝĂďůĞŝƐ
likely to be influenced by fluĐƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?dŝŵĞĚƵŵŵŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĨŽƌ
this to some extent, but not completely.  
POVERTY  
Monetary measures of poverty are the most common due to the lack of reliable alternatives. 
Poverty headcount data simply do not exist on the scale needed, and for this reason logged 
GDP per capita is used in the parsimonious specification. This is likely to be the data that the 
donor had access to when making the decision. 
POPULATION 
Logged Population is used to capture what is in essence another indicator of need  W the 
population. By making population a factor in its own right, and separating it from poverty, a 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐ ŚŝŶĂ ĂŶĚ /ŶĚŝĂ ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ
coefficients. While the population size in India and China presents a problem for the applied 
researcher seeking to disentangle the effect of poverty and population upon aid receipts, 
this solution is more desirable than succumbing to the temptation to exclude them as special 
cases, which means ignoring the majority of the developing world. Furthermore, as we are 
modelling the impact of these factors in the mind of the donor, we can be reassured that 
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ƚŚŝƐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĨŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ďĂƐĞĚ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ
formulas that are available to the public (where income and population are typically 
included separately, the latter discounted at the rate ݔ଴ ?଺, see previous chapter for 
discussion).  
POLICY 
For the more parsimonious specification, many of the more sophisticated measures cannot 
be used due to data availability.  We follow Neumayer (2003b) in using the Freedom Index 
and Political Terror Scale (PTS). The Freedom Index is a combined total of political rights and 
civil liberties indicators, transformed to a scale from 2 (worst) to 14 (best), and taken from 
Freedom House. The PTS runs from 1 (worst) to 5 (best) and describes the level of terror or 
absence of the rule of law. The information is ultimately taken from two sources: Amnesty 
International and the US State department. While the data may or may not capture 
accurately the policy outcomes or inputs of a recipient, they are likely to capture the level of 
policy as perceived by donors. Indeed, they have been used by some donors explicitly (e.g. 
the Millennium Challenge Account). The data also suffer considerably less from missing data 
than alternate measures over the period examined. 
To give a better understanding of the policy data, a few brief examples are presented. There 
are no signs of multicollinearity between the two variables, but they are positively 
correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.51. Both are negatively skewed, with mean 
scores of 3.4 and 8.6 for PTS and Freedom respectively. In 2006 for the PTS, the nine 
countries to score four or worse were Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Columbia, 
Congo (DRC), Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Sudan and Sri Lanka. In 2006, the nine worst scores for 
Freedom were held by Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.  There is little overlap, so the distinction is clear in many 
cases. On a regional level, African countries in 2006 scored higher on the Freedom variable 
(by 1.5) than the rest of the sample, but had no real difference in PTS. Some countries show 
low levels of democracy but an absence of political terror: Qatar, Swaziland and United Arab 
Emirates. Others show relatively high scores for democracy but low levels for PTS: Brazil, 
India and the Philippines. However, the overall pattern is of a positive relationship between 
the two variables, as can be seen in Figure 4.2. 
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 Figure 4.2 PTS and Freedom Index, 2006 with ISO Labels 
 
Note: ISO labels are used as markers. Those of interest include: SDN Sudan, COL Columbia, IRQ Iraq, BRA Brazil, 
CUB Cuba, BRN Brunei, BHR Bahrain and COM Comoros. 
PROXIMITY 
Proximity can be understood in many ways. Religion, Language and Colony variables 
describe the cultural and historical links between two nations. The religion variable 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĂĚŚĞƌĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ůĂƌŐĞƐƚ ĨĂŝƚŚ ŝŶ
the donor country. For example, for Japan it measures the percentage of recipient 
population that are Buddhist, and for USA Christian. Language is a dummy which takes the 
value 1 if at least nine percent of the donor and recipient populations speak the same 
language. This threshold is inherited from the data used (CEPII), but represents the most 
accurate and complete dataset available on bilateral common languages. Colony is a similar 
dummy, but with colonial history. To capture trade interests, Exports is a variable which is 
the logged share of donor country exports that a recipient represents. This should capture 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƚŽĂĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉort sector. To measure military importance 
Arms is a measure of the total amount of arms exports from the donor to the recipient in 
that year. This should capture any particularly strategic military relationships, USA-Egypt for 
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example. Another measure to capture military proximity, only available for the USA, is the 
value of American bilateral military aid transfers (these are not included in ODA). 
A Proximity Index is constructed for use in answering questions 2-4, where proximity is 
included as a control rather than a variable of direct interest. While tests show 
multicollinearity is not a concern, in later questions the size of the dataset is more restricted 
and the index allows clearer interpretation by aggregating the cultural, religious, historical 
and military links. The proximity index was constructed by regressing Arms (as a dummy), US 
Military Grants, Religion, Language and Colony and controls in a similar regression to that 
reported in Table 4.3. The relevant coefficients were then used as weights in the proximity 
ŝŶĚĞǆ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐƐĐĂůĞĚƐŽƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ĐůŽƐĞƐƚ ?ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐĐŽƌĞŽĨ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĨƵƌƚŚĞƐƚ ?
country received a score of 0. In this form, the coefficient in the level stage can be 
interpreted as the difference between the most and least proximate recipient countries. For 
the second stage, standardised coefficients are used and so interpretation is also clear. 
Regressions show a negligible loss of information. This index means proximity in questions 2-
4 is represented by only two variables: Trade and the Proximity Index, and thus facilitates 
easier interpretation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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WHICH DONORS? 
 Figure 4.3 2006 ODA Commitments by Donor,  
as a % of Total Commitments 
 
Note: Authors Calculations, based on OECD data, where all commitments are included. 
The literature tends to analyse either average donor behaviour (with deviations from this) or 
a collection of individual donors. We employ the latter method, focusing throughout on 
seven donors. The donors found in Figure 4.3 ĂƌĞƵƐĞĚ ?ĞǆĐĞƉƚƚŚĂƚŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĂŶĚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?
are excluded, and Sweden is chosen to represent the Nordic Donors. This decision is 
motivated partly by a belief in the heterogeneity of donors which implies some difficulties in 
ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŵ ĨŽƌ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?  ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ĐĂŶ ďĞ Ă
misleading term, as it is an unweighted average. Thus what is happening to donors on 
average could be quite different to what is happening to aid on average. This later concept 
will be dominated by the 7 donors chosen, who accounted for over 60% of aid commitments 
in 2006. 
4.4  RESULTS 
QUESTION 1: WHAT ARE THE DONOR DIFFERENCES?  
In order to answer the above question, we estimate the parsimonious specification over the 
entire time period. Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 report the results for step 1 and 2 respectively, 
and Table 4.4 the Wald statistics for the four factors.  
 
France
10%
Germany
8%
Japan
11%
Netherlands
8%
United 
Kingdom
8%
United States
17%
Nordic 
Donors
7%
Total Multilateral
14%
Others
17%
4- Aid Allocation         Paul Clist 
73 
 
 Table 4.2 1982-2006, Parsimonious Specification, Eligibility Stage 
Variables France Germany  Japan Holland 
 
Sweden   USA  UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.44*** -0.36*** -0.42*** -0.46*** -0.30*** -0.64*** -0.47*** 
 
(5.17) (4.39) (6.09) (5.90) (4.02) (7.95) (5.85) 
Ln(Population) -0.14* -0.096 -0.20*** 0.14* 0.29*** -0.12* 0.0046 
 
(2.06) (1.43) (3.64) (2.44) (5.06) (2.01) (0.080) 
Freedom Index 0.039 0.038 0.10*** 0.068** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.077** 
 
(1.45) (1.49) (4.46) (2.84) (4.89) (4.07) (3.10) 
Political Terror Scale -0.28** -0.25* -0.34*** -0.32*** -0.10 -0.36*** -0.27** 
 
(2.63) (2.30) (3.33) (3.45) (1.22) (3.43) (2.77) 
Religion 0.0064** 0.0077*** -0.00058 0.0069*** 0.0030 0.0054* 0.0056** 
 
(2.99) (3.39) (0.12) (3.65) (1.77) (2.42) (2.74) 
Arms 0.0056* 0.0092* 
 
-0.0064 -0.033 0.00028 0.0037 
 
(2.04) (2.36) 
 
(1.57) (1.50) (0.52) (1.76) 
Exports 0.085 -0.99* 0.68** -2.28*** -1.23* 0.25 -0.75 
 
(0.16) (2.01) (2.67) (3.53) (2.52) (0.88) (1.30) 
Colony -0.40 -0.43 
    
0.20 
 
(1.67) (0.98) 
    
(0.94) 
Language 0.54* 
  
0.24 
 
0.38* 0.39 
 
(2.04) 
  
(1.75) 
 
(2.24) (1.71) 
US Military Grants 
     
-0.013 
 
      
(1.66) 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.153 0.182 0.118 0.293 0.159 0.255 0.201 
Observations 532 532 527 570 530 523 531 
Non-Recipients 96 90 91 201 296 123 138 
Correctly predicted  
aid recipients 
83.60% 85.71% 83.23% 79.71% 66.06% 83.07% 80.74% 
Correctly predicted non-
recipients 
50.00% 54.29% 50.00% 73.29% 71.52% 70.27% 67.57% 
 Note: This was estimated using a Probit model, without clustered errors. Coefficients are not standardised. 3, 2  
and 1 Star(s) denote the 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively.  
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 Table 4.3 1982-2006, Parsimonious Specification, Level Stage  
(Standardised  Coefficients) 
Variables France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.055 -0.15** -0.11* -0.29*** -0.33*** -0.041 -0.27*** 
 
(1.19) (2.81) (2.58) (4.33) (3.95) (0.90) (5.24) 
Ln(Population) 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.28*** 0.24* 0.29*** 0.44*** 
 
(6.48) (6.87) (7.72) (3.73) (2.30) (5.58) (7.25) 
Freedom Index -0.026 0.057 0.093* 0.13* -0.034 0.033 0.042 
 
(0.63) (1.20) (2.25) (2.12) (0.40) (0.75) (0.90) 
Political Terror Scale 0.11* 0.0018 0.037 0.058 0.10 -0.084 0.059 
 
(2.36) (0.035) (0.76) (0.94) (1.17) (1.75) (1.20) 
Religion 0.031 -0.047 0.13*** -0.0053 0.078 0.063 0.038 
 
(0.82) (1.07) (3.47) (0.10) (1.09) (1.47) (0.87) 
Arms -0.050 0.092* 0.058 0.29*** 0.023 -0.10* 0.067 
 
(1.32) (2.12) (1.62) (6.28) (0.37) (2.59) (1.53) 
Exports 0.29*** 0.20*** 0.34*** -0.024 0.016 -0.10* 0.087 
 
(5.48) (3.37) (7.41) (0.34) (0.17) (2.28) (1.40) 
Colony 0.43*** -0.028 
   
0.064 0.45*** 
 
(9.37) (0.70) 
   
(1.89) (9.06) 
Language 0.19*** 
  
-0.11* 
 
0.11** -0.0011 
 
(4.48) 
  
(2.30) 
 
(2.78) (0.021) 
US Military Grants 
     
0.67*** 
 
      
(17.0) 
 Observations 436 442 436 369 234 400 393 
Adjusted R-squared 0.554 0.390 0.472 0.257 0.123 0.563 0.509 
 Note: The second part is estimated using OLS, excluding those recipients that receive no aid. Standardised 
Coefficients are reported to assist interpretation  W where beta reports the standard deviation change in Y 
resulting from a one standard deviation change in X. Non-standardised coefficients can be found in the Appendix, 
Table C9. Following standard practice, this does not apply to the dummy variables (colony, language, religion) 
which are instead the standard deviation change in Y resulting from a one unit change in X. 3, 2  and 1 Star(s) 
denote 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels respectively. 
 Table 4.4 Wald Tests 
 
 
France Germany Japan Netherlands   Sweden USA UK 
1
st
 S
te
p
 Poverty 6.950*** 4.091** 11.55*** 17.46*** 9.454*** 15.95*** 11.30*** 
Population 1.268 0.579 5.810** 2.678 16.41*** 1.645 0.00251 
Policy 4.357 3.037 13.05*** 8.406** 15.08*** 11.90*** 7.582** 
Proximity 6.11 6.669 3.506 27.06*** 9.973** 11.84** 9.564* 
2
n
d
 S
te
p
 Poverty 0.116 4.812** 2.374 18.52*** 7.734*** 0.827 14.16*** 
Population 23.17*** 26.14*** 34.60*** 2.011 2.279 24.05*** 31.78*** 
Policy 1.202 0.142 3.698 1.647 3.198 2.461 2.441 
Proximity 87.03*** 8.492* 33.70*** 19.14*** 2.53 323.6*** 63.82*** 
 Note: The Wald Test statistics is shown, with stars denoting the 1, 5 and 10 % significance levels. The Wald 
statistic has a large-sample Chi-squared distribution.  
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,ĞƌĞ ?ǁĞĐĂŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĂŝĚĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶĐĞĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĂĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ
average allocation behaviour over a 25 year period. The Wald statistics allow us to attribute 
explanatory power to the competing factors of the 4P framework. Using these statistics, we 
find that all donors use income as a determinant of aid eligibility (less so for Germany and 
France), but the same is not true at the levels stage. Amongst the donors reported, we can 
identify three groups of poverty sensitivity: high (Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), medium 
(Germany and Japan) and low (USA and France). Looking at population, this is only a 
significant determinant at the eligibility stage for two donors. For Japan this appears to be in 
excluding larger countries (most probably a China effect), and for Sweden excluding smaller 
countries. Sweden selects fewer recipients than other donors, and so this is unsurprising. All 
donors have positive coefficients for population at the levels stage, and exhibit evidence of a 
small-country bias.  
Four of the seven donors have significant Wald statistics at the eligibility stage for Policy, and 
none of the seven at the levels stage. Inspection of the coefficients shows that every donor 
has a positive relationship with the Freedom coefficient and a negative one for Political 
Terror Scores. Interestingly, for all donors the average PTS score for recipients of aid is 
higher than for non-recipients. This means that on average donors are more likely to give aid 
to countries with better human rights, but this result reverses when controlling for other 
factors. Tests show multicollinearity is not problematic. It may be that donors are less 
interested in human rights than other factors, and it is simply correlated with poverty or 
proximity. In the second stage France, Japan and the Netherlands exhibit some signs of 
Policy sensitivity, but not when tested overall. This implies policy sensitivity has not been a 
ŵĂũŽƌĨĞĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂŶǇĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐǁŚĞŶĂǀĞƌĂŐĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞůĂƐƚ ? ?ǇĞĂƌƐ ?dŚŝƐ
is particularly apparent when comparing the size of the Wald statistics with other factors.  
Wald statistics show that the proximity variables are significant for every donor at some 
stage, but show large differences between donors in the level of significance and the 
constituent parts that underlie this significance. Germany and Sweden only have significant 
Wald statistics at one step, and a relatively low score in the other. For Sweden this manifests 
itself in a (weakly significant) negative coefficient on trade in the levels stage and for 
Germany it is a positive coefficient on the trade variable at the 2nd Step. The Netherlands has 
a negative coefficient for trade but a positive coefficient for Religion at the first stage. At the 
levels stage it gives more to countries that purchase its arms and less to recipients with 
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which it shares a language. For the Netherlands, many countries share a language as its own 
population are often multilingual, i.e. the dummy includes French, German and English 
speaking countries. The UK and France have much higher Wald statistics for proximity than 
those donors already discussed. For France almost all proximity coefficients at both stages 
are positive. The standardised coefficients show the biggest effect is for former colonies at 
the levels stage, but language and exports are also positive. For the UK, the biggest effect at 
the levels stage is of former colonies. For both France and the UK being a former colony 
results in 40% of a standard deviation increase in aid: roughly 0.7% of the aid budget for 
both donors. 
The USA has an almost incomparably high Wald statistic for proximity. At the eligibility stage 
they are not too dissimilar from other donors. However, at the level stage they have positive 
and relatively large coefficients for US military grants and language. For the USA the colony 
dummy is identifying solely on the Philippines, and is thus effectively a dummy for the 
Philippines (which was a colony of the USA for almost half a century). The coding of the 
language variable (at least 9% of the recipient-donor pair speaking the same language) 
means this includes Hispanic America, and is thus positive at both stages. The military 
variable has the largest coefficient across the standardised coefficients, which suggests 
American aid is often used to reward or reinforce military relationships.  It is likely that this 
relationship trumps any relationship through arms sales, and thus this later coefficient is 
found negative. The USA is different from other donors in their relationship to trade.  Most 
donors show a positive and significant relationship, whereas for the USA it is negative and 
significant. It was on the basis of this coefficient that Berthélemy (2006) classified some 
donors as selfish and others as altruistic. However, the literature makes clear that there are 
several channels though which aid could be used to promote exports (Osei et al., 2004), and 
it is difficult to rule out aid being used to promote exports on the basis of a negative 
coefficient. For example, aid could be given to recipients that currently import a small 
amount of goods from the donor country, with the aim of increasing this over time (Lloyd et 
al., 2000). The results show that American and British aid do not have a positive relationship 
with trade flows, in contrast to other donors.  
QUESTION 2: WHAT ARE THE CHANGES OVER TIME? 
To answer the previous question, we looked at each donor in turn over the 25 years. To 
answer how allocation practice has evolved over time, we look specifically at three periods: 
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Cold War, post Cold War and post 9/11. The post 2001 time period has been studied for 
American aid, but not for others. It is possible that other donors were affected in the same 
way, but it also offers some evidence regarding policy selectivity. Separate results by donor, 
time period and stage are provided in Appendix C (Table C 2 - Table C 8). To give some initial 
measure of the extent to which allocation practice has changed over the period, Chow tests 
were conducted on the sample. These are calculated by augmenting the previous regression 
with all of the variables interacted with dummies for the CW period, and the period after the 
September the 11th terrorist attacks. The Chow test is essentially a test of whether there has 
been a significant change in the underlying relationships, as these new variables contain no 
new information. If there was a consistent relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables the coefficients on these new variables would be equal to zero. The 
statistics reported below are in essence tests of that assumption.  
 Table 4.5 Chow Tests for Changed Relationships 
 Period  Step France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
C
o
ld
 W
ar
 Eligibility 12.99* 19.60*** 9.909 13.98* 7.702 10.44 27.12*** 
(0.0724) (0.0065) (0.194) (0.0515) (0.36) (0.165) (0.0003) 
Level 0.956 2.501** 1.021 1.706 2.721*** 3.463*** 1.091 
(0.463) (0.0156) (0.416) (0.106) (0.00985) (0.00127) (0.368) 
P
o
st
 9
/1
1
 Eligibility 7.027 5.082 3.243 25.81*** 30.28*** 8.414 6.285 
(0.426) (0.65) (0.663) (0.0005) (0.00008) (0.298) (0.507) 
Level 0.712 0.872 0.628 0.66 0.823 2.667** 0.864 
(0.662) (0.515) (0.678) (0.682) (0.569) (0.0104) (0.535) 
 Note: Chow statistics have an F distribution and are reported with the P value below. Results refer to the 
parsimonious specification. The statistics are relative to the period 1992-2001.  
Table 4.5 shows joint significance tests by step, donor and period. Japan is the only donor 
that does not show significant differences in overall allocation policy over the twenty-five 
year period. The USA, Sweden and Netherlands are the only donors for whom the GWOT 
period is significantly different (and the USA is the sole donor for whom it is significant at the 
level stage). The Cold War period, by contrast, sees changes for every donor apart from 
Japan. We can further break these differences down into differences using the 4P 
framework, for those donors that demonstrate significant differences.  
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 Table 4.6 Wald Statistics for Donors with Significant Changes,  
Using the 4P Framework 
Period CW CW CW CW GWOT GWOT CW CW GWOT CW 
Step 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 
 France Germany Germany Neth. Neth. Sweden Sweden USA USA UK 
Poverty 2.42 2.17 0.22 0.12 0.96 0.002 6.64** 0.16 1.49 0.082 
 
(0.12) (0.14) (0.64) (0.73) (0.33) (0.97) (0.011) (0.69) (0.22) (0.78) 
Population 0.89 0.079 0.21 0.12 1.79 2.17 4.77** 0.15 2.79* 0.33 
 
(0.35) (0.78) (0.65) (0.73) (0.18) (0.14) (0.03) (0.70) (0.096) (0.57) 
Policy 5.84* 5.01* 0.66 2.96 0.79 1.52 0.61 0.88 3.18** 7.42** 
 
(0.054) (0.082) (0.52) (0.23) (0.67) (0.47) (0.55) (0.42) (0.043) (0.025) 
Proximity 0.091 0.38 0.35 1.39 1.91 3.05 3.28** 7.96*** 1.26 0.064 
 
(0.96) (0.83) (0.70) (0.50) (0.39) (0.22) (0.039) (0.0004) (0.29) (0.97) 
Note: The Wald Test statistics are shown with P values below, with stars denoting the 1, 5 and 10 % significance 
levels. The Wald statistic has a large-sample Chi-squared distribution. CW denotes the cold war period 1982-1991, 
GWOT 2002-2006 and Neth., The Netherlands. 
Using the breakdown in Table 4.6, and further inspection of individual coefficients, we can 
find the cause of the differences between periods (the effects can be assessed by examining 
Table C 2 - Table C 8, which report the regressions by period and donor). For France, the 
change is driven by an increasingly negative coefficient on PTS, perhaps as long-term 
recipients have received worse scores but aid has not decreased. The same can be said for 
Germany, although that is combined with an increasingly positive coefficient for Freedom. 
For Germany, the difference of the levels stage for the Cold War period does not have a 
single factor, but instead a multitude of small changes including decreasing poverty 
ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ŽƚŚ ƐƚĞƉƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ EĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ ĂŶĚ ^ǁĞĚĞŶ ?Ɛ  ?st Step can also be said to be a 
number of small changes. This is perhaps expected as they are smaller donors that focus 
more than other donors, and small adjustments in selecting aid recipients may still be 
identified. Sweden during the Cold War appears different in almost every factor in the levels 
stage. The coefficient on poverty actually decreased with the end of the cold war, whereas 
policy selectivity appears to have increased (but is still not significant). The coefficient during 
the Cold War (for Sweden at the levels stage) on exports was positive, but this has become 
negative in the latter periods. For the USA, a number of changes occurred, including a 
decreasing importance of Freedom over time, and a more negative coefficient for PTS. The 
Proximity index was most positive and significant in the period 1992-2001. This is driven by a 
significant and positive effect of trade in the first step and significant and negative effect in 
the second. In the Cold War and GWOT periods the coefficient is insignificant at both levels. 
The UK has had an increasingly negative coefficient for PTS. 
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Moss et al. (2005) found three variables were successful in controlling for the effect of the 
GWOT on US aid allocation. The first was a dummy for four countries that received large aid 
increases since 2001: Iraq, Afghanistan, Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. The second 
was a dummy for recipients that saw large drops (which, it is argued, partially financed the 
aforementioned increases) in aid: Israel, Egypt and Bosnia Herzegovina. The third (which was 
less successful) was an interaction term for the percentage of Muslim population and a 
dummy for years after 2001. Retesting these variables for the second stage of US allocation 
(Table 4.7) finds only the dummy for those countries that receive less aid is significant, but 
that this variable is highly significant and represents 30% of a standard deviation fall in aid 
receipts.  
 Table 4.7 Retesting the GWOT dummies, USA 
Step 1st 2nd 
Muslim*01 0.0061 -0.0012 
 
(1.86) (0.038) Ǯ
ǯ ? ?  - 0.013 
  
(0.42) Ǯǯ* 01 - -0.27*** 
  
(4.83) 
Note: Standardised Coefficients are reported to assist interpretation  W where beta reports the standard deviation 
change in Y resulting from a one standard deviation change in X. Other variables included, but not reported: these 
variables are augmenting the parsimonious specification. 
QUESTION 3: HAS POVERTY SELECTIVITY INCREASED? 
Augmenting the parsimonious regression equation with income interacted with a period 
dummy allows us to estimate poverty selectivity by period, while still controlling for the 
other factors (the normal income variable is, of course, excluded). Table 4.8 reports only the 
poverty coefficients but they were obtained in a regression using the parsimonious 
specification over the 25-year time period. 
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 Table 4.8 Income Coefficients: by Step, Period, Stage and Donor 
    France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
1
st
 s
ta
ge
 
1982- -0.26*** -0.17* -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.63*** -0.35*** 
1986 (3.40) (2.25) (5.15) (5.01) (4.71) (8.44) (4.54) 
1987- -0.29*** -0.19** -0.37*** -0.43*** -0.37*** -0.63*** -0.36*** 
1991 (3.92) (2.58) (5.08) (5.85) (4.94) (8.52) (4.76) 
1992- -0.32*** -0.23** -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.51*** -0.64*** -0.42*** 
1996 (4.29) (3.18) (5.64) (5.98) (6.54) (8.80) (5.55) 
1997- -0.32*** -0.24*** -0.42*** -0.45*** -0.30*** -0.62*** -0.43*** 
2001 (4.41) (3.45) (5.92) (6.21) (4.15) (8.65) (5.85) 
2002- -0.32*** -0.24*** -0.42*** -0.52*** -0.30*** -0.60*** -0.44*** 
2006 (4.49) (3.49) (5.98) (7.11) (4.13) (8.66) (6.00) 
2
n
d
 S
ta
ge
 
1982- -0.29* -0.36** -0.33** -0.76*** -1.00*** -0.27* -0.86*** 
1986 (2.39) (2.74) (2.61) (3.97) (4.53) (2.35) (6.02) 
1987- -0.30* -0.42** -0.32* -0.82*** -1.09*** -0.37** -0.90*** 
1991 (2.47) (3.12) (2.42) (4.35) (4.73) (2.94) (6.01) 
1992- -0.31* -0.48*** -0.33* -0.83*** -0.57*** -0.46*** -0.87*** 
1996 (2.51) (3.43) (2.53) (4.15) (3.67) (3.55) (5.85) 
1997- -0.30* -0.56*** -0.41** -0.91*** -1.44*** -0.41** -0.93*** 
2001 (2.39) (4.03) (3.11) (4.59) (5.11) (3.08) (6.33) 
2002- -0.33** -0.59*** -0.43** -0.92*** -1.54*** -0.39** -0.93*** 
2006 (2.66) (4.25) (3.28) (5.34) (5.40) (2.90) (6.41) 
 Note: 2
nd
 Stage standardised coefficients are reported, with T statistics in parentheses. Controls from the 
parsimonious specification are included but not reported. 
The first stage shows evidence of a small increase in the coefficient for some donors. As 
there is only a single variable representing poverty, the coefficients from stage 2 of the 
regression can be easily plotted, see Figure 4.4. This easily allows us to compare donors, and 
any changes over time relative to differences between donors. France, the USA, Japan and 
Germany all have coefficients of between -0.2 and -0.6 over the 25 year period. Of these, 
only the USA has become less poverty-sensitive in recent year, possibly an effect of the 
GWOT. While France has remained fairly static over the period, Japan and Germany have 
become more poverty focused. The Netherlands and the UK both started significantly more 
poverty-sensitive, and have increased this over the period. For both donors, a 1 standard 
deviation difference in income per capita implies a response in aid budget share of almost 
one standard deviation. Sweden is even more poverty focused at this second step, but less 
so at the first step. The big decrease in poverty sensitivity in the 1992-1996 period is 
reflected by a larger coefficient for poverty in the first stage. We can divide the donors into 
two: the poverty sensitive donors (Netherlands, UK and Sweden) and the less poverty 
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sensitive donors (France, Germany, Japan and USA). While there is some downward 
movement of the 25-year period, the largest differences are clearly between different 
donors, rather than between time periods.  
 Figure 4.4 Poverty Sensitivity Coefficients 1982-2006 Level Stage,  
by Donor 
Notes: Coefficients taken from the level stage of Table 4.8, and so a more negative coefficient signifies greater 
poverty sensitivity. 
QUESTION 4: HAS POLICY SELECTIVITY INCREASED? 
In order to examine the question of more recent changes to policy selectivity, we can 
augment the parsimonious specification. This means taking advantage of some of the more 
sophisticated variables available, at the cost of losing some years of data1. The motivation 
for suspecting that policy selectivity has increased is the work of Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
and the apparent move from conditionality toward selectivity. The variable chosen is the 
corruption variable taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. This is 
produced by the World Bank and uses a number of inputs to measure corruption on a scale 
between -2.5 (most corrupt) and 2.5 (least corrupt, although where standardised 
                                                             
1
 We lose two time periods: 1982-1986 and 1987-1991. The WGI data is available from the year 1996, and this 
one observation is used for the 1992-1996 period. 
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coefficients are reported this scale is somewhat immaterial). This variable has previously 
been used, but never as extensively (Hout, 2007b used all of the WGI variables with time 
variation, but only for three donors; Neumayer, 2003b used one observation over the whole 
time period). Corruption is chosen as it is the most easily measured and widely discussed 
aspect of policy selectivity, and does not introduce problems of multicollinearity (this is 
partly because corruption is distinct from policy per se). When corruption is included in the 
specification as the sole representative of policy (results not reported), it is virtually always 
insignificant for each donor and step. The only exception is for the 2nd step coefficient for the 
USA, where it is found to be negative (i.e. more corrupt countries receive more aid). It is 
possible however that any policy changes are most evident in recent years. For this reason, 
Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 show the coefficients for policy variables at the first and second 
stages, when corruption is interacted with a dummy for different periods. If there was Policy 
Selectivity on corruption, we would expect to find positive and significant coefficients. 
 Table 4.9 1992-2006 Main Specification Eligibility Stage,  
Augmented With Policy Variables Interacted With Time Dummies 
 
France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.41*** -0.36*** -0.39*** -0.48*** -0.35*** -0.54*** -0.52*** 
 
(4.00) (3.58) (3.83) (4.69) (3.67) (5.41) (4.87) 
Ln(Population) -0.093 0.066 -0.12 0.25*** 0.28*** -0.13 0.10 
 
(1.32) (0.91) (1.61) (3.76) (3.98) (1.95) (1.48) 
Freedom Index 0.093*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
 
(3.53) (4.45) (4.49) (3.62) (4.36) (5.91) (5.32) 
Political Terror 
Scale 
-0.51*** -0.53*** -0.40** -0.55*** -0.27* -0.53*** -0.57*** 
(3.70) (3.75) (2.72) (4.37) (2.44) (3.80) (4.26) 
Control of 
Corruption 
0.076 0.13 0.028 0.020 0.68*** 0.057 0.19 
(0.33) (0.57) (0.12) (0.096) (3.30) (0.25) (0.80) 
Corruption * 2001 0.74 1.55 -0.25 1.88 -4.47*** -0.92 0.46 
 
(0.58) (1.19) (0.19) (1.55) (3.81) (0.73) (0.36) 
Corruption * 2006 -0.59 -0.36 -1.89 2.76* -5.25*** -2.54 -0.31 
 
(0.45) (0.26) (1.33) (2.32) (4.37) (1.96) (0.23) 
Exports -0.37 -1.58** 0.49 -3.46*** -1.65** 0.92* -1.37 
 
(0.57) (3.01) (1.51) (4.00) (2.77) (2.10) (1.85) 
Proximity Index 0.049 -0.0093 2.46 -0.24 -0.20 -2.07 0.65** 
 
(0.17) (0.016) (0.19) (1.34) (0.64) (1.95) (2.77) 
Observations 379 379 317 398 378 376 379 
Pseudo R-squared 0.162 0.211 0.169 0.318 0.237 0.247 0.266 
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 Table 4.10 1992-2006 Main Specification Level Stage, 
Augmented With Policy Variables Interacted With Time Dummies 
 
France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.11* -0.18** -0.10 -0.27*** -0.34*** -0.075 -0.30*** 
 
(2.00) (2.94) (1.65) (3.45) (3.61) (1.60) (5.04) 
Ln(Population) 0.24*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.37** 0.26*** 0.53*** 
 
(3.78) (5.63) (5.92) (4.07) (3.23) (4.96) (7.11) 
Freedom Index 0.034 0.057 0.098 0.29*** 0.12 0.089 0.14* 
 
(0.67) (0.99) (1.61) (3.60) (1.23) (1.84) (2.33) 
Political Terror 
Scale 0.034 -0.041 -0.012 -0.077 -0.018 -0.052 0.059 
 
(0.58) (0.61) (0.16) (0.86) (0.17) (0.96) (0.93) 
Control of 
Corruption -0.014 0.027 -0.054 -0.14 -0.18 -0.089 -0.12 
 
(0.19) (0.33) (0.65) (1.41) (1.05) (1.41) (1.59) 
Corruption * 2001 0.012 0.075 0.071 0.14 0.20 -0.057 0.061 
 
(0.23) (1.22) (1.11) (1.86) (1.54) (1.18) (1.08) 
Corruption * 2006 -0.0052 0.025 0.027 0.24** 0.29* -0.070 0.040 
 
(0.10) (0.42) (0.44) (3.32) (2.19) (1.49) (0.74) 
Exports 0.34*** 0.29*** 0.34*** -0.14 -0.17 -0.14** 0.072 
 
(5.58) (4.44) (5.46) (1.52) (1.56) (3.00) (1.06) 
Proximity Index 0.54*** -0.051 0.051 0.073 0.12 0.73*** 0.44*** 
 
(12.2) (1.08) (1.03) (1.14) (1.58) (18.6) (9.33) 
Observations 297 294 253 228 174 283 257 
Adjusted R-squared 0.555 0.397 0.436 0.201 0.178 0.644 0.525 
Note: Standardised Coefficients are reported to assist interpretation  W where beta reports the standard deviation 
change in Y resulting from a one standard deviation change in X.  
 
Table 4.9 shows the results for the first step. Only Sweden has a positive coefficient for 
corruption but this is only for the period 1992-1996, and in later years it is significant and 
negative. The Netherlands show evidence of an increased coefficient on corruption, but for 
most donors there is little change. At the levels stage (Table 4.10) the Freedom and PTS 
coefficients are typically insignificant, the exceptions being positive coefficients for the UK 
and Netherlands. There is scant evidence of an increasing importance of corruption; the 
Netherlands and Sweden being exceptions to this. In the case of the Netherlands, this is 
particularly interesting as it is then sensitive to corruption at both steps. There is 
(insignificant) evidence of a negative relationship between US aid and high levels of 
corruption, and of this increasing over the period. It should be remembered that the 
augmented coefficient should be interpreted in conjunction with the standard coefficient, 
e.g. the coefficient corruption for the Netherlands in 2006 isെ ? ?  ?൅  ? ?  ?ൌ  ? ?  ?, so a one 
standard deviation increase in the control of corruption results in 10% of a standard 
deviation increase in aid budget share. Also, it is the change from previous practice that is 
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found significant (or, in most cases, insignificant) rather than the practice itself. Overall, the 
picture is not one of high policy selectivity at either stage for most donors, but rather 
insignificant coefficients for policy variables.  
The results are robust to exclusions of other policy variables, and the use of Corruption 
Perception Index data instead of the WGI data (not reported). We report one robustness 
test here; using the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) which is a dataset 
constructed by World Bank staff to measure economic and social policies. While criticised in 
some of the academic literature for being too closely related to growth (Dalgaard et al., 
2004), some multilateral donors use it as a measure of policy (e.g. IDA). As it is not publicly 
available for years before 2005, a cross section averaged over the 2001-2006 period is 
reported here. 
 Table 4.11 Augmented with CPIA: 2001-2006 Cross Section,  
Eligibility Stage 
 
France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.064 -0.15 -0.37 0.45 0.027 -0.30 0.049 
 
(0.15) (0.35) (0.68) (0.84) (0.052) (0.70) (0.10) 
Ln(Population) 0.20 0.70 0.39 1.35* 1.00* 0.45 0.81* 
 
(0.69) (1.80) (0.90) (2.32) (2.51) (1.64) (1.99) 
Freedom Index 0.15 0.27* 0.20 0.53* 0.098 0.16 0.54** 
 
(1.37) (2.07) (1.10) (2.47) (0.91) (1.42) (2.76) 
Political Terror Scale -0.70 -0.37 -0.35 -4.26** -1.22 0.040 -1.21 
 
(1.25) (0.67) (0.52) (2.86) (1.82) (0.076) (1.84) 
Control of Corruption 0.91 0.83 0.35 5.54** 1.75 0.44 0.96 
 
(1.01) (0.96) (0.26) (2.85) (1.83) (0.56) (0.91) 
CPIA -0.36 -0.35 -0.081 -1.12 0.017 -0.39 -1.15 
 
(0.40) (0.39) (0.068) (0.94) (0.017) (0.48) (1.14) 
Exports -1.13 -15.2* -5.15 -19.1 -11.5* -2.59 -9.57 
 
(0.12) (1.99) (1.28) (1.91) (2.34) (0.52) (1.85) 
Proximity Index -0.14 -1.19 -3.98 1.83* 1.54 10.3 1.03 
 
(0.18) (0.92) (0.10) (2.02) (1.20) (0.62) (1.11) 
Observations 65 65 47 62 65 65 65 
Pseudo R-squared 0.146 0.323 0.251 0.584 0.505 0.187 0.513 
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 Table 4.12 Augmented with CPIA: 2001-2006 Cross Section,  
Levels Stage 
 
France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.14 0.12 0.21* -0.21 -0.21 0.051 -0.061 
 
(1.03) (0.86) (2.06) (1.40) (1.27) (0.43) (0.54) 
Ln(Population) -0.35 0.42 0.72*** 0.90** 0.35 0.17 0.31 
 
(1.43) (1.59) (4.11) (3.45) (1.17) (0.86) (1.41) 
Freedom Index -0.018 0.16 0.27 0.13 -0.089 0.081 0.041 
 
(0.13) (1.00) (1.75) (0.65) (0.46) (0.61) (0.26) 
Political Terror Scale -0.15 -0.018 -0.019 0.44 0.10 -0.16 -0.13 
 
(0.81) (0.095) (0.12) (1.76) (0.46) (0.93) (0.81) 
Control of Corruption -0.33 -0.12 0.059 -0.071 -0.29 -0.33* -0.16 
 
(1.98) (0.66) (0.40) (0.32) (1.30) (2.24) (1.03) 
CPIA 0.31 -0.020 -0.33 0.069 0.53* 0.22 0.082 
 
(1.82) (0.11) (1.96) (0.29) (2.26) (1.47) (0.51) 
Exports 0.66*** 0.27 0.20 -0.60** -0.25 -0.15 0.27 
 
(4.31) (1.68) (1.62) (3.12) (1.09) (1.25) (1.90) 
Proximity Index 0.32* -0.090 0.076 -0.047 0.076 0.51*** 0.37*** 
 
(2.60) (0.77) (0.77) (0.32) (0.49) (4.58) (3.65) 
Observations 58 56 43 38 47 57 53 
Adjusted R-squared 0.425 0.325 0.616 0.352 0.133 0.526 0.581 
Note: Standardised Coefficients are reported to assist interpretation  W where beta reports the standard deviation 
change in Y resulting from a one standard deviation change in X. 
Table 4.11 shows the policy variables for the first stage of the regression. The CPIA variable is 
not significant for any donor. It does however mean that the Freedom Index coefficient 
become positive, this is most likely due to the sample size restrictions of including the CPIA. 
Table 4.12 reports the 2nd Step, where only Sweden has a significant relationship with the 
CPIA. Interestingly, the corruption coefficient for the USA becomes significant and negative 
upon the inclusion of the CPIA. This implies the US is less concerned with corruption than 
other dimensions of policy selectivity.  
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
A common variable in the literature not included here is that of geographical distance 
between the donor and recipient. It was not included in the preceding estimations for three 
main reasons. First, while the variable is commonly justified by a desire to capture a focus on 
countries that are relatively close, the variable is often found to be positive. This leads to 
problems of interpretation, as it is not immediately clear why donors would focus on distant 
recipients, controlling for other factors. Second, the estimation of a geographical distance 
variable is highly sensitive to which countries are included in the sample. For example, the 
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choice of whether to include eastern-European countries will severely influence the 
estimatioŶŽĨĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚŝƌĚ ?ŝƚŝƐŚŽƉĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽǆŝŵŝƚǇŝŶĚĞǆŝƐĂďůĞ
to capture the majority of the proximity effects. Bearing these caveats in mind, we present 
below the first and second steps for the 7 donors over the 25 year period. As qualitative 
differences in the majority of the other variables were neither expected nor found, we only 
report the three variables of interest.  
 Table 4.13 Step 1 and 2, Including Geographical Distance 
Step 1 France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Exports 0.47 -1.10* 0.90*** -2.57*** -1.41** 0.42 -0.83 
 (1.02) (2.50) (3.47) (3.99) (2.98) (1.64) (1.73) 
Proximity Index 0.18 -0.12 15.5 -0.43** -0.16 -0.80 0.61*** 
 (0.81) (0.28) (1.43) (3.15) (0.65) (1.11) (3.38) 
Distance 0.096*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.0053 0.026 -0.0052 0.039* 
 (4.82) (4.33) (3.83) (0.26) (1.32) (0.26) (2.12) 
Step 2 France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Exports 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.24*** -0.015 0.049 -0.14*** 0.14** 
 (5.90) (5.64) (5.26) (0.24) (0.57) (3.54) (2.85) 
Proximity Index 0.54*** -0.013 0.040 0.074 0.12 0.68*** 0.41*** 
 (16.3) (0.33) (1.15) (1.58) (1.82) (20.5) (10.3) 
Distance -0.10** -0.057 -0.29*** 0.070 0.075 -0.11*** 0.033 
 (3.12) (1.45) (7.32) (1.44) (1.11) (3.36) (0.93) 
Note: the above coefficients were the result of the standard parsimonious regression; only variables of direct 
relevance are included here. The first step was estimated by probit, the second step by OLS. The second step is 
reported using standardised coefficients.  
In the first step, distance is positive for six of the seven donors, implying donors are less 
likely to allocate aid to countries that are closer. Using France as an example, the effect of 
the proximity index moving from 0 to 1 (i.e. from the least proximate to the most proximate 
country) is the same as being closer by 2000 km, as one unit of distance is 1000 km. In the 
second step, distance is found to have a significant and negative effect for three donors, and 
is insignificant for the remaining four. For Japan the effect is large and highly significant, and 
the proximity index becomes insignificant. It is understandable that distance is more 
significant for Japan as its proximity index includes neither common language nor colonial 
history. While it is significant for the USA and France, it is much less significant than the 
proximity index.  
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4.5 DISCUSSION 
We have presented evidence that differences between donors are large and persistent. 
While much of the recent discussion and debate regarding the differences in allocation 
policy has focused on changes over time, this should not obscure the larger differences 
between donors. In answering question 1, abundant evidence was found of these 
differences. In terms of poverty sensitivity three clear groups were identified: high 
(Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), medium (Germany and Japan) and low (USA and France). 
The two smallest donors (Sweden and Netherlands) appear to have a much larger small-
country bias than other donors. Policy does not appear to be a major determinant for any 
donor, when averaged over the last 25-year period. The different weights attached to 
Proximity are so large as to be almost incomparable. The results agree with previous 
research that argued Nordic donors (represented here by Sweden) are different (Gates and 
Hoeffler, 2004), but also provide evidence that a more suitable distinction can be made. The 
 ‘EŽƌĚŝĐA? ? ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ  ?EŽƌǁĂǇ ? ^ǁĞĚĞŶ ? &ŝŶůĂŶĚ ? h< ? /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? ƚŚĞ EĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ ĂŶĚ
Denmark) that are included here are shown to indeed be like-minded with regard to poverty 
focus.  
Question 2 by contrast revealed only modest evidence for changes over time. The 
differences found were often far from substantive, and of a more evolutionary nature. 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) found the CW to have caused a shift from geopolitics to trade 
relationships as a key factor. The only donor that fits that pattern in our results is the USA, 
for whom trade is only significant (with the opposite sign at the levels stage to that 
postulated by Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004) between the CW and GWOT periods. For the UK, 
by contrast, we find the Trade coefficient to be insignificant in the post-cold war period. We 
also find little evidence in favour of the idea that the end of the CW meant an increased 
importance of poverty (Meernik et al., 1998), but instead evidence that it resulted in little 
substantial change (Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007; Easterly, 2007). We find the GWOT to 
have had relatively little effect in aid practice, even for the USA. While other research 
presents evidence of a changed size of the overall aid budget for the USA (Fleck and Kilby, 
2010), this would not be detected in our analysis as the size of the budget is treated as 
exogenous. Our analysis instead focuses on the change in how that money is allocated, and 
this confirms findings that the anticipated large-scale change in allocation practice (Buzan, 
2006; Woods, 2005) did not truly materialise (Moss et al., 2005). For other donors, the 
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GWOT period was not expected to be different primarily because of the GWOT, but instead 
the idea of selectivity may have had more time to influence allocation policy.  
By looking more specifically at poverty sensitivity in question 3 we can reaffirm conclusions 
already drawn. Figure 4.4 clearly illustrates that the biggest differences in poverty sensitivity 
are between donors, not time periods. The picture is complicated slightly by the two stage 
process, as some donors are more affected by poverty at the first step (such as the USA and 
the Netherlands). Nevertheless, this more focused section restates the large difference 
between the most poverty-sensitive donors (Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) and the 
others. The same figure also shows no shift in the poverty coefficient around the CW period 
ending, which some research suggests likely. Instead, it shows a modest increase in the 
weight given to poverty. There also appears to be no great effect due to the proposed move 
from conditionality to selectivity in the mid 1990s, which would imply shifts of a bigger 
magnitude rather than incremental moves. The slight recent decline in US poverty sensitivity 
found elsewhere (Fleck and Kilby, 2010)  is replicated, but for other donors this has 
increased slowly. 
Question 4 seeks to directly address the debate regarding whether policy sensitivity is low 
and fairly static (Easterly, 2007; Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006) or significant and increasing 
(Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Dollar and Levin, 2006). Much of the disagreement appears to 
be the inevitable result of distinct methodologies, specifically in defining which variable or 
variables represent policy. Easterly (2007) uses a number of variables, looking over time at 
Openness, Inflation, Democracy and Corruption1. His general conclusions are of low 
selectivity with little movement, with some donor heterogeneity amongst the five donors 
used. Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2006) use a mixture of WGI and CPIA data, and conclude 
from both approaches that there is little evidence of policy selectivity. By contrast, 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) conclude that policy selectivity has increased. As discussed, 
this is substantiated by the coefficient on lagged economic growth and has various problems 
of collinearity and rival interpretation. Dollar and Levin (2006) use ICRG data on the Rule of 
Law and Freedom House data on democracy as their policy variables and find that aid 
selectivity increases over time when averaging by donor. For bilateral aid (which is much 
larger than multilateral aid) they find no statistically significant result. Our econometric 
approach differs from these four papers by using the Two Part model, controlling for serial 
                                                             
1
 Democracy is from the Polity IV dataset and Corruption from the ICRG, a private company that provides data for 
researchers and businesses. 
4- Aid Allocation         Paul Clist 
89 
 
correlation and aid volatility, expanding the time period, presenting econometric tests 
between the various estimators, linking the specification to the 4P framework and formally 
comparing the explanatory power of these factors. When using the WGI corruption variable 
the overall picture is one of low policy selectivity with few changes over time. There is 
limited evidence for recently increased policy selectivity for the Netherlands and Sweden at 
the level stage, and at the eligibility stage for the Netherlands. When using the CPIA only 
Sweden has a significant coefficient in either step. It is to be expected that Nordic donors 
differ (Gates and Hoeffler, 2004), however, it has previously been found that the 
Netherlands were not remarkable in their policy-focus (Hout, 2007a, p.166).  This conclusion 
was based upon a regression for the period 1999-2002, and we only find coefficients on 
policy to be positive in the period 2002-2006. This then has been a recent move. Donors 
often commit aid for many years at a time, and thus a policy shift may be undetectable for a 
number of years. However, it is clear that most donors do not place much emphasis on 
policy. 
The chosen methodology does not include the size of the aid budget, and therefore cannot 
identify perhaps the biggest effect of both the CW and GWOT: increased aid budgets. A 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ  ‘ďůŝŶĚƐƉŽƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇŵĂǇŽďƐĐƵƌĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶĂŝĚĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌ
the period: It is possible that donor selectivity does in fact exist but is not detected using this 
methodology. Having chosen to remain within the positive allocation tradition, the unit of 
analysis is the amount of aid (budget share) given by a donor to a recipient. There have been 
some signs that policy selectivity could alter not the level but the type of aid on the basis of 
recipient policy (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia, 2007). A different methodology would need to be 
employed to find if that is true (as employed in the next chapter). However, the 
methodology chosen remains highly beneficial to the literature in a number of ways. 
Relating to the given examples, the econometric results presented challenge earlier findings. 
It has previously been found that the end of the CW changed allocation practice significantly. 
Also, it has been suggested that the GWOT would have a similarly large effect on allocation 
practice. The results presented question both ideas.  
4.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined aid allocation by donor and time period, and sought to answer a 
number of salient questions. The formal framework used to analyse and compare different 
factors permits these comparisons across donor and year to be more credible. It divides 
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allocation motives into the four competing factors of the 4P framework (Poverty, 
Population, Policy and Proximity) allowing the relative weights of the factors to be 
estimated. An increased weight for one factor would often mean a decreased weight for 
another, and the revealed preferences can then be examined by factor, donor and time 
period. The major feature of aid allocation found by this approach is not a change in poverty 
or policy sensitivity, but substantial and entrenched donor heterogeneity. Sweden, the 
Netherlands and the UK are considerably more poverty sensitive than other donors. It has 
been argued that Sweden is free from colonial ties and therefore is able to attach more 
weight to the poverty factor (Alesina and Weder, 2002), and we indeed find proximity to be 
insignificant for Sweden. However, this argument cannot be made for the UK and the 
Netherlands, for whom both proximity and poverty factors are significant. The USA and 
France do not appear to balance the two factors either, with proximity being many times 
more important. By comparison, Japan and Germany attach less weight to proximity and 
more to poverty, although the relative difference is marginal. These results imply that for 
some donors there is a sizeable tension between factors (Germany, Japan, the Netherlands 
and the UK), but for others there is not (Sweden, the USA and France)1.  
This chapter contributes to the debate regarding whether aid selectivity on the basis of good 
policy and low income levels have been adopted in recent years. Expectations of large shifts 
in selectivity due to the end of the CW, Selectivity or the GWOT have largely been 
confounded. With regards poverty, the overall picture is one of slowly increasing sensitivity 
at the level stage. With regards policy, small increases for some donors in recent years must 
be understood in the context of broad insensitivity to policy. There are many possible 
reasons for this. The main impact of the CW and GWOT appear to be changes in the volume 
of aid, rather than its allocation. The rationale for selectivity was predicated upon specific 
econometric results, which have been found dubious. Thus it is possible that donor-
confidence in selectivity diminished along with that of the econometric results. A further 
reason is that change amongst aid agencies is likely to be slow, because they are often large 
institutions, but also due to implementation. Multi-year commitments mean that only a 
percentage of aid allocation decisions will be made in that year. This means data on 
commitments will see a smoother and slower transition in allocation principles than would 
otherwise be the case.  
                                                             
1
 This is one reason why the approach of Berthélemy (2006) in grouping donors merely by their trade coefficient 
seems inadequate  W some donors show signs of concurrently pursuing more than one goal. 
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This research underlines the large differences between donors. In some cases this is due to 
the competing priorities, in others there is no competition and one factor dominates the 
allocation. These distinct donor preferences are the most likely cause of donor 
fragmentation. The results do suggest that some donors share preferences, and efforts to 
reduce fragmentation could be more successful if it focused upon those donor groups (e.g. 
among the Nordic+ donors). This fragmentation in itself is likely to increase transaction costs 
and thus lower aid effectiveness (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007; Knack and Rahman, 
2007). Furthermore, research has also shown a link between allocation practice and aid 
effectiveness (Headey, 2008; Reddy and Minoiu, 2006). A vicious circle is perhaps at work, as 
if donors continue to weight proximity highly in allocation decisions (and this in turn reduces 
aid effectiveness), it may continue to be difficult to identify a positive effect from aid 
(Roodman, 2008). This may cause donors to believe aid has limited growth-promotion 
effects, leading to a higher weight for proximity than (potentially) growth-promoting factors. 
However, this research does not enable statements upon the effects of policy selectivity; 
instead it confirms that aid selectivity has not been practiced over 25 years of aid allocation 
and thus its effects are most likely unknown. The lesson taken from the history of poverty 
sensitivity is salient here: donor change happens slowly. The two large events that were 
external to donors (the conclusion of the Cold War and the Global War on Terror 
commencing) as well as the policy discussion that was to some extent internal (policy 
selectivity) have changed aid allocation only incrementally. Comparisons by donor and era 
clearly demonstrate that even over 25 years, there is much greater resemblance within a 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂŶǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐŝŶŐůĞƚŝŵĞƉĞƌŝŽĚ ? 
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5. PULL THE OTHER ONE:  
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND THE 
FORGOTTEN POLICY LEVER IN  
AID ALLOCATION 
The previous chapter can be seen as a test of whether selectivity has been implemented. As 
the recipient policy indicator was found to have been of marginal concern in allocation 
decisions for 25 years we can reject the idea that the application of selectivity is widespread, 
a finding that concurs with those of Hout (2007a, b) Easterly (2007) and Nunnenkamp and 
Thiele (2006). In isolation this implies that donors are indifferent to recipient policy, which is 
perhaps misleading. This chapter finds that donors are in fact sensitive to policy, although 
not in the way suggested by the standard conceptualisation of selectivity. It is profitable to 
briefly consider why selectivity is not practiced more widely. It has been argued that one of 
the reasons that conditionality failed was the inability of donors to punish recipients who 
had not met conditions as these countries were still poor (Collier, 1997; Easterly, 2001). 
Selectivity does not negate this characteristic of donors, and so perhaps the practice of 
donors  ‘ƚƵƌŶŝŶŐĂďůŝŶĚĞǇĞ ?ƚŽƉŽŽƌŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŝŶƉĂƌƚĞǆƉůĂŝŶƐŚŽǁďŽƚŚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚ
selectivity have failed to be used more widely. The famous aid campaigner Bob Geldof, when 
ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŝŶŐĨŽƌŚŝŐŚĞƌĂŝĚ ?ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ “^ŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŵƵƐƚďĞĚŽŶĞ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚǁŽƌŬ ? ?
(Chamberlain, 2005). This statement illustrates the apparent hesitancy of donors to withhold 
aid in situations where aid is likely to be of little use. We can think about this in terms of the 
 ‘ǁĂƌŵ ŐůŽǁ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ  “ŐĂŝŶ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚ ŽĨ ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ?(Andreoni, 1990, p. 
473).  
ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ? dŚĞ
^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂŚĂƐďĞĞŶƵƐĞĚďĞĨŽƌĞŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ(Svensson, 2000, discussed later), 
and it effectively states that a donors concern for the poor stymies their ability to punish low 
levels of recipient effort. Donors may agree a contract but fail to punish the recipient if it 
reneges on this contract, as they do not wish to penalise the poor. While this theoretical 
moĚĞů ŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝƚĐĂŶŐŝǀĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐ ŝŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?
of selectivity (i.e. the failure to implement policy selectivity). It does not appear clear that 
donors would be more able to punish recipients (by withholding aid) when they have not 
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ĂŐƌĞĞĚĂĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?^Ž ?ƚŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂŵĂǇĂůƐŽŚĞůƉĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚǇƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŚĂƐŶŽƚ
been practiced. This chapter introduces the concept of pragmatic selectivity, where donors 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚ ƚŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŝŶ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚgovernance not by altering the amount of 
aid, but the type. The concept of pragmatic selectivity is so called because it appears to be 
feasible for donors to implement it, unlike (ex-ante and ex-post) conditionality. 
The concept of Pragmatic Selectivity can easily be identified within a number of policy 
documents and discussions: 
ǲǤǤǤ        - where corruption is rife and 
governance poor - we should walk away. But we cannot abandon aid just because a 
country has corrupt leaders ... we can earmark aid for a particular programme of 
work in a sector and account for that money independently through a separate bank 
account. We do this in the education sector in Kenya, where the financial risk of 
handing over money to the governmenǤǳ(Benn, 2006) 
ǲ             
governments. For example, where government budgets do not prioritise the needs of 
poor people or where governments are not tackling weaknesses in their public 
financial management systems or corruption. In these cases we will use other ways 
Ǥǳ(DFID, 2008, p.2) 
ǲ             
elections in 2005, aid to Ethiopia was only repackaged in different forms, not 
Ǥǳ 
(The Economist, 2010) 
dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ƋƵŽƚĞ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇ ƚŚĞ ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ? ,ŝůůĂƌǇ ĞŶŶ ? ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŶ
secretary of state for DFID, dismisses the idea of selectivity because the donor cannot 
 ‘ĂďĂŶĚŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƉŽŽƌŝŶĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝƚŚďĂĚŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?EŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ‘^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ?ŝƐ
expressed in the context of selectivity.  His proposal is simply to use other means by which 
to deliver aid. The second quote is the closest explicit statement of pragmatic selectivity in 
official donor documents that we are aware of. It recognises two factors that should help 
decide the composition of aid: recipient government preferences for the poor and the 
efficiency loss of recipient-implemented aid. Both of these points are crucial in the 
theoretical literature, discussed later. The third quote is a comment on the general 
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ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŽĨĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ĂŐĂŝŶŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ? ?dŚĞquotes tell us that while 
aid volumes did not alter after an episode of poor governance, aid composition did. They 
describe neither conditionality nor selectivity, but a strategy where the policy lever for 
dealing with low levels of governance is the type of aid delivered, specifically the amount of 
control a recipient is granted. This then implies that the two stage decision (who gets aid and 
how much) is actually a three-stage decision (adding what type of aid should be given). The 
chapter continues in section 2 by reviewing the literature. Section 3 presents a simple 
theoretical model, used to motivate the chapter. Section 4 introduces the empirical 
approach, and section 5 reports the results. Section 6 discusses and section 7 concludes.  
5.2  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The theoretical literature models the aid modality choice between two types of aid, 
generally Project Aid (PA) and General Budget Support (GBS). A brief discussion of various 
modalities is included first, before moving on to the simplified theoretical conceptualisation. 
While there are many valid distinctions made between different types of aid, it is best 
thought of as a spectrum with classification cut-off points being at least partially arbitrary 
(see Figure 5.1). While a simple dichotomy is often a helpful simplification for theoretical 
models, a more realistic picture is one of varying degrees of recipient control. Different 
instruments then offer the recipient different degrees of control. With General Budget 
Support it is obviously the decision of the recipient how to use that aid money. By contrast, 
the goal and implementation of project aid is typically not decided by the recipient, but it 
still offers some control as recipients could anticipate donor spending and decrease their 
own in a certain sector/region. There are a myriad of other instruments between these two 
extremes. The majority of measures used within the empirical section are towards the 
extreme of recipient control, mainly due to data availability.   
 Figure 5.1: Different Aid Instruments 
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Many of these different aid modalities, which rise and fall in popularity, were first used 
because of dissatisfaction with a previous instrument. By understanding the criticisms of the 
different types of aid, we can better model the aid composition decision, and thus 
understand and control for other factors. Project aid has been criticised heavily over a long 
period, with reasons including co-ordination failure, a disregard for recurrent expenditures, 
high transaction costs and the undermining of local institutions (Ohno and Niiya, 2004 , p. 6). 
The move towards SWAps in the mid 1990s was in part motivated by a desire to address 
these weaknesses by clustering projects around a particular sector (Harrold, 1995). The most 
common contemporary modality with a very high level of recipient control is General Budget 
Support (GBS). As it is relatively new, well documented and at one extreme of the recipient-
control spectrum, it will be used extensively in the empirical section. According to its 
proponents, GBS solves many of the aforementioned problems with project aid. It is said to 
strengthen a recipient ?s own systems (DFID, 2008, p.1) and be more efficient. Indeed the 
tŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ‘Ɛbudget support in Uganda was found twice as efficient as project support in 
terms of cost per disbursed USD (Miovic, 2004). An extensive evaluation found the use of 
GBS improved the overall quality of aid in a country due to increased coherence, 
harmonisation and alignment (IDD, 2006). 
However, GBS is not without its detractors. Killick (2004) and Frantz (2004) both argue that 
the claim that GBS decreases transaction costs is not sufficiently substantiated. Foster (2000) 
argues that GBS is in some cases less predictable, and Batley (2005) also reports evidence of 
timing issues undermining any potential transaction cost benefits. The Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs  (2003, p.71) ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŚĂƚ  “ ? ? ? ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ EĞƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶ ĐŽƐƚƐ
(due to pooled funding, harmonisation of procedures and less time needed in direct 
programme management) is outweighed by the increased time use due to co-ordination, 
particularly on the sectoral level... Overall, increased intensity of co-ordination has led to an 
incƌĞĂƐĞ ŽĨ ƚƌĂŶƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĐŽƐƚƐ ĨŽƌ hŐĂŶĚĂŶ ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ  Q ?dŚƵƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĂŝĚ
instruments are highly nuanced and any apparent advantage is not necessarily automatic. 
Theoretical models, for obvious reasons, simplify this greatly. 
From the theoretical literature, we first present the paper by Cordella and Dell'Ariccia (2007) 
ĂƐ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ŚĂĚ ƚŚĞ ďŝŐŐĞƐƚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? dŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ ĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?
between two types of aid: General Budget Support (GBS) and Project Aid (PA). The reader 
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may be aware of two earlier papers1 by the same authors. We present the model in Cordella 
and Dell'Ariccia (2007, hereafter CD) along with criticism and discussion, and include 
relevant comments on aspects of their other papers. The model contains two agents (donor ܦ and recipient ܴ) and two goods (development good ݏ and non-development good ݉). The 
recipient balances the utility derived from these two goods, given by ߙ where ߙ א ሾ ? ? ?ሿ and 
a higher ߙ means a more development friendly recipient. ܷோ ൌ ߙܸሺݏሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܸሺ݉ሻ 
/ƚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉůŝĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐƐŝŵƉůǇܷ ஽ ൌ ܸሺݏሻ, which makes it clear that this is a 
principal-agent framework. While Cordella and Dell'Ariccia (2007 p.1264, footnote 10) note 
that the analysis holds as long donor and recipient preferences over ሼݏ ?݉ሽ differ, it is 
discussed in a situation where the donor is more altruistic than the recipient. Also, if ߙ ൌ  ? 
then there is clearly no issue of divergent preferences. The production function for the 
development good is given as ݏ ൌ ݏሺ݇ ? ݁ሻ and assumed to be symmetrical. Crucially, ݇ 
(capital) is observable whereas ݁ is not. It is assumed that the donor can observe the total 
non-capital expenses ݖ ൌ ݁ ൅݉. Implicitly, ݉ is the only input of good ݉, and so ݉ ൌܨሺ݉ሻ. 
The budget constraint is given on the recipient side: ݇ ൅ ݖ ൑ ܩ ൅ ߜܣ 
Where ߜ is 1 when aid is granted and 0 when it is not; ݇ and ݖ are capital and non-capital 
expenditures, and ܩ and ܣ are the domestic and external sources of revenue respectively. 
Using this set up, the paper then deals with three types of aid: unconditional budget 
support, conditional budget support and project aid. The reservation utility for the recipient 
is given by the no aid case, where ߜ ൌ  ?. This case is denoted by the superscript NA.  ܷே஺ሺߙሻ ൌ ߙܸሾݏሺ݇ே஺  ? ே݁஺ሻሿ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܸሺܩ െ ݇ே஺ െ ݁ே஺ሻ 
We can see that the model assumes that the budget constraint is binding, as ݇ ൅ ݁ ൅݉ ൌ ܩ 
is required to give the last expression. For unconditional budget support (superscript NC), 
                                                             
1
 The first (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia, 2002) differs from the paper discussed by using a different utility function for 
the recipient, which is a CES objective function: ܷோ ൌ ሾߙݏఘ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻ݉ఘሿଵ ఘൗ  Where ߩ א ሾ ? ? ?ሿ. The analysis 
continues in much the same way as the version presented here, starting with a situation of full information, 
moving on to an unobserved ݁ and concluding with unobserved ݁ and ߙ. The second (Cordella and Dell'Ariccia, 
2003) combines the theoretical part with an empirical test of its predictions. The theoretical part is almost 
identical to the model discussed here. 
5- Pragmatic Selectivity        Paul Clist 
97 
 
the problem of the recipient of type ߙ is given by first substituting the budget constraint into 
the utility function of the recipient, and then using the symmetrical nature of the 
development goŽĚ ?ƐƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ P ݇כ ൌ ሼ࢞ ?ߙ ᇱܸሾݏሺ࢞ሻሿݏ௫ሺ࢞ሻ െ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܸᇱሺܩ ൅ ߜܣ െ  ?ݔሻ ൌ  ?ሽ 
This finds x such that the marginal utility of the two goods are equal: here ࢞ ൌ ሺݔ ? ݔሻ, as the 
production function is symmetrical the recipient has no need to diverge from a situation 
where ݇ ൌ ݁ሺൌ ݔሻ. With unconditional aid as opposed to the no aid case, the level of s is at 
least as high as there are additional resources but ߙ has not changed. We can write this as ݏሺ݇ே஼  ? ே݁஼ሻ ൒ ݏሺ݇ே஺  ? ே݁஺ሻ 
As long as ߙ is positive the above becomes a strict inequality. However, if ߙ ൏  ? then the 
additional resources are not entirely spent on the development good, implying conditionality 
may impƌŽǀĞƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞ ?Given the assumptions on observability, conditionality can 
only be on the basis of ݇ and not ݁. As such, the analysis proceeds with the donor setting a 
required level of ݇ upon which the aid is conditional. It is worth noting that Bougheas et al. 
(2007) discuss the idea of partial conditionality as a prior action signalling efficiency further, 
and find that such conditionality may not provide enough information for the donor to 
ascertain whether the recipient is truly more efficient than another. This casts doubt on the 
effectiveness of the screening mechanism. Continuing with the CD model, the recipient 
problem, for any  ݇ ൐ ݇ே஼, is given by:  ݁?ሺ݇ሻ ൌ ௘ ሼߙܸሾݏሺ݇ ? ሻ݁ሿ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܸሺܩ ൅ ܣ െ ݇ െ ݁ሻሽ 
Where the recipient chooses only ݁ in response to the ݇ that is set by the donor. The 
problem of the donor is one of setting the required minimum level of ݇, taking into account 
the likely response of the recipient: ௞ ܹ ൌ ݏሾ݇ ?  ݁?ሺ݇ሻሿ 
Subject to ߙܸሼݏሾ݇ ?  ݁?ሺ݇ሻሿሽ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܸ൫ܩ ൅ ܣ െ ݇ െ  ݁?ሺ݇ሻ൯ ൒ ܷே஺ሺߙሻ  
This constraint is the individual rationality (IR) constraint of the recipient which simply states 
that their utility must be greater with conditional budget support than with no aid in order 
to accept the contract. We can take the no conditionality level of capital (݇ே஼) as a minimum 
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level of k, and the case where the IR constraint of the recipient is an equality (݇ூோ) as the 
maximum. The donor has no incentive to set a level lower than ݇ே஼ and the recipient would 
not agree to a contract in which it would be worse off than under project aid (given by ݇ூோ). 
Two important points are demonstrated. First, it is shown that the production level of the 
development good is greater under conditionĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚŝƐŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŽŶƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƐŝĚĞ ?ĂƐ
they would only prefer conditionality if it increases the production of the development good. 
Second, conditionality results in an inefficiency in the production, as the level of k will be 
somewhere between the maximum and minimum: ݇ே஼ ൏ ݇ ൏ ݇ூோ and  ݁?ሺ݇ሻ ൏ ݇. As e is 
unobserved, the recipient will under provide e for any given level of k, as opposed to the no 
conditionality case. While the donor buys an overall increase in the production of the 
development good it loses efficiency, as the recipient revaluates its input decision and alters 
its production inputs.  
The optimal level of conditionality is given by the following: ݇௖ሺߙሻ ൌ ሼ݇ூோ  ?෠݇ሽ 
with ෠݇ ؠ ௞ ݏሾ݇ ?  ݁?ሺ݇ሻሿ 
Here, ෠݇ represents the level of conditionality that the donor would choose if it paid no 
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ /Z ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ? tŚĞŶ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚ ŝƐ ďŝŶĚŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂǆŝŵƵŵ
level of conditionality that the recipient would accept is ݇ூோ.  
Project aid is introduced as an alternative modality. While budget support is subject to the 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŵŝƐĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝĚŝƐƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨ
project aid is assumed to mean foregoing any influence over the allocation of the recipient 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ďƵƚŐĂŝŶŝŶŐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶ ?WƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝĚŝƐĂƐƐƵŵĞĚ
ƚŽ ďĞ ĂŶ ŝŵƉĞƌĨĞĐƚ Ĩŝƚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ? Ɛ ƐƵĐŚ ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ
production function for the development good remains the same, there is a cost of ሺ ? െ ߣሻݏሺ࡭  ? ? ሻ where ߣ א ሾ ? ? ?ሿ describes the severity of this cost. Alternatively, this could 
be thought of as an efficiency cost. It is found that for conditional budget support to result in 
a higher level of the development good than project aid, ܩ and ߙ must be sufficiently high. A 
larger ܩ means that the donor can influence a larger amount of resources. A larger ߙ means 
that there is a smaller difference between donor and recipient preferences, and so 
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conditionality will be met with more favourably. If ߣ is high (i.e. the efficiency loss of project 
aid is low) the results are driven by preference alignment. This is the argument found in 
Morrissey (2006), where the key consideration in the GBS decision is the degree of 
preference alignment (ߙ) rather than efficiency (ߣ) or the relative size of the aid transfer (ܩ 
and ܣ). 
The final extension of the model is to consider the case where ߙ is not observable, that is the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƚǇƉĞŝƐƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ(a situation explored more fully in Bougheas et al., 
2007) . It is this part of the model which most resembles my own. The rationale for 
examining this is easily understood by considering a case where a recipient cannot credibly 
signal its type. If this is the case, the contract design must alter. The distribution of 
types,ሾߙ ? ߙሿ, is common knowledge, as is ܩ. The following simple case is considered: ߙ ൌ ߙ଴ ൌ  ?  with probability   ? െ ݌ ߙ ൌ ߙଵ ൌ  ?  with probability  ݌ 
We know that type ߙ଴ recipient will prefer budget support to project aid if ݇ ൏ ܣ. Where ݇ ൌ ܣ, the ߙ଴ type recipient  is indifferent between the two and so for simplicity we say it 
prefers project aid. Optimal conditionality for type ߙଵ is given by ෠݇ ൌ ሺܩ ൅ ܣሻ  ? ? . This is 
clear, as the donor would prefer all resources to be spent upon producing the development 
good, and so choose ݁ ൌ ݇ ൌ ሺܩ ൅ ܣሻ  ? ? . The ability of the donor to distinguish between 
the two types of recipient by altering the menu of contracts offered hinges on the relative 
size of ܩ and ܣ. Where ܩ ൒ ܣ the donor can separate the two types, and so expects the 
following development good output: 
ܧሺݏሻ ൌ ݌ݏ ൬ࡳ ൅ ࡭ ? ൰ ൅ ሺ ? െ ݌ሻߣݏ ൬࡭ ?൰ 
So, in this case the recipient with aligned preferences chooses to receive budget support 
from the menu of contracts offered, and the recipient with misaligned preferences chooses 
project aid. As the model always assumes full commitment, the intuition for this is clear. The 
required change of behaviour for the ߙଵ type recipient will be less, and so the recipient 
prefers budget support as it is a higher transfer (as there is no efficiency loss). For the ߙ଴ 
type recipient this level of conditionality is a large change of their desired behaviour, and so 
project aid is preferred (despite the assumed higher transaction costs). For the unlikely case 
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of ܩ ൏ ܣ, there are three options to choose from as to how best separate the recipients, 
which are not presented here. 
There are six criticisms to be made of the model and its assumptions. First, the model states 
that fungibility is higher for larger projects, and lower for smaller ones. The rationale for this 
comes from a situation where the aid budget can be larger than the recipient ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
own resources, with one donor. In this situation, the recipient would have spent less than 
the donor spends on a specific area, and so the recipient cannot reallocate, as it can only 
take away the amount it would have spent on that area. However, this does not seem to be 
a realistic assumption. As discussed in the literature review, most recipients have a large 
number of different projects and donors. In this case, it is likely that recipients can only 
anticipate the larger projects and reallocate their resources in response to the largest aid 
projects (i.e. the opposite effect to that assumed by CD). Second, while project aid is subject 
to a cost that can be interpreted as an efficiency cost, GBS is not. This assumes that project 
aid is at best as efficient as GBS, whereas in some circumstances GBS could be less efficient 
than project aid. The evidence base for an efficiency gain from GBS is certainly not 
conclusive (Batley, 2005; Frantz, 2004; Killick, 2004; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2003). Third, CD assume that a donor always chooses one instrument, rather than a 
combination of instruments. As shown elsewhere, most donors do use a variety of different 
ƚǇƉĞƐŽĨĂŝĚ ?&ŽƵƌƚŚ ?ĚŽŶŽƚĨƵůůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂ ?ĂƐƚŚĞǇ
always include full commitment. Svensson (2000) shows that donors find it very difficult to 
adhere to contracts if they require punishing recipiĞŶƚƐ ? dŚŝƐ ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ?Ɛ
reliance on full commitment undermines to some extent its attempt to resemble reality. As 
such, the situation where the donor sets the required level of ݇, to which the recipient must 
adhere if it is to receive GBS, is a problematic assumption. In reality a separate technology is 
available to the recipient: reneging on this level of ݇. &ŝĨƚŚ ? ŝĨ ǁĞ ƚŚŝŶŬ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ
ŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ? ?ĂƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƌĞĚŽŶŽƌƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚŚŽůĚĂŝĚ ?ŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƵƚŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
the recipient) is unlikely, as donors find it problematic to withhold aid. Thus the reservation 
utility of the recipient is unlikely to be the no aid case. Sixth, CD assume donors are altruistic, 
although their model could be presented in a different context.  
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We now turn to Hefeker (2006)1, who uses a similar weighting of two groups to CD although 
in a slightly different set-ƵƉ ?dŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŐŝǀĞŶďǇ P 
ோܹ ൌ ߙݑଵ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻݑଶ 
Where group 1 is the poor, group 2 is the rich and ߙ determines the weight placed upon 
these two groups in the utility function. The utility of each group is given by the shortfall 
from a target, which equals entire discretionary resources of the government: ݑ௜ ൌെሺ݃௜ െ ݃௜כሻଶ where ݃௜ ൏ ݃௜כ and ݃௜כ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߜܣ. ݃௜ is the level of government spending for 
group i, and ݃௜כ is its target. The budget constraint of the recipient is simply ݃ଵ ൅ ݃ଶ ൑ ܩ ൅ߜܣ. Budget support and Project aid are assigned the efficiency loss parameters ߝ and ߟ 
respectively. These can be interpreted as losses to corruption or simply as measures of 
marginal cost, i.e. efficiency parameters. Unfortunately, this feature of the model is not fully 
developed, and is only used briefly in the last stages of the paper. Under the benchmark case 
of unconditional budget support, the recipient allocates its budget as it sees fit, giving the 
shares: ݃ଵே஼ ൌ ߙሺܩ ൅ ߜܣሻ ݃ଶே஼ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܩ ൅ߜܣሻ 
Hefeker (2006) starts by assuming that the donor is benevolent, such that its utility function 
is: 
஽ܹ ൌ ߚݑଵ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߚሻݑଶ 
Clearly, this resembles the CD set up if ߚ ൌ  ?. In that model the donor only cares about the 
poor, whereas this set-ƵƉĂůůŽǁƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌƚĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚŚĞƌŝĐŚ ?ƐǁĞůĨĂƌĞĂƐǁĞůů ?
There is an additional assumption that ߚ ൐ ଵଶ ൐ ߙ, i.e. the donor is more pro-poor than the 
recipient. Project aid is used to introduce the idea of fungibility. In the paper, the author 
states that recipients can foresee the amount of project aid and adjust their own budget 
allocation accordingly. Specifically, the production of the development good is ݃ଵ௉஺ ൌߙሺܩ െ ܶሻ ൅ ܶ after fungibility, where ܶ is the amount of aid given as project aid. However, 
this appears to be an erroneous assertion. If the recipient were to control the entire budget, 
                                                             
1 Some of the notation has been changed, so as to facilitate ready comparison to the other papers reviewed in this 
section. 
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it would allocate ݃ଵ௉஺ ൌ ߙሺܩ ൅ ܶሻ and ݃ଶ௉஺ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺ݃ ൅ ܶሻ. As such the adjustment in 
resources for group 1 should not be െߙሺܶሻ but െሺ ? െ ߙሻܶ. This does result in the correct 
final allocations: ݃ଵ௉஺ ൌ ߙሺܩሻ െ ሺ ? െ ߙሻܶ ൅ ܶ ݃ଶ௉஺ ൌ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܩሻ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻ  ܶ
That notwithstanding, complete fungibility does not seem a realistic assumption, as 
recipients are unlikely to be able to perfectly anticipate the amount of aid. Furthermore, 
fully reallocating its budget is likely to be costly and time consuming. The analysis then 
moves to conditional aid. The donor sets a target level for the proportion of the budget that 
gets allocated to the poor, ො݃ଵ. This target will be higher than under no conditionality ො݃ଵ ൐ ݃ଵே஼, otherwise the donor would not use conditionality. The donor then differentiates 
the amount of aid given on the basis of whether this minimum level of spending on the poor 
has been achieved, such that 
ܣ ൌ ቊܣ݂݅݃ଵ ൒ ො݃ଵܣ݂݅݃ଵ ൏ ො݃ଵ  
While CD assume the reservation utility is given by no aid, Hefeker makes the situation 
somewhat more realistic. As he notes, it is unlikely that ܣ ൌ  ?, as donors are subjected to 
ƚŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂ ?^ǀĞŶƐƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇǁŝƚŚhold aid, and 
so are unable to credibly threaten this amount. However, this model still relies upon a 
change in the amount of aid committed, something that the previous chapter found very 
little empirical evidence for. Continuing with the analysis, we can write as ܣመ the level of aid 
that must be given by the donor in order for them to accept ො݃ଵ, where ො݃ଵ ൌ ߚሺܩ ൅ ܣመሻ and ߚ 
ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ǁĞŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽŽƌ ? dŚĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůǀĂůƵĞ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ďƵĚŐĞƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŝƐ
increasing in ܣ andߙ but decreasing in ܩ and ߚ. These are expected results. ܣ is aid received 
when conditional budget support is rejected, and so gives the fallback utility. ߙ and ߚ are the 
weighting given to the poor by the recipient and donor respectively. If these are close then 
the differĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚĂŶĚĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞĚǀĂůƵĞŽĨƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞƉŽŽƌŝƐ
small. In other words a high ߙ and low ߚ would give a smaller value for ො݃ଵ െ ݃ଵே஼, meaning 
the utility loss for the recipient is smaller. An interesting extension of the model is taken 
from a simple insight  W donors are unlikely to be altruistic and bureaucratic incentives may 
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play a part. This is incorporated in the model by augmenting the donors objective function 
so it becomes: 
஽ܹ ൌ ߚݑଵ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߚሻݑଶ ൅ ߛሺܣሻ ൅ ߯ሺܶሻ 
Where ߛሺܣሻ and ߯ሺܶሻ are the inherent bureaucratic utility derived from disbursing GBS and 
project aid respectively. Many of the conclusions from this step are similar to those found by 
CD: for example, they find that budget support is preferred when aid is small relative to the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?,ĞĨĞŬĞƌ(2006) concludes that if there is not preference 
alignment, budget aid will be preferred. This result comes from the assertion that budget aid 
is likely to be larger than project aid (if given), something that comes from the assumptions 
regarding bureaucratic incentives.  
Unfortunately, the mathematical derivation of much of the analysis appears to be flawed.1 
While this calls into question many of the results, it does not invalidate the innovative 
contributions of this paper. The contributions are four-fold. First, it allows for a low donor 
offer of aid, as opposed to the withholding of aid, to form part of the reserve utility of the 
recipient. As the previous chapter found that aid allocation is policy sensitive, this seems a 
more realistic assumption. Second, the paper acknowledges that bureaucratic incentives will 
play a part in the modality decision of the donor. Third, it models the problem in a new 
setting  W using shortfalls in utility from a target consumption as opposed to a more 
production-orientated set-up. This is perhaps a more realistic setting, given the likely 
lobbying by the two groups. Fourth, it allows for the different types of aid to have different 
efficiency parameters. Frustratingly, this innovation is not explored as their use is limited to 
a small part of the analysis.  
Other than the apparent mathematical mistakes, there are two specific weaknesses of the 
model. The first is that it does not truly capture an interaction between the two agents, as 
they are considered separately without truly taking into account the preferences of the 
                                                             
1
 Further to the apparent mistakes mentioned elsewhere, there is something that this author cannot replicate 
from the appendix, where the following two equations (original notation maintained) are made equal: ோܹ஻஺ ൌߙሺ ො݃ଵ െ ܩ െ ܣሻଶ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܩ ൅ ܣ െ ො݃ଵ െ ܩ െ ܣሻଶ and ோܹே஼ ൌ ߙሺ݃ଵே஼ െ ܩ െ ܣሻଶ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܩ ൅ ܣ െ ݃ଵே஼ െܩ െ ܣሻଶ. The next step in the paper is to state that ߙሺ ො݃ଵ െ ܩሻଶ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܣ െ ො݃ଵሻଶ ൌ ߙሺ݃ଵீ ை௏ െ ܩሻଶ ൅ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܣ െ ݃ଵீ ை௏ሻଶ, this result is not explained and cannot be reproduced. The working paper version has a 
different step, but one that is more obviously flawed. Specifically, it goes from the same situation as above ߙሺ ො݃ଵ െ ܩሻଶ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܣ െ ො݃ଵሻଶ ൌ ߙሺ݃ଵீ ை௏ െ ܩሻଶ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻሺܣ െ ݃ଵீ ை௏ሻଶ to ሺ ො݃  ?െ ܩሻ ?െ ሺ݃ ?ܩܱܸ െ ܩሻ ?ൌߣሾሺܣ െ ݃ ?ܩܱܸሻ ?െ ሺܣ െ ො݃  ?ሻ ?ሿ. However, it then simply takes the root of each side (without taking into account 
that it should be the root of the total) and concludes that ො݃  ?െ ݃ ?ܩܱܸ ൌ െ ?ߣሾሺܣ െ ݃ ?ܩܱܸሻ ൅ ሺܣ െ ො݃  ?ሻሿ.  
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other. The second weakness stems from the use of a shortfall as the utility function. 
Consider the case of the poor without aid, as opposed to the no conditionality case.  ݑଵே஺ ൌ െሺ݃ଵே஺ െ ܩሻଶ ݑଵே஼ ൌ െሺ݃ଵே஼ െ ܩ െ ܣሻଶ 
We know that the recipient, without conditionality, would choose ݃ଵே஼ ൌ ߙሺܩ ൅ ߜܣሻ, giving 
the poor the following shares under no aid ݃ଵே஺ ൌ ߙሺܩሻ and under aid (without 
conditionality) ݃ଵே஼ ൌ ߙሺܩ ൅ ܣሻ. We can then state the difference between the two as 
simply ߙܣ, giving ݃ଵே஼ ൌ ݃ଵே஺ ൅ ߙܣ. We also know that ߙ ൏  ? ? ?, which means the ߙܣ cannot 
be as large as ܣ, thus the poor are always worse off with aid than without it. Put 
mathematically: ݑଵே஺ ൐ ݑଵே஼ , as െሺ݃ଵே஺ െ ܩሻଶ ൐ െሺ݃ଵே஺ ൅ ߙܣ െ ܩ െ ܣሻଶ 
This is an intuitively simple to understand mistake: the target consumption includes aid, and 
giving aid to a recipient increases their target consumption by more than the increase in 
their actual consumption. This methodological weakness means that donors should, if acting 
in a manner consistent with their stated preferences, never give aid. 
Jelovac and Vandeninden (2008, hereafter JV) correct a weakness of the CD paper, by 
allowing two modalities to co-exist. In order to model this, the marginal utility of the two 
goods cannot be constant (if they were, one would dominate the other over the whole 
plane). Thus a Cobb-Douglas form is used for the production function of the development 
ŐŽŽĚ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞŝƌ ƌĞƐƵůƚ  ĂƌĞ ǀĞƌǇ ƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ
made on the efficiency and fungibility losses of project aid. The conclusions differ from CD in 
two major ways. First, while CD always prefer conditionality, JV find it depends upon the 
efficiency of the two modalities, preference alignment and the size of the aid budget relative 
ƚŽƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ?^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?:sĨŝŶĚƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝĚŝƐŽŶůǇƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚǁŚĞŶƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝĚ ?ƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇůŽƐƐ are low.  The approach of JV is an improvement on 
the CD paper in two main ways. First, recognising the co-existence of various modalities 
brings the model much closer to reality. Second, the paper emphasises a little more the role 
of efficiency in the modality choice. However, being so close to the CD paper, it inherits a 
number of its weaknesses. First, they assume that project aid is at best as efficient as budget 
5- Pragmatic Selectivity        Paul Clist 
105 
 
support. The only possible loss to budget support is assumed to be the reallocation of 
resources stemming from preference misalignment (the crowding out of development 
expenditure). It is possible however, that project aid is more efficient than budget support in 
certain cases. Second, JV assume full commitment. While they allow for non-observability of 
development inputs, complete commitment overstates the likely effect of conditional 
budget support.  
In a similar vein, Azam and Laffont (2003) apply contract theory to the problem, but focus on 
complete contracts with perfect monitoring, a more extreme position than CD. Hagen 
(2006a, p.268) is particularly vocal in his criticism of this approach, arguing that contract 
ƚŚĞŽƌǇŝƐŶŽƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚ ŝŶƚŚŝƐƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ  “ĐĂŶŶŽƚďĞĞŶĨŽƌĐĞĚŝŶĐŽƵƌƚƐ
and the generally poor record of conditionality demonstrates that such agreements have not 
been self-ĞŶĨŽƌĐŝŶŐ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ? ? dŚĞ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƌĞŵĞĚǇ ŝƐ ƚŽ ƵƐĞ ĂŐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?
although as the paper does not focus on the choice between modalities it is of little use 
here. Furthermore, as currently used in this field, game theory implies that the two agents 
have similar bargaining power, meaning that the suggested modelling framework is not 
applicable to the aid allocation problem.  
Svensson (2000) ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂƚŽ ƚŚĞĂŝĚallocation problem, and while 
the paper does use different aid modalities it is not the focus. That notwithstanding, the 
analysis provides one salient insight and so is summarised here. Donors are inequality 
averse, and so allocate aid to poorer recipients. Recipients anticipate this and so a moral 
hazard problem is created, as they have less incentive to decrease poverty. In essence, a 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƉƵŶŝƐŚƉŽŽƌƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚĞĨĨŽƌƚŝƐƐƚǇŵŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ?
This analysis is an elegant eǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐƚŚĞĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨĚŽŶŽƌƐ
to implement conditionality. It also hints as to why donors do not implement selectivity (ex-
post conditionality), as suggested in the preceding chapter. The relevant point for this 
chapter is to underline the flaw of a model that assumes full commitment. However, it 
would be an overreaction to assume that no commitment is a more realistic assumption. 
Federico (2004) shows that even under weak commitment, conditionality is still preferred to 
no conditionality. For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to acknowledge that while 
full commitment does not exist, donors have succeed in changing the overall spending 
patterns within a recipient country (Mosley et al., 2004). This means that the composition of 
recipient spending is not fixed and inflexible but influenced by donors.  
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^ǀĞŶƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ(2000) suggested remedy focuses on the delegation of aid allocation decisions to 
international bodies that has less inequality aversion. From a theoretical point of view, 
Hagen (2006b) questions this recommendation finding that it does not hold when aid 
efficiency varies across recipients. Furthermore, it is clear that this has not been widely 
practiced, given the low levels of multilateral commitments. Indeed, there is not enough 
substantive evidence that multilateral organisations have consistently enforced 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞǁŝƚŚĂŶǇĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ
Dilemma themselves. While it is out of the remit of this chapter to fully explore this idea, it is 
worth noting that the use of different instruments may offer a way out of this dilemma. In 
ƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞĂŵŽƵŶƚŽĨĂŝĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?ĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ? ? ?ĂŶĚ
the type of aid to efforƚ ?ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ? ? ? 
Many of the factors within the theoretical literature are echoed by the more policy-
orientated literature. While Fritz and Kolstad (2008) do not agree with the high degree of 
fungibility assumed by some of the theoretical papers, they agree that in certain extreme 
situations it renders project aid no different in outcome to budget support. The role of 
preference alignment is acknowledged by DFID (2006 p.24), who state the recipient 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽƉŽǀĞƌƚǇƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞĨĂĐƚŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŵŽĚĂůŝƚǇ
decision (the others being the level of policy and human rights). While there is agreement on 
the importance of aid dependency and the leverage afforded a donor by the relative size of 
their aid transfer, the effects expected are contradictory. Fritz and Kolstad (2008) argue that 
the higher the level of aid dependency, the greater the level of control a donor has with 
project support. HŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? / Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ĂƌŐƵĞ '^ ŝƐ  “ŵŽƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ĂŶ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ
ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇ ĂŝĚ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ŚĞůĚ ďǇ
Morrissey (2006). The expected effect depends upon beliefs regarding fungibility and donor 
influence. In the high aid dependency case, those that argue GBS is the preferred modality 
focus on the ability of donors to influence the spending composition of donors. Those that 
argue project aid is preferred in this situation have less confidence in the ability to influence 
recipients, and focus instead on the assured (but not necessarily additional) spending in the 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƉƌŝŽƌŝƚǇĂƌĞĂƐ ? 
5.3 A SIMPLE MODEL OF AID MODALITY CHOICE  
I consider a situation with two agents, a donor (D) and recipient (R) and two possible goods 
consumed within the recipient country (݃ଵ and ݃ଶ). ݃ଵ can be thought of as all expenditures 
5- Pragmatic Selectivity        Paul Clist 
107 
 
that are valued by both the recipient and the donor, and ݃ଶ as all expenditures that are 
valued by the recipient but not the donor. The ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĞŶĂǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚƐƵŵŽĨ
these two goods, whereas the donor only values the former. This is referred to as the 
development good for ease, but note that it ŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽĂƐƐƵŵĞƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ
ŐŽŽĚ ? ŝƐ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ŵŽƌĞ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŐŽŽĚ ? ŝŶ ƌĞĚƵĐŝŶŐ ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ?
merely that there exists the possibility of  preference misalignment.  The distinction between 
the two goods is simply a demarcation between those which the donor considers a valid use 
of aid and that which it does not. The utility functions of the recipient and donor are given 
below: ܷ௥ ൌ ߙ݃ଵ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߙሻ݃ଶ (1) ܷௗ ൌ ݃ଵ ൅ ܽ௥ ൅ ܽௗ (2) 
 
Where ߙ߳ሾ ? ? ?ሿ, and a higher value of ߙ represents a higher degree of preference alignment 
between the donor and recipient. ܽ௥ and ܽௗ represent GBS and Project aid respectively 
(given the subscript d or r according to whether it is controlled more by the donor, Project 
ĂŝĚ ?ŽƌƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?'^ ? ?dŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇƌĞůŝĞƐƵƉŽŶĂĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to offer different levels of aid depending upon recipient preferences and commitments. The 
previous chapter found that this ability to vary aid levels in response to policy indicators is 
not evident. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, this can be explained as the 
 ‘^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ŝŵƉƵůƐĞ ? Žƌ  ‘ǁĂƌŵ ŐůŽǁ ? ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? dŚŝƐ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ
function of the donor as the sum of aid disbursed, ܽ௥ ൅ ܽௗ . This models directly the warm 
ŐůŽǁ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ  “ŐĂŝŶ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚ ŽĨ ŐŝǀŝŶŐ ?(Andreoni, 1990, p. 473) as 
well as from the effect of their giving. Because of this, the amount of aid remains constant 
throughout the analysis. For simplicity we use the utility function of ܷௗ ൌ ݃ଵ in the following 
equations, but keep the idea that disbursal increases utility by including the assumption that 
all aid is disbursed.  
The context of the model can be explained using the idea of the three step decision: who 
gets aid, how much aid they get (both modelled in the previous chapter), and finally what 
type of aid they get. The first two stages are exogenous to this model, and can be thought of 
ĂƐďĞŝŶŐƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐŚĞĂĚŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?dŚĞƚŚŝƌĚĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨĂŝĚ ?ĐĂŶďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ
ŽĨĂƐďĞŝŶŐƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĨŝĞůĚŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?dŚĞĚŽŶŽƌƚŚĞŶĐŚŽŽses between the types of 
aid that it has available (we consider only two for convenience), so as to maximise its 
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expected welfare. The simple production functions of the two goods and the budget 
constraints of the recipient and donor are given below. ݃ଵ ൌ ݁ ൅ ߠܽௗ (3) ݃ଶ ൌ ݉ (4) ܩ ൅ ܽ௥ ൒ ݉ ൅ ݁ (5) ܣ ൌ ܽ௥ ൅ ܽௗ (6) 
 
Where ݉ and ݁ are production inputs of the recipient (analogous to expenditure allocation) 
for the two types of good, ܽ௥ and ܽௗ are GBS and project aid respectively, ߠ is an efficiency 
parameter for project aid, and ܩ ŝƐ ƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂƌǇďƵĚŐĞƚ ?tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƚŚĞ
theoretical literature has generally constrained project aid to be at best as efficient as GBS, 
here it is only assumed that ߠ ൐  ? so that ߠ can be interpreted as the efficiency of project 
aid relative to GBS. Implicitly, we assume that the efficiency parameter is ߠ ൌ ߠכ ߣ ? , where ߣ 
is the efficiency of ܽ௥. To simplify matters (without losing generality), we use the relative 
efficiency term ߠ and normalise the parameters such that ߣ ൌ  ?. We start by assuming all 
variables are common knowledge, and that recipients are either good (ߙ ൌ  ?) or bad (ߙ ൌ ?) from a donor perspective. The assumption of either an entirely aligned or non-aligned 
recipient is extreme, and made in order to increase ease of comprehension. It is worth 
noting two points. First, the model is dealing only with discretionary spending, and so no 
production of the development good does not equate with no utility for the poor, merely no 
extra utility above some base level. Second, the later introduction of the probability of 
misalignment tempers this assumption considerably.  
If the recipient is type ߙଵ, then there is no preference misalignment as both agents sole 
concern is the ݃ଵ good.  ܷ௥ ൌ ܷௗ ൌ ݃ଵ (7) 
 
In this case the recipient would choose ܩ ൅ ܽ௥ ൌ ݁ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?dŚĂƚ
ŝƐ ?ƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂƌǇƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐŝƐĂƉƉƌŽǀĞĚŽĨďǇƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?dŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ
utility is given by: ܷௗ ൌ ݁ ൅ ߠܽௗ ൌ ܩ ൅ ܽ௥ ൅ ߠܽௗ (8) 
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Where there is no preference misalignment the sole consideration is the relative efficiency 
of the two modalities. The donor would seek to maximise its utility, and comparing the 
marginal efficiency of the two types of aid gives: 
డ௎೏డ௔ೝ ൌ  ?, డ௎೏డ௔೏ ൌ ߠ. 
So, donors would choose to distribute aid either as GBS or as project aid, depending on the 
efficiency parameters of the two. If ߠ ൐  ? the donor would choose project aid, if ߠ ൌ  ? it 
would be indifferent, and if ߠ ൏  ? it would choose GBS. If the recipient is type ߙ଴, there is 
complete preference misalignment regarding the discretionary budget. As such, the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ? ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ĐŚŽŽƐĞƐ ܩ ൅ ܽ௥ ൌ ݉. Clearly, the donor then 
chooses project aid (as Ăůů ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ŐŝǀĞŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ  ‘ŵŝƐƐƉĞŶƚ ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ݃ଵ ൌ ߠܽௗ. We now move to the more interesting situation where there is not complete 
information.  
with probability ݌,  ߙ ൌ ߙଵ ൌ  ?  
with probability  ? െ ݌,  ߙ ൌ ߙ଴ ൌ  ?.  
Where ݌߳ሾ ? ? ?ሿ, the distribution of which is commonly known. We first find the recipients 
reserve utility function, given by project aid. If it is the bad type, it does not allocate any 
resources towards the development good. If it is the good type, it gains utility both from its 
ĞŶƚŝƌĞĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶĂƌǇďƵĚŐĞƚ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝĚ ?ܷ௥௉஺ሺߙ଴ሻ ൌ ݃ଶ ൌ ݉ ൌ ܩ (9) ܷ௥௉஺ሺߙଵሻ ൌ ݃ଵ ൌ ݁ ൅ ߠܽௗ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߠܽௗ (10) 
 
ŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƵƚŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĞŶܧሺܷ௥௉஺ሻ ൌ ܩ ൅ ݌ߠܽௗ. 
hŶĚĞƌWƌŽũĞĐƚĂŝĚ ?ƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĞ total development good it produces, augmented 
by any produced by the recipient.  ܷௗ௉஺ሺߙ଴ሻ ൌ ߠܽௗ. (11) ܷௗ௉஺ሺߙଵሻ ൌ ܩ ൅ ߠܽௗ. (12) 
dŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚƵƚŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĞŶܧሺܷௗ௉஺ሻ ൌ ݌ܩ ൅ ߠܽௗ. 
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/Ĩ ƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ǁĞƌĞƚŽŐŝǀĞ'^ ? ƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƵƚŝůŝƚǇǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞ
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?/ĨƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŵŝƐĂůŝŐŶĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĂŶǇ
of its additional discretionary resources to ݃ଵ, and so the donor receives no utility. If they 
have aligned preferences, all resources are spent on the development good (݃ଵ). Regardless 
of their preferences, the recipient always allocates its available resources as it sees fit, and 
so always receives the output it desires. This is mathematically stated as: ܷௗீ஻ௌሺߙ଴ሻ ൌ  ? (13) ܷௗீ஻ௌሺߙଵሻ ൌ ݁ ൌ ܩ ൅ ܣ (14) ܷ௥ீ ஻ௌሺߙ଴ሻ ൌ ܷ௥ீ ஻ௌሺߙଵሻ ൌ ܩ ൅ ܣ (15) 
And so ܧሺܷௗீ஻ௌሻ ൌ ݌ሺܩ ൅ ܣሻ (16) ܧሺܷ௥ீ ஻ௌሻ ൌ ܩ ൅ ܣ (17) 
 
As aforementioned, the reserve utility for the recipient is given by project aid. For GBS to be 
ŐŝǀĞŶ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ďŽƚŚĂŐĞŶƚƐŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚĂƐŵƵĐŚƵƚŝůŝƚǇƵŶĚĞƌ'^ ?dŚĞĂŐĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
participation constraints are:  ܧሺܷ௥ீ ஻ௌሻ ൐ ܧሺܷ௥௉஺ሻ (18) ܧ൫ܷௗீ஻ௌ൯ ൐ ܧሺܷௗ௉஺ሻ (19) 
 
For the recipient, this means ܩ ൅ ܣ ൐ ܩ ൅ ݌ߠܣ 
i.e. if  ? ൐ ߠ ȉ ܧሺ݌ሻthen GBS is preferred, which means Project aid is only preferred if the 
efficiency gained from using project aid (if any) is enough to offset the potential preference 
misalignment. 
The donor will prefer GBS if  ݌ሺܩ ൅ ܽௗሻ ൐ ݌ܩ ൅ ߠܽௗ 
i.e. if ܧሺ݌ሻ ൐ ߠ. This is more easily understood negatively, as depending on whether the 
expected preference misalignment is smaller than the relative efficiency loss of project aid. 
This simple framework shows that there are two main factors that influence the choice of 
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aid modality: the preference alignment (modelled here as the expectation of preferences 
being aligned) and the efficiency of Project aid relative to GBS. The real value of the model is 
that it maintains the role of alignment from the existing theoretical literature, and adds to it 
a more appropriate role for the relative efficiency of the two types of aid. In order to derive 
a reduced form equation, we can simply state (from the above) the following: ܽ௥ܣ ൌ ܨሺܧሾ݌ሿ ? ߠሻ 
As ߠ has been understood as the relative efficiency parameter, we can extend this slightly. 
We have been using ߠ ൌ ߠ෠ ߣ ?  and normalising the parameter using ߣ ൌ  ? . If we now let this 
vary, we can say that ܧሺ݌ሻ ൐ ߠ෠ ߣ ?  ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ
modality choice, where ߣ is the absolute efficiency of ܽ௥ and ߠ෠ is the absolute efficiency of ܽௗ. This then gives the following ܽ௥ܣ ൌ ܨሺܧሾ݌ሿ ? ߠ෠ ? ߣሻ 
With the results ܨԢሺܧሾ݌ሿሻ ൐  ?, ܨᇱ൫ߠ෠൯ ൏  ? and ܨԢሺߣሻ ൐  ?. The results are intuitive. In 
keeping with the previous theoretical literature, we find that the greater the degree of 
alignment, the more likely GBS will be preferred by the donor. We also confirm that the 
efficiency of GBS and project aid are crucial, as they determine the effect of aid. We abstract 
from issues regarding ƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŝĚďƵĚŐĞƚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞƐŝǌĞŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?
as we acknowledge that while aid may be a significant source of external finance within a 
recipient country, the normal situation is for this to be highly disbursed between different 
donors. Also, the model presented here does not rely on the assumption that donors 
possess commitment technology. As discussed it is unlikely that donors are credibly able to 
threaten punishment and so models that rely heavily on the assumption of full commitment 
are not to be preferred.  
5.4 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The closest existing empirical research that we are aware of is Knack and Eubank (2009). 
They propose a simple theoretical model with the use of recipient systems thought of as a 
public good that causes improvements that are enjoyed by all donors (who use government 
systems). In their framework an individual donor is more likely to use recipient systems if 
they are more likely to benefit from their improvement (measured by the share of recipient 
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aid given by a donor), their citizens have a high level of trust in development aid and/or the 
recipient systems are already of a high level. This simple model is then tested using three 
dependent variables taken from the OECD (2008) survey Monitoring the Paris Declaration, 
which measure some elements of recipient control. Our analysis differs in that we do not try 
to explain differences between donors, whereas they aim to account for them by using the 
level of support for development aid amongst their domestic population and their type (e.g. 
bilateral, multilateral). Our analysis can include more observations than Knack and Eubank 
(2009), who are limited to a maximum of 59 donors, 55 recipients and one year, although 
regression results imply an average of only 13 recipients per donor (as data is only available 
if a donor gives aid to a recipient). Although they often report a large sample size, this is 
misleading as a very large proportion of observations are in effect missing (as a given donor 
may never give any type of aid to a given recipient). Using several datasets affords many 
more dependent variables, each of which provide new information on the variation and 
distribution of recipient control. The synthesis of these different perspectives constitutes a 
more extensive test of the theoretical prediction. 
A major impediment to researching this question is data scarcity. Ideally, a measure of the 
control a recipient exercises over ODA related to their country would be used to see which 
factors best explain this decision. However, data relating to different aid modalities are 
scarce, misleading and often incomplete. In fact, they can be misleading precisely because 
they are incomplete, as any judgement on the general composition of aid is only valid if data 
on the majority of aid is available (i.e. the aid share given as a certain type of aid is the 
relevant information, not the absolute amount of aid). Even if data existed on the use of all 
aid modalities, it would be difficult to combine this into a single sensible measure, as one 
would need to ascribe a certain level of recipient control to each modality. Here, we use 
different variables to proxy for recipient control, which complement one another to provide 
the best evidence available to answer the question at hand.  We first discuss the 
independent variables, as they are largely constant throughout the analysis.  
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We have previously found 
௔ೝ஺ ൌ ܨሺܧሾ݌ሿ ? ߠ ? ߣሻ, and so the equation to be estimated, in 
words, is: ܽ௥ܣ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܲݎ݂݁݁ݎ݁݊ܿ݁ݏ ൅ ߚଶܩ݋ݒ݁ݎ݊ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൅ ߚଷܶݎܽ݊ݏܽܿݐ݅݋݊ܥ݋ݏݐݏ ൅ ߚସܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ 
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With the expectation that ߚଵ ൐  ?, ߚଶ ൐  ?, and ߚଷ ൏  ?. I will now introduce the variables 
that measure the factors.  
Preferences ሺ݌ሻ: much of the theoretical literature that focuses on a choice between project 
and programme aid finds the alignment of preferences between donor and recipient to be 
ƚŚĞŬĞǇĨĂĐƚŽƌ ?dŚŝƐŝƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƌŽŵŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽƌƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƚŚĞĂďility 
to meet goals, but rather the desirability of those goals from the donor perspective. To 
capture this we include the percentage of public spending on education, with GDP as the 
ĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŽƌ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĐůŽƐĞ ƚŽ ǁŚĂƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ƉƌŽ-public expenditurĞ ?  ?WW ? ĂŶĚ
should be a good proxy for ݁  ?ƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŐŽŽĚ ?ƐŝŶƉƵƚŝŶƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ?. The 
assumptions of the theoretical literature are normally of a benevolent donor, who wishes to 
maximise development outcomes, and as such we can think of donor preferences being 
constant and predictable. The alignment of recipients to this goal is very difficult for donors 
to quantify, and we use these data as a signal regarding the commitment to development of 
a potential recipient. Any missing data (especially in the years after 2006 and before 1998) 
are replaced with the nearest available data. This closely mirrors the best available data a 
donor would have, and is therefore a suitable solution. Also included here is the variable 
prsp which is a dummy that takes the value one if the recipient has published a PRSP-related 
document (this includes progress reports and so forth). This is to capture ownership and the 
existence of a recipient-led approach, which are likely to increase the efficiency of 
government-implemented aid-funded activities. The prsp variable is a dummy, but may 
capture alignment more accurately as the process requires a number of prior actions to be 
taken, over a period of time.  
Governance ሺߠሻ: this is the key motivation of this research. Governance here is 
conceptualised using a narrow definition of the ability to convert aid inputs into 
development outcomes. We expect that a donor is less likely to use recipient systems if it 
incurs a large efficiency loss in doing so, which would be represented here by a positive 
coefficient on the variables representing governance. There are two main datasets which are 
relevant here. From the first we can choose from the six Governance Matters variables 
including government effectiveness and control of corruption, from 1996 until the present for 
up to 190 countries. The second is the CPIA, which includes the variables general public 
sector quality and the quality of the budget, but only for up to 75 countries over the years 
2005-2008. The two sets of variables are correlated, particularly public sector management 
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and government effectiveness (0.84). Government Effectiveness is chosen as it provides the 
best reflection of the theoretical conceptualisation of governance (which is the efficiency of 
government in producing a development good) and coverage.  
Transaction Costs (ߣ):  within the policy community transaction costs are a common 
argument for using newer aid modalities that give the recipient more control. Essentially, 
they are thought to determine the efficiency of project aid, and so are as good measure of ߣ. 
If this is a major motivation, we would expect more control to be granted to recipients that 
face higher transaction costs. The number of donors is included as a measure of how 
fragmented aid is within a given country, measuring simply the number of donors to 
disburse aid within that country on the CRS/OECD. The expectation is that recipients with 
higher fragmentation would have higher transaction costs, and in turn see more efforts by 
donors to reduce these costs. Ideally this would be a concentration measure, but this is not 
available. Aid dependency is another potential indicator for higher transaction costs: for a 
recipient that receives large amounts of aid relative to its GDP, the transaction costs are 
higher as a percentage of GDP (even when assuming some economies of scale). Aid 
dependency is also likely to be positively related to new modalities for the simple reason 
that the more aid there is in a country, the more likely it will be to take different forms. The 
measure of aid dependency used is aid as a % of GDP. 
Controls  W The income of a recipient (GNI per capita PPP in international dollars) is used to 
measure income.  Ceteris paribus, poorer recipients might be more likely to receive more 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ĂƐ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ǁŝůů ƌĞǁĂƌĚ ŐŽŽĚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ Ă ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽŵĞ ůĞǀĞů ? 
Controlling for income then allows for the quality of governance to be understood relative to 
ƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐŽŵĞůĞǀĞů ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚĞWĨŽƌŵƵůĂƐŝŶƚŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƚŚƌĞĞ ?The 
ƐŚĂƌĞ ŽĨ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ ďƵĚŐĞƚ that a recipient represents is included as donors are more 
likely to use a variety of modalities in recipients that receive more of their aid (a larger 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ? ?/ŶƚŚĞ<ŶĂĐŬĂŶĚƵďĂŶŬ ?Ɛ(2009) 
framework, this variable is motivated by the reputational stake a donor has in a country, and 
the likely ability of the recipient to benefit from any resulting institutional improvement. 
Alternative Specification  W the preceding description details the main specification, chosen 
partly to maximise coverage. However, an alternative specification is often employed in the 
research as a robustness check. This alternative specification replaces two variables 
(education spending and government effectiveness) with two variables taken from the CPIA 
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data. The first variable is called the equity of public resource use and is chosen to measure 
alignment. Some explanation is needed, as the name of the variable is perhaps misleading. 
The variable measures two things in relation to their effect on the poor: government 
spending and taxation. The specific indicators (IEG, 2009, p. 79) are: 
x  “/ĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ those (individuals, groups, localities) that are poor, vulnerable, or 
have unequal access to services and opportunities 
x Adoption of national development strategy with explicit interventions to assist 
groups identified above 
x Systematic tracking of composition and incidence of public expenditures and their 
results feed back into subsequent allocations 
x Incidence of major taxes (progressive or regressive) and their alignment with 
ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
As such, this variable is a close representation of alignment as conceptualised by the 
theoretical literature, where it is the percentage of discretionary resources that are allocated 
to the poor. The second variable from the CPIA is public sector management. It is quite 
highly correlated with government effectiveness, but has a narrower focus. Again, it closely 
resembles the theoretical literatures as it is the efficiency of the government, rather than a 
broader notion of governance that includes, for example, democratic values. The alternative 
specification provides a robustness check of any evidence found using the main 
specification, this has two main sources. First, it is plain that these different variables are 
measuring slightly different notions of the factors which they represent. If the evidence from 
the two specifications concur, there is stronger evidence for the conclusions. If they differ, it 
implies that one is a truer measure of the important factor for the donor. Second, these 
variables are not used in the main specification as they are only available for more recent 
years. This limitation forces us to examine the later years more closely, and highlights 
whether the aid composition decision has evolved over time.   
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We use three different datasets, each of which provides a set of dependent variables and a 
different perspective. First, we use the CRS to give information on the use of GBS. Second, 
we use AiDA which gives data on program and civil society aid. Third, we use data from DFID 
on four criteria of recipient control. Because of low data coverage, results relating to this 
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third dataset are included in Appendix D, rather than in the main body of text. All data is by 
recipient, donor and year. 
GBS from the CRS dataset  W this OECD dataset is the most complete single source of 
disaggregated aid, and we use it to extract information on General Budget Support. As 
donors only give GBS to a fraction of its aid recipients, we estimate a two-stage model (as 
discussed in the aid allocation chapter). The first dependent variable is then a dummy, 
where a one denotes that the recipient has received GBS from the given donor within the 
last three years. A zero denotes that the recipient has received aid from that donor, but not 
GBS. Countries that have not received any type of aid are not included in the equation, as 
the decision as to the amount of aid is seen as exogenous. This time smoothing is used to 
counteract the volatile reporting of individual aid instruments. The data allows a probit to be 
estimated by donor, with data from 1996-2007 and up to 88 potential recipients. There is a 
broad choice of donors and the following six were chosen to give a broad indication of 
different types of donor, both bilateral and multilateral: Japan, Netherlands, UK, USA, EC and 
IDA.  
AiDA  W this dataset is a self-reported dataset that collates donor-published information on 
their own activities. Each individual packet of aid is broken down into a specific category, 
from which we focus on Civil Society and General Programme Assistance. These variables are 
transformed so as to measure the percentage of aid that meets a given criterion, e.g. it is 
given as civil society aid or as general programme assistance. There are observations for 
around 110 recipients over the period 2002-2007, for seven donors.  
SAMPLE  
Throughout the analysis, we estimate by donor; a departure from the literature that is partly 
motivated by a recognition that donors differ. While Knack and Eubank (2009) seek to 
explain these differences (using the level of development support within the donor country) 
we do not. Instead, these donor differences are controlled for completely by running 
separate regressions. Given the disjointed nature of the data available, the choice of which 
donors and years to include in the sample is normally dictated by the dataset. Because of 
this the research should be seen as an initial investigation as to the extent of the 
implementation of pragmatic selectivity (if any) and more generally the factors that 
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ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞĂŝĚŵŽĚĂůŝƚǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶĂŶĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞĐĂƚĂůŽŐƵŝŶŐŽĨĂůůĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ĂŝĚ
composition decisions.  
 
DATA PRESENTATION 
As the data used herein are rarely used and the reader may not be aware of the basic 
attributes, some simple descriptive data plots are provided. Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 give 
basic plots of GBS over time. The first is the fraction of aid recipients that are given GBS. The 
second is the average percentage GBS/aid for those recipients that receive at least some 
GBS. While both of these are calculated by donor, they are not labelled so as to assist easy 
interpretation (by reducing unnecessary information). There are three points that are made 
apparent by these figures. First, donor heterogeneity is large and the decision to estimate by 
donor is necessary.  Second, there is volatility in the use of this instrument, hence the data 
smoothing. Third, there may be a slight increase in its use over the period, but there is not as 
much of an increase as we would expect (given the discussion of the instrument).  
 Figure 5.2: Fraction of Recipients that are Allocated GBS 
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 Figure 5.3 Percentage of GBS/Aid 
 
The basic plots of the AiDA data are shown in Figure 5.4. The seven donors for whom reliable 
data is available are included, over the period for which we estimate. There is obviously 
great variation between donors. Most obviously, Germany do not give large amounts of aid 
as either to Civil Society or as General Programme Assistance. France are the only donor who 
give large amounts (around 20% of their aid) as programme aid, whereas the remaining 
donors tend to give at least 20% of their aid to civil society organisations. For all donors the 
six year period is surprisingly consistent, implying no major changes in the use of different 
instruments.  
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 Figure 5.4 Civil Society and General Programme Aid as % of Aid, 2002-2007  
 
Note: The dark upper area of each graph represents Civil Society/Aid %, the dark lower area of each graph 
represents Program Aid/Aid %.  
5.5 RESULTS 
Because of the disparate nature of the results, they are presented briefly in this section, with 
a longer discussion in the following section taking the results as a whole. The first dependent 
variable to be used is General Budget Support, as data availability is relatively high, and it 
represents the extreme of recipient control. A two-step model is used to estimate this, as 
the problem is similar to that discussed in the aid allocation chapter (clustering at the zero-
bound).  
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 Table 5.1 Determinants of GBS recipients, Eligibility Stage 1997-2007 
Donor Japan Netherland
s 
UK USA EC IDA  
Public spending on 
education  -0.083** -0.051 -0.016 -0.15** -0.033 
-
0.10*** 
 
(2.16) (0.81) (0.35) (2.01) (0.85) (2.65)  
PRSP document created -0.082 0.90*** 0.23 0.41 0.78*** 1.25***  
(0.49) (4.01) (1.46) (1.33) (5.25) (8.63)  
Government Effectiveness 0.20 0.53* 0.51 0.58** 0.096 0.26  
(1.06) (1.69) (1.50) (2.20) (0.56) (1.51)  
Number of Donors 
0.041*** 0.00051 
0.062**
* 
0.030 -0.036*** 
-
0.0022 
 
(3.40) (0.03) (3.18) (1.26) (2.93) (0.22)  
Aid/GNI % 
0.013 0.016 0.026** 
-
0.0016 
0.029*** 
0.016*
* 
 
(1.57) (1.50) (2.25) (0.13) (3.26) (2.30)  
GNI per capita (/100) -
0.015*** 
-0.0050 -0.030** 
-
0.0013 
-
0.0073** 
-
0.0057 
 
(3.15) (0.58) (2.38) (0.33) (2.28) (1.05)  
Recipient Share of  
Donor Aid 
0.079* 0.41*** 0.12 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.19***  
(1.71) (3.87) (1.46) (3.18) (3.44) (4.63)  
Observations 1117 799 955 1042 1058 927  
Pseudo R-squared 0.184 0.213 0.316 0.184 0.195 0.300  
Mean of Y 0.10 0.12 0.082 0.020 0.21 0.20  
Note: This is the first stage regression, and so is run using a probit with clustered standard errors. T statistics are 
provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance levels are denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
Table 5.1 reports results from a first stage regression over an eleven year period for six 
major donors. Only recipients that receive some aid from that donor are included, which 
accounts for the sample size variability. The dependent variable is one if the recipient 
receives GBS from that donor, and zero otherwise. The first point to notice is actually in the 
last row, as it reports the fraction of recipients that receive GBS for each donor, e.g. while 
IDA give at least some GBS for 20% of its aid recipients, the USA does so in only 2% of its 
recipients. The variability in the utilisation of GBS illustrates the importance of controlling for 
donor-specific effects, which is done here by estimating them separately. Of the two 
alignment parameters, public spending on education is always negative and the existence of 
a PRSP is (almost) always positive (both are significant in three of the six cases). This implies 
that PRSP more fully captures alignment, and that donors have not abandoned the idea that 
ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ Ă ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ ? dŚĞ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ ŝƐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ĨŽƌ
each donor but significant only for the Netherlands and USA. At the eligibility stage then, 
governance is of real but limited importance. A higher level of aid dependency has a positive 
relationship with recipient control for each donor, so GBS is more likely to be used in 
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countries for whom the transaction costs of aid are more prevalent. The results also show 
that donors are more likely to use GBS if the recipient is poor or they give them a large 
proportion of their aid budget, as expected. 
 Table 5.2 Determinants of GBS recipients,  
Eligibility Stage 2005-2007, Robustness Check 
Donor Japan Netherlands UK USA EC IDA 
Equality of Public  
Resource Use 
-0.30 -0.077 -0.68 -0.65 -0.43 0.19 
(0.83) (0.12) (1.48) (1.13) (1.28) (0.49) 
PRSP document  
created 
. . -0.81 . 0.95** 0.96*** 
  (1.21)  (2.24) (2.63) 
Public Sector  
Management 
0.46 2.23*** 1.92** -0.29 0.77* 0.85* 
(0.53) (3.00) (2.11) (0.38) (1.82) (1.73) 
Number of Donors 0.12*** -0.00085 0.30*** 0.22* -0.044** 0.0040 
(2.73) (0.02) (3.83) (1.94) (1.96) (0.19) 
Aid/GNI % -0.017 0.054** 0.046* 0.017 0.055*** 0.0015 
(0.65) (2.19) (1.67) (0.99) (3.25) (0.13) 
GNI per capita (/100) -0.00021 0.00019 -0.0011 0.000085 0.000022 -0.00021* 
(0.76) (1.01) (1.39) (0.32) (0.18) (1.78) 
Recipient Share of  
Donor Aid 
0.11 0.64*** 0.079* 0.69*** 0.70*** 0.17* 
(1.22) (2.68) (1.67) (4.00) (3.25) (1.92) 
Observations 143 115 158 138 183 202 
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.30 0.47 0.34 0.20 0.239 
Mean of Y 0.035 0.30 0.10 0.029 0.40 0.35 
Note: This is the first stage regression, and so is run using a probit with clustered standard errors. T statistics are 
provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance levels are denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
Table 5.2 reports the results from the same regression, but using the alternative 
specification. This varies a number of things, meaning a similar result would imply robust 
findings. The first change is obviously in the variables used to measure alignment and 
governance. The second impact is one of sample coverage  W as it restricts the sample to 
ƚŚƌĞĞ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚŝŵĞ ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĞ ĐĂŶ ƐĞĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ǀĂƌŝĂďůĞ  ‘WZ^W
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĚƌŽƉƉĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝŶ ůĂƚĞƌ ǇĞĂƌƐ ?for 
these donors, that variable perfectly predicts the dependent variable. In some cases, in 
these later years the donor only allocates GBS to recipients that already have a PRSP 
document in place. As a single variable perfectly predicts the use of GBS, this confirms the 
importance of alignment. It is reported for the multilateral donors, where it is again found 
strongly positive and significant. However education spending is found to be irrelevant. 
These results strongly echo the previous results that prsp is a better measure of alignment, 
as understood by donors. In these results we find that governance is positive and significant 
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for every donor, apart from Japan and the USA who give low levels of GBS. There are two 
reasons that might explain why this result differs from earlier findings. First, the variable 
measuring governance might more closely resemble the important aspect of governance 
that the donor values. This variable more closely resembles the conceptualisation of 
governance from the theoretical literature  W the technocratic ability of the public sector. 
Second, it may be that pragmatic selectivity has only come into use in more recent years. A 
further discussion of this is found below. The coefficients of other variables largely concur 
with previous findings.  
 Table 5.3: Determinants of GBS recipients, Eligibility Stage 2005-2007 
Donor Japan 
Netherland
s 
UK USA EC IDA  
Public spending on 
education  
-0.20 -0.033 -0.44** -0.27 -0.048 -0.091  
(1.11) (0.34) (2.57) (1.54) (0.86) (1.45)  
PRSP document created -0.29 1.96** . -0.51 0.63** 2.22***  
(0.39) (2.43) . (0.74) (2.02) (5.93)  
Government Effectiveness -0.40 0.76** 1.30* 1.27** 0.55** 1.20***  
(0.47) (2.17) (1.76) (2.18) (2.17) (3.60)  
Number of Donors 0.26* -0.0034 0.30*** 0.088 -0.035* 0.012  
(1.86) (0.09) (4.01) (1.43) (1.89) (0.47)  
Aid/GNI % -0.0029 0.034** 0.061** 0.028 0.057*** 0.0073  
(0.12) (2.18) (2.44) (0.79) (3.49) (0.68)  
GNI per capita (/100) 
-
0.00015 
0.000077 
-
0.00076** 
-
0.00016 
-
0.000081** 
-
0.00019
* 
 
(0.85) (1.13) (2.01) (1.12) (1.99) (1.90)  
Recipient Share of  
Donor Aid 
0.094* 0.51*** 0.0067 0.62*** 0.43** 0.17*  
(1.73) (3.56) (0.20) (3.11) (2.47) (1.92)  
Observations 317 208 127 307 298 259  
Pseudo R-squared 0.395 0.282 0.434 0.329 0.271 0.379  
Mean of Y 0.025 0.18 0.11 0.023 0.27 0.27  
Note: This is the first stage regression, and so is run using a probit with clustered standard errors. T statistics are 
provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance levels are denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
In order to investigate whether the positive relationship between governance and the use of 
GBS is found because of a change in the sample (a time effect) or a specification change, 
Table 5.3 reports the results from the first stage regression using the main specification with 
a restricted time period. These results then differ from those in Table 5.2 in the specification 
but not the years observed. Because of the greater coverage of the main specification, Table 
5.3 does still have more observations. The non-governance coefficients do not vary 
considerably from previous findings. However, the governance variables are found to be 
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positive and significant for every donor (apart from Japan, which gives GBS to very few 
recipients). These results then show that governance is a major factor in deciding which aid 
recipients of these major donors receive GBS. These three sets of results lead us to conclude 
that the efficiency of the government in the aid composition decision is important, and has 
become increasingly important in recent years. PRSP is also important, as are some 
transaction cost concerns, income level and the importance to the donor.  
 Table 5.4: Determinants of GBS recipients, Level Stage 1997-2007 
Donor 
 
Japan Netherlands UK USA EC IDA 
Public spending on education  
 
0.88 0.35 -1.88 -9.32*** 0.12 0.89 
  
(0.56) (0.15) (0.71) (3.71) (0.11) (0.82) 
PRSP document created 
 
0.0063 -6.65 5.30 0.46 -8.82* -1.23 
  
(0.00) (0.96) (0.58) (0.07) (1.73) (0.16) 
Government Effectiveness 
 
-2.43 14.0* 21.8** 31.1* 14.1*** -6.86 
  
(0.25) (1.87) (2.30) (2.09) (2.70) (1.07) 
Number of Donors 
 
-1.28* -0.090 -0.78 -1.11 -0.28 -2.14*** 
  
(2.00) (0.11) (0.70) (1.66) (0.80) (4.52) 
Aid/GNI % 
 
0.42 0.55 -0.066 -0.32 0.17 0.53*** 
  
(1.21) (1.08) (0.18) (0.36) (0.78) (2.89) 
GNI per capita (/100) 
 
-0.0035 0.31 -0.73 0.79*** -0.27** 0.00038 
  
(0.02) (1.61) (1.08) (3.51) (2.39) (0.24) 
Recipient Share of  
Donor Aid  
-1.41** -7.50** -6.65** 10.00*** 5.01 0.56 
  
(2.46) (2.33) (2.58) (3.44) (1.33) (0.35) 
Observations 
 
112 98 78 21 221 188 
R-squared 
 
0.217 0.188 0.127 0.918 0.088 0.202 
Mean of Y 
 
28.1 46.8 38.7 39.4 34.3 49.1 
Note: This is the second stage regression, and so is run using OLS with clustered standard errors. T statistics are 
provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance levels are denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
Table 5.4 reports the second stage regression using the main specification, where the 
dependent variable is the percentage of aid from a given donor to a recipient that is GBS. 
The starting place for the discussion of this table is the final column, which shows the 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐĂǀĞƌĂŐĞůĞǀĞůŽĨ'^ƵƐĞ ?ĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞh^ƵƐĞƐ'^ƐŽŝŶĨƌĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞƐĂŵƉůĞƐŝǌĞ
is so small that its results are fragile and mostly not discussed, but included for 
completeness. A striking point is that the average level of GBS is quite high, when it is 
decided that it will be used. Unlike at the eligibility stage, alignment is not a major factor for 
donors when deciding the amount of GBS. Government effectiveness is positive and 
significant for four donors, with a sizeable coefficient. GovernmĞŶƚĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?ƌĂŶŐĞŝƐ-
2.5 to 2.5, and so a 1 unit increase resulting in a 20% increase in GBS/Aid is a sizeable effect. 
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Japan and the IDA do not exhibit any positive relationship between governance and GBS/Aid 
however. Unfortunately, due to sample size it is not informative to run the regression with 
the alternative specification. However the first stage regressions do suggest that the 
importance of governance has grown over time. There are no clear cross-donor patterns 
regarding the relationship between the level of GBS and either the variables representing 
transaction costs, income or the recipient share of donor aid.   
AIDA DATABASE 
We now turn to analysis that uses the dependent variables from the AIDA database, as 
detailed earlier in this chapter. The major advantage of this data is that it gives two 
dependent variables that are broader in definition than GBS, and are from opposite ends of 
the recipient control spectrum, allowing us to test from both sides. Unfortunately, data 
availability severely restricts the number of tests we can perform on the hypothesis. A 
maximum of seven donors are chosen on the basis of size and data coverage. While these 
donors do not include the USA, UK or Japan, they do include some of the Nordic+ donors as 
well as France and Germany. The former group are seen as being more pro-poor than other 
donors (as discussed in the aid allocation chapter), and as AIDA data is self-reported it is 
likely that the data is more representative of this pro-poor, pro-transparency group of 
donors. As such, this cannot be seen as a test of whether pragmatic selectivity is used by all 
donors, but rather whether it is used by this sub-set. Table 5.5 reports the results from the 
first regression, where the dependent variable is the percentage of aid that is program aid.  
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 Table 5.5 Program Aid, 2002-2006 
 
Canada Denmark France Germany Netherlands Norway Sweden 
% Education 
spending/GDP 
-0.00086 0.034 0.071 0.045 -0.055* -0.42*** -0.11** 
(0.01) (0.57) (1.49) (1.21) (1.76) (3.77) (2.20) 
PRSP document created -0.092 0.10 0.47** -0.50*** 0.56*** 0.23 0.30* 
(0.34) (0.41) (2.37) (2.74) (4.26) (0.98) (1.85) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
0.93*** 0.87** -0.27 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.55 1.19*** 
(2.96) (2.26) (1.12) (2.67) (3.94) (1.40) (5.30) 
Number of Donors 0.010 0.064** -0.0027 0.062*** 0.0080 0.27*** 0.0036 
 (0.59) (2.14) (0.19) (3.74) (0.89) (5.77) (0.21) 
Aid/GNI % 0.012 0.0043 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.057*** 0.039*** 
 (0.86) (0.29) (2.60) (3.14) (2.61) (3.95) (4.43) 
GNI pc/100 -0.015** -0.030** -0.011* -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.025* -0.036*** 
 (2.08) (2.35) (1.74) (3.40) (3.49) (1.73) (4.60) 
Observations 970 452 336 726 944 917 817 
R-squared 0.092 0.124 0.169 0.164 0.142 0.449 0.289 
chi2 15.7 20.4 51.7 74.0 101.3 124.6 144.9 
Mean of Y 1.02 1.89 9.82 4.23 6.26 0.76 4.49 
Note: Standard OLS used. T statistics are provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance 
levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Despite the relative similarity of donors, Table 5.5 reports a large difference in the 
employment of program aid, from 2% to 17%. On alignment there is no consistent cross-
donor picture, but as in previous results, there is a negative coefficient for education 
spending. While the picture is somewhat muddied by the time trend (as a higher number of 
recipients have agreed a PRSP in later years), there is evidence that alignment (as measured 
by the prsp dummy) is important for some donors (but not for Germany). Government 
effectiveness is positive and very significant for five of the six donors, duplicating previous 
results.  Familiar findings are also found for the transaction cost and income variables  W 
donors give recipients more of their aid as program aid if the recipient is poorer, has a higher 
degree of aid/GNI or a larger number of donors. These results allow us to be more confident 
of the relationship with the level of a high-recipient control type of aid (having been 
restricted in our analysis on the level of GBS), and the consistent picture is reassuring. 
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 Table 5.6 Program Aid 2005-2007, robustness check  
 
Canada Denmark France Germany Neth. Norway Sweden 
Equality of Public 
Resource Use 
-1.46  -0.91** 1.45*** 0.38 -0.18 0.54 
(1.03)  (2.15) (3.25) (1.06) (0.37) (1.16) 
PRSP document  
created 
-0.85  0.33 -0.46 -0.080 0.062 -0.37 
(1.11)  (0.89) (1.35) (0.28) (0.14) (0.98) 
Public Sector 
Management 
5.62**  1.35** 0.72 1.79*** 0.85 1.17* 
(2.01)  (2.40) (1.08) (3.06) (0.92) (1.72) 
Number of Donors 0.14  -0.0081 0.12** 0.028 0.36*** -0.0089 
(1.29)  (0.26) (2.35) (0.74) (2.75) (0.18) 
Aid/GNI % 0.18**  0.11** 0.050** 0.047** 0.089*** 0.030 
(2.16)  (2.48) (2.13) (2.36) (2.95) (1.22) 
GNI pc/100 0.050  -0.019 -0.0084 0.0048 0.043* -0.037 
(1.12)  (0.96) (0.49) (0.33) (1.65) (1.61) 
Observations 145 87 86 172 137 158 140 
R-squared 0.397  0.293 0.390 0.255 0.352 0.225 
chi2 14.5  32.6 54.2 40.2 29.9 18.4 
Mean of Y 1.94 4.54 20.5 6.56 12.6 1.86 4.87 
Note: Standard OLS used. T statistics are provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance 
levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. Denmark was omitted due to insufficient variation, in essence 
the independent variables predicted the dependent variable too well. 
Table 5.6 reports the results of the same regression, when using the alternate specification. 
Data availability demands a change of time period, with a vastly reduced number of 
observations. Also, it becomes impossible to estimate for Denmark. The role of alignment is 
found to again be somewhat erratic across donors, as for four donors the coefficient for the 
first variable is insignificant and the remaining two have opposing signs. The role of the PRSP 
in the later time period is again found to be minimal. All donors exhibit signs of using 
ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ǁŝƚŚ ĨŽƵƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĐŽĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
governance variable, and it is positive for all five. The other variables are as expected, except 
for the income effect which is largely insignificant. These results show that when the 
broader definition of program aid is used, the phenomenon of a positive relationship 
between governance and recipient control of aid holds. Alignment, Transaction costs and 
poverty are found to be important, but evidence for the latter two is not universal.  
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 Table 5.7 Civil Society 2002-2006, Probit 
 Canada Denmark France Germany Neth. Norway Sweden 
% Education 
spending/GDP 
-0.027 0.015  0.070** -0.025 -0.047** -0.10*** 
(1.30) (0.50)  (2.28) (1.21) (2.13) (4.22) 
PRSP document 
created 
0.070 0.30*  -0.25 0.051 -0.077 0.42*** 
(0.60) (1.94)  (1.43) (0.42) (0.59) (2.82) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
-0.055 0.35**  -0.64*** 0.23** -0.19* -0.046 
(0.58) (2.23)  (4.44) (2.54) (1.84) (0.44) 
Number of Donors 0.037*** 0.048***  0.074*** 0.018*** 0.12*** 0.0053 
 (7.39) (3.48)  (6.46) (3.38) (11.69) (1.00) 
Aid/GNI % -0.014** 0.014*  -0.018* 0.0027 0.0037 -0.010 
 (2.36) (1.67)  (1.69) (0.44) (0.56) (1.59) 
GNI pc/100 0.0045*** -0.0019  0.011*** -0.0023 0.0055*** -0.0016 
(2.59) (0.59)  (4.95) (1.45) (2.62) (0.85) 
Observations 970 452 234 726 944 917 817 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.046  0.123 0.027 0.168 0.046 
chi2 73.3 28.6  73.4 33.6 193.7 42.9 
Mean of Y 17.3 18.9 0.48 1.73 10.9 15.1 25.1 
Note: Standard OLS used. T statistics are provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance 
levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. France was omitted due to insufficient variation (the mean of Y is 
0.48). 
Table 5.7 shows a different test of the hypotheses, as it reports regressions where the 
dependent variable is the percentage of aid that is given to civil society. We can see that this 
type of aid is much more prevalent than program aid in the data, but that there is variation 
by donor. As this is at the extreme of low recipient control, we would expect many of the 
coefficients to be of the opposite sign to those found previously. The alignment variables are 
not consistent across-donors. We also find a certain symmetrical assortment of results for 
the governance variable as two of the six donors estimated are insignificant, significant and 
positive, and significant and negative respectively. The number of donors is found positive 
and generally significant, with mixed results for aid/GNI. Program aid (as a percentage of aid) 
has a positive relationship with income, mirroring earlier results.  
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 Table 5.8 Civil Society 2005-2007, Robustness check 
 Canada Denmark France Germany Neth. Norway Sweden 
Equality of Public 
Resource Use 
0.24 -0.88** 
 
0.71** 0.46 0.14 0.29 
(0.74) (2.11) 
 
(2.37) (1.26) (0.41) (0.71) 
PRSP document  
created 
-0.51** 0.070 
 
-0.33 -0.68** -0.10 0.39 
(2.01) (0.20) 
 
(1.32) (2.49) (0.37) (1.23) 
Public Sector 
Management 
-0.16 1.41** 
 
-0.20 -0.15 -0.16 -0.92* 
(0.38) (2.56) 
 
(0.53) (0.36) (0.40) (1.82) 
Number of Donors 0.11*** 0.037 
 
0.034 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
(4.03) (0.94) 
 
(1.59) (4.80) (5.48) (4.21) 
Aid/GNI % -0.025 -0.025 
 
-0.039** 0.0061 0.0045 0.0028 
(1.62) (1.37) 
 
(2.23) (0.38) (0.26) (0.16) 
GNI pc/100 0.012 -0.038** 
 
-0.020* 0.0034 -0.000046 0.042*** 
(0.95) (2.18) 
 
(1.71) (0.27) (0.00) (2.62) 
Observations 145 87 56 172 137 158 140 
Pseudo R-squared 0.214 0.148 
 
0.115 0.216 0.224 0.218 
chi2 40.7 16.9 
 
23.1 40.2 42.7 28.0 
Mean of Y 20.9 16.4 0.33 3.41 9.40 13.3 25.5 
Note: Standard OLS used. T statistics are provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance 
levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. France was omitted due to insufficient variation (the mean of Y is 
0.33). 
Table 5.8 reports the results from the same regression, but using the alternate specification. 
The mixed evidence on alignment parameters persist. However, the PRSP coefficients are 
negative for four donors and significantly so for two of these. This mirrors the evidence that 
recipients that have agreed a PRSP receive higher amounts of program aid and lower 
amounts of civil society aid. Coefficients on the governance variable are inconclusive, but 
negative for all but one donor. This mirroring is consistent with the expected behaviour of 
pragmatic selectivity. A similar relationship is found for the transaction costs and income 
variables.  
5.6 DISCUSSION 
The theoretical literature has tended to focus on the importance of preference 
(mis)alignment in the aid composition decision. This may in part be to the ease to which 
preference alignment lends itself to being modelled using the principal agent framework. 
While we acknowledge and confirm the role of alignment, we have presented a simple 
model that brings out more fully the role of relative efficiency. One of the advantages of this 
model is that it does not rely unduly on assumptions of full commitment and enforceable 
conditionality. This takes seriously the point made by Hagen (2006a), that any commitments 
are neither self-enforcing nor subject to external authority. It has been argued that 
conditionality in the case of non-alignment is ineffectual (White and Morrissey, 1998) and in 
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the case of high alignment it is clearly superfluous. The related issue of aid fungibility 
 ?ƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐ ĨƌŽŵ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ŵŝƐĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĐĂůůĞĚ Ă  “ƌĞĚ ŚĞƌƌŝŶŐ ?(McGillivray and 
Morrissey, 2000), which makes the focus on alignment, conditionality and fungibility in the 
theoretical literature disconcerting. The model presented here, while simple, acknowledges 
the role of preference alignment, but adds to that a more substantial role for efficiency.  
While the literature has generally assumed that no aid is the relevant comparison for any 
given modality, for a number of reasons we have modelled project aid as the default 
modality. It is clear from aid proliferation that donors face incentives to maximise the 
number of countries and sectors in which they work (Knack and Rahman, 2007), which 
results in a large amount of project aid being disbursed. The bureaucratic incentives that 
donors themselves face (Easterly, 2002) lead to a mentality that aid should be disbursed, 
ǁŝƚŚ ůĞƐƐ ŽĨ Ă ĨŽĐƵƐ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ? dŚĞ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ  ‘ŶŽ ĂŝĚ ? ĨŽƌŵŝng the appropriate 
ƌĞƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽŽƌ ĐĂŶ ƚŚĞŶ ďĞ ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂƐ ŽĨ  ‘ǁĂƌŵ ŐůŽǁ ? ? ƚŚĞ
^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ĂŶĚ/or bureaucratic incentives. Each of these arguments point to a 
situation where withholding aid is not a credible threat for the donor, and so the fact that 
the model presented earlier does not include this is a real advantage. The bureaucratic 
incentives mentioned here, and the model itself, confirm that project aid is the most likely 
default aid modality.  
When discussing the role of efficiency, it is obvious that the efficiency of GBS will be dictated 
by the recipient government. The less obvious role is that of the efficiency of aid that is more 
under the control of the donor. It is perhaps because the efficiency of this type of aid is 
opaque that models have tended to underemphasise its role. The empirical section takes 
various measures that capture the likely cause of transaction costs as determining this type 
of aid efficiency. It may initially seem that the efficiency of donor-implemented aid does not 
vary within a donor. However, the use of these measures of transaction costs show how the 
efficiency of donor-implemented aid may vary across recipients within a single donor.  
The econometric results include estimations for a combined total of twelve donors (including 
bilateral and multilateral), three sets of dependent variables, two estimation techniques, 
two specifications and various time periods. While the disparate nature of the econometric 
evidence means there has been an extensive test of the theory, it also leads to a somewhat 
disjointed presentation of the results. However, synthesising these into a coherent picture is 
reasonable because of the consistent nature of the results. The results concerning GBS 
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focused on six large donors that have varied greatly in the use of GBS. Looking at the first 
stage (deciding GBS recipients) we found that alignment (as measured by PRSP, but not 
education) is important. This result held for both specifications and time periods, although 
negative coefficients on education spending became insignificant when only the later period 
was focused upon. In conjunction with the estimates regarding the level of GBS, they suggest 
that donors are not discouraged from allocating GBS to recipients who have not 
demonstrated preference alignment, but that they may only give small amounts of GBS for 
those recipients.  
The results for governance are more uniformly in keeping with the model predictions. The 
following is found in each of the regressions using GBS: recipients with higher levels of 
governance are more likely to receive GBS and the GBS they do receive is likely to be 
substantially higher. Both variables that measure governance (in the narrower and broader 
senses) are found to be significant for most donors, but the effect is found to be stronger on 
average in the 2005-2007 period than in the 1997-2007 period. This means donors are 
increasingly using the rationale of pragmatic selectivity and responding to different 
governance levels with different aid modalities. The role of transaction costs is mixed. For 
most donors and estimations, the transaction cost measures are positively correlated with 
recipients of GBS at the first (eligibility) stage, a relationship that is often found to be 
significant. The EC is a consistent exception to this, with the number of donors found to have 
a significant and negative effect on the use of GBS. This may be capturing the role of the EC 
ŝŶĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶ ‘ĂŝĚŽƌƉŚĂŶƐ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚĞǆŚŝďŝƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞďĞŚĂǀiour as captured here. The 
EC excluded, donors do show signs of using GBS in countries where donor-implemented aid 
ŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞůĞƐƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ?ŝŶůŝŶĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵŽĚĞů ?ƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
The second set of dependent variables necessitated a change of donors and time period. 
Because earlier results indicate (albeit for a different group of donors) that the 
implementation of pragmatic selectivity has increased over time, we could expect stronger 
results as data is only available for more recent years. The change of donors to include more 
donors from the Nordic+ grouping would also confirm this expectation. The evidence for the 
role of alignment for this group of donors is not unvarying. Germany is the real exception to 
the earlier pattern of positive coefficients on PRSP, as a negative coefficient is found for 
PRSP using both specifications. However, the other donors generally conform to previous 
findings. The strongest evidence for this pattern is the mirroring found in coefficients when 
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using civil society as the dependent variable. Because this is the one variable that measures 
the amount of aid at the donor-implemented end of the aid control spectrum, findings of 
coefficients of the opposite sign to other results are good evidence of the predicted 
relationship.  
The results for governance variables conform to the theoretical predictions for almost every 
donor in each of the four specifications. They are found to be positive (for all but one donor) 
and mostly significant in regressions with program aid. When switching to use civil society 
they are only found to be positive (i.e. not mirroring the result, and at odds with the 
predictions) in three cases. These results show that even under a stringent test of the 
prediction (i.e. testing from both sides with different specifications for different donors and 
time periods) there are consistent signs that pragmatic selectivity is practiced. The role of 
transaction costs is somewhat more ambiguous, as positive results are found for the number 
of donors in both regressions based on program aid and civil society. Coefficients on the 
level of aid reveal a more consistent picture, with some amount of mirroring.  
The DFID results, reported in Appendix D, confirm the importance of alignment, but also the 
primacy of efficiency over alignment. In each regression and specification, we see a positive 
relationship between government efficiency and the measure of recipient control of aid. In 
six of the eight results, it is also significant. The different levels of significance also support 
the hypothesis as the strongest evidence is found for the dependent variables with the 
highest recipient control. Coefficients for the number of donors also show transaction costs 
are an important concern, and so relative efficiency appears to be a suitable way of 
understanding the mechanism at work here. One control is common to each of the 
regressions: the income level of the recipient. We find consistent evidence that donors are 
more likely to cede control to poorer recipients. This result is best understood by 
acknowledging that this result is found assuming ceteris paribus. As such, we can think of 
donors giving more control to recipients that have efficient governments relative to their 
income level. An alternate explanation is that income is partly capturing the efficiency of 
donor-implemented aid (i.e. donor-implemented is less efficient in poorer countries). These 
two arguments are reinforcing  W in each case poorer recipients are rewarded for having a 
relatively efficient government.  
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5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented both a theoretical model and an empirical investigation of the 
aid composition decision. Both of these have highlighted the importance of the relative 
efficiency of different aid modalities. The econometric results have also shown that 
alignment is important, and that while data is problematic the PRSP variable does capture 
alignment at least partially. This also suggests donors have not abandoned the idea that they 
can influence recipients and their spending plans, a point for which there is some, if limited, 
evidence (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000; Mosley et al., 2004). The theoretical model 
presented here is perhaps more appropriate than previous models as the important point is 
the expected risk that funds will be reallocated, rather than pre-existing spending patterns. 
Results from the alternate specification, which includes a variable that is very close to 
previous theoretical conceptualisations of alignment (the degree to which government 
resources are used in a pro-poor fashion), calls into question the important role alignment 
was previously afforded as evidence for the role of alignment is mixed, and weaker than that 
for efficiency. This chapter has argued that the crucial consideration of donors is not 
preference alignment (although this is found to be important), but relative efficiency, an 
argument that agrees with the only known empirical research on the subject.  
There is only one paper that we are aware of that has previously worked on the aid 
composition decision (Knack and Eubank, 2009), and so this research takes place in a relative 
vacuum of empirical work. Our analysis differs from that paper in a number of ways, most 
importantly by estimating for different donors separately, and our use of three different 
datasets which greatly expands the available tests. Our results agree with those of Knack and 
Eubank (2009), that better government efficiency is related to the amount of control ceded 
to the recipient. While their results focus on the differences between donors, we find 
evidence of pragmatic selectivity for many of the donors analysed and donor heterogeneity 
that is more appropriately controlled for by estimating for donors separately. This is 
something that the data they use does not readily allow for, as the number of observations 
for each donor is quite small. Estimating by donor allows us to highlight the low uptake of 
GBS by the USA and Japan, and other interesting cross-donor differences. Another limitation 
of the SMPD data  (used by Knack and Eubank, 2009) is that they can only estimate for one 
year (2008) which means they cannot examine any changes over time.  
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The most salient empirical contribution of this chapter lies in the exploitation of various 
datasets, which affords a more extensive exploration of the aid modality choice. We have 
examined the largest donors as well as some of those from the Nordic+ group. While we 
have found heterogeneity, we find evidence of pragmatic selectivity for most donors. 
Because of the data we have been able to examine a longer time period, and found that 
evidence of pragmatic selectivity has become stronger in recent years. We have also looked 
for signs of pragmatic selectivity for various different indicators of recipient control. These 
have been narrow (GBS), broad (Programme Aid) and at lower end of recipient control (Civil 
Society). These dependent variables have provided surprisingly consistent evidence of the 
primacy of efficiency over alignment. This chapter provides the definition of an alternate aid 
allocation strategy, and discusses this using policy documents, a theoretical model and 
econometric results. While this research is not exhaustive and severely hampered by data 
availability, it constitutes the most complete exploration of the aid composition decision of 
which we are aware.  
It is now well established that donors face incentives to disperse aid, a situation variously 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ?  ‘ǁĂƌŵ ŐůŽǁ ? ĂŶĚ ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƐ ? dŚĞ
previous chapter confirmed that on average different levels of recipient governance have 
not been met with different levels of aid. The most popularly proposed solution to the 
^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?ƐŝůĞŵŵĂŝƐƚŽĂůůŽĐĂƚĞŵŽƌĞĂŝĚĨƵŶĚƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ
that is not practised. Furthermore, the success of this suggestion is doubtful as multilateral 
agencies themselves show signs of inequality aversion and lacking commitment technology. 
dŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ŚĂƐ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ P ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ
selectivity. Pragmatic selectivity satisfies the Samaritan impulse by allowing aid levels to be 
dictated by poverty (as well as proximity and population), but meets the desire for efficiency 
by allowing different levels of governance to be met with different types of aid. This chapter 
does not propose a new strategy; rather it identifies one currently in practice. Indeed, the 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŝĚĐŽŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝƐĞĂƐŝůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚŝŶĚŽŶŽƌƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?
ŝƚŚĂƐŽŶůǇďĞĞŶĂ ‘ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶƉŽůŝĐǇůĞǀĞƌ ?ĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽmmunity.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
Development aid has existed in its modern incarnation for around sixty years. Over that time 
many different ways of giving aid have been tried, and many more suggested. Countless 
allocation decisions have been made by donors seeking to strike a balance between 
competing priorities, be they good or ill. The recipients and donors have fallen into common 
patterns of behaviour. Public interest has fluctuated, donor priorities have changed and aid 
agencies have multiplied. The effects of aid have been diverse, and new impacts have been 
identified. But amid this changing landscape there remains a constant question: could this be 
done better? We cannot observe the counterfactual (what would have happened without 
aid) but we can observe the task ahead, the most commonly cited goal of aid being poverty 
reduction. While there has been some recent debate over the level of poverty in Africa (Sala-
i-Martin and Pinkovskiy, 2010), it is clear that the task of poverty reduction remains 
considerable. This thesis has engaged with some of the potential unintended consequences 
of aid, as well as the reasons behind the allocation of aid. I will now detail eight specific 
contributions contained herein.  
The first contribution made by this thesis is related to the general question of aid and 
governance. Specifically, the second chapter reported evidence that aid does not 
systematically reduce tax revenue. A concern when giving aid is that it may undermine 
governance within the recipient country by breaking the citizen-state link established by 
taxation (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 2001; Moore, 2007; Ross, 2004). The chapter 
does not deal directly with governance, but focuses instead on one part of the proposed 
ĐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇĐŚĂŝŶ PĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŝĚ ?ƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŽŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƚĂǆƌĞǀĞŶƵĞ ?dŚĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ
that the detrimental effect of foreign aid found in other research is not replicated, other 
than for aid grants before 1985. The empirical approach also deals with endogeneity 
problems more adequately than previous research, by allowing for longer term effects 
between aid and tax. When looking over the longer term, aid has a positive effect on 
taxation. As such, the potentially detrimental link from aid to governance, at least through 
the most commonly mentioned channel, is questioned.  
The second contribution is to the debate over the relative merits of aid loans and grants. 
While there are a number of considerations, the differential tax effect of grants and loans 
found by Gupta et al. (2004) is found to be key. Chapter two reports evidence that this 
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differential effect is only found in the early years of the sample: since 1985 grants have not 
had a detrimental effect on tax revenue. The longer-term perspective also reveals grants to 
have had a positive effect, possibly by controlling for the endogeneity of the allocation 
decision. This result is an important one as the decision to choose between the two types of 
aid appears to hinge on such concerns. The potentially harmful future repayment obligations 
implied by aid loans do not need to be chosen because of fears over governance.  
The third contribution of the thesis is to collate the various perspectives and research on the 
allocation of aid. These include the approach of starting from an ideal allocation principle, 
the formulas that donors produce to guide their own allocations and econometric 
investigations of the importance of different factors in actual allocations. Each of the 
different approaches reveal the inherent tensions between different views of development 
aid. As the different perspectives are presented alongside each other, the reader can identify 
some recurring themes: for example, the relative importance placed on need and effort and 
the difficulty in separating the two.  This tension is made apparent in the decisions of 
Llavador and Roemer (2001) and Cogneau and Naudet ?Ɛ  (2007), when they try to decide 
which variables belong to the category of conditions (with which aid allocation should have a 
negative relationship) and which to effort (with which aid allocation should have a positive 
relationship). The demonstrated difficulty in identifying and separating effort and conditions 
hints at a further reason why donors find it difficult to allocate on the basis of policy 
(discussed below, and in chapter four).   
The fourth contribution is the recognition that aid volume is not the only valuable unit of 
analysis. Much as the goal of aid has been recognised as important (Clemens et al., 2004), its 
composition is considered here. The composition of aid is examined in detail in chapters two 
and five, and broader considerations concerning the way aid is given are discussed in 
chapter three. The excessive focus on aid-growth regressions has emphasised the volume of 
aid as the salient piece of information, allowing the composition of aid to be relatively 
unexamined. By focusing on the type of aid and how it is given, the thesis has contributed to 
the understanding of the relative merits of grant and loans, as well as how aid composition is 
used by donors to maximise efficiency. 
The fifth contribution is the finding of large donor heterogeneity in aid allocation practice. 
WƌĞǀŝŽƵƐ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŚĂƐ ĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ  ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ĚŽŶŽƌ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? ĂƐ Ă ŶŽŶ-weighted average of 
different donors. While this is a valid approach for some questions, it can be misleading if 
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smaller donors unduly obscure the behaviour of the larger donors that represent the vast 
majority of aid. Chapter four presented evidence that donor heterogeneity is persistent, and 
while there have been changes over the 25 year period, they have been relatively small. The 
persistence of this heterogeneity has implications for the policy community in trying to 
ĚĞĐƌĞĂƐĞ ĨƌĂŐŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? /Ĩ ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞferences are distinct and change only slowly over 
time, efforts to harmonise their activities will be necessarily limited in their success. 
The sixth contribution is to distinguish donor interest from the proximity of a recipient to a 
donor when analysing aid allocation. Because of the concerns over fragmentation detailed in 
chapter three, we can recognise that focusing on recipients that are geographically, 
linguistically or culturally proximate may indeed be altruistic behaviour. The false dichotomy 
between donor interest and recipient need may also be misleading if donors simultaneously 
pursue multiple objectives, evidence of which is reported in chapter four.  
The seventh contribution is that in contrast to findings of its increasing use reported 
elsewhere (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Claessens et al., 2009; Dollar and Levin, 2006), 
chapter four finds that policy selectivity has not been practised by seven major donors over 
the 25 years examined. This result concurs with a number of other papers (Easterly, 2007; 
Hout, 2007a, b; Nunnenkamp and Thiele, 2006) ?dŚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵƐŽƵƌĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂŝĚ ?ƐĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?
Whereas some donors (especially Sweden) clearly allocate aid on the basis of poverty, others 
(the USA and France) are much more influenced by other factors. The chapter also reports 
evidence that ex post conditionality has failed to be implemented.  
The eighth contribution is the identification of an alternative allocation strategy: pragmatic 
selectivity.  This allocation strategy is neither proposed nor argued for here, rather it is found 
in both the policy papers of donors and their actions. While the econometric investigation is 
necessarily limited by data availability, a rather consistent picture is found: aid composition 
is influenced by preference alignment and efficiency concerns. In a context of (ex post and 
ex ante) conditionality failure, pragmatic selectivity is an alternative strategy that meets 
both the Samaritan and efficiency impulses. While it may be sub-optimal behaviour, the 
important point is that this behaviour has not been widely recognised and thus insufficiently 
studied.  
While the thesis has made contributions to the literature, it also leaves untouched areas 
where our current understanding is inadequate and so points to avenues for further 
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research. First, the most obvious of these is further exploration of pragmatic selectivity. 
Given that the research question is novel this is unsurprising. While data availability clearly 
sets the limits in which new empirical research can operate, new datasets are being made 
available and some of these may allow for more extensive tests to be performed. While 
chapter five represents an initial investigation of the question, a dataset covering more 
years, donors and types of aid would enable the strength and breadth of any conclusions to 
be improved upon.  
Second, while chapter four introduced a number of different econometric techniques that 
have been used within the aid allocation context, a true understanding of how the use of the 
different estimators might affect the results is not available. Future research could not only 
add to our understanding on conditions under which the different estimators are consistent, 
but also help explain the divergent findings when using the different estimators. In the aid 
allocation context this would be particularly valuable given the variation in the econometric 
approach (including specification, sample, years, donors, pooling decisions and variables 
used).  
dŚŝƌĚ ?ǁŚŝůĞĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĨŝǀĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇŝŶƐŽŵĞƐĞŶƐĞ ‘ƐŽůǀĞƐ ?
ƚŚĞ ^ĂŵĂƌŝƚĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝůĞŵŵĂ ? Ă ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ŵŽĚĞůůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĞms more appropriate. This 
would formalise the different explanations as to why conditionality and selectivity are not 
implemented, but pragmatic selectivity is.  
Within the context of large questions, the thesis has identified specific gaps within the 
literature and focused on these in detail. Paradoxically, some broader points have been 
made as a result of this focused methodology. For example, the thesis has been motivated 
by a desire to contribute to the large question regarding the effects of aid. Because of the 
link between taxation and governance, chapter two focused on the specific question of 
whether aid grants and loans have differential tax effects. Econometrically, the discovery of 
a break in the data and a longer-term focus meant both types of aid are found to have a 
positive effect on tax (since 1985). This result informs our understanding of a commonly 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ĐŚĂŶŶĞů ĨƌŽŵ ĂŝĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƐ ŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐ ĂďŽƵƚ ĂŝĚ ?Ɛ
effect. The improved methodology used in chapter four reveals donors that are 
heterogeneous, but remarkably consistent within themselves. This has major implications 
for those wishing to change donor behaviour. It also limits any expectation of the impact of 
aid, as several large donors allocate aid on the basis of non-development concerns. Chapter 
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five identifies pragmatic selectivity as a new allocation strategy, utilising new datasets to 
confirm that donors use this strategy.  
Thus while aid is not homogenous in goal, composition or effect, this heterogeneity does not 
mean that it is so complex as to be inexplicable. To the contrary, this thesis contains answers 
to specific questions, and thereby provides evidence towards a broader understanding of 
the effects of aid.  
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Appendix A 
Appendices A, C and D refer to chapters 2, 4 and 5 respectively. They each report a 
description of the data used first, followed by any additional tables or results. Therefore, this 
appendix starts by describing the data used in chapter 2. To extent the Gupta et al. (2004) 
data from 1970-2000 up to 2005, we are sometimes forced to use slightly different sources, 
and utilise these for the entire sample to ensure comparability. Agriculture, Industry, 
Imports, Exports and GDP per Capita data are from the World Development Indicators of the 
World Bank, Population (to derive GDP per capita) is from the UN, Aid is from the OECD and 
Tax Revenue is from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. Details for each variable are 
provided below. 
Net Aid (OECD) - total Official Development Assistance (ODA) including Technical Co-
operation but excluding grants, loans and credits for military purposes. Data reported in 
Current US$ is converted to share of GDP. 
Net Loans (OECD) - ODA loans with maturities of over one year and meeting the criteria set 
out for ODA, extended by governments or official agencies, and for which repayment is 
required in convertible currencies or in kind. The net data are reported after deduction of 
amortisation payments and the impact of other measures reducing debt (e.g. forgiveness). 
Data reported in Current US$ is converted to share of GDP. 
Grants (OECD) - ODA transfers, in money or in kind, for which no repayment is required. 
Data reported in Current US$ is converted to share of GDP. 
Tax Revenue as % of GDP (IMF Government Finance Statistics) - Consolidated Central 
Government. It comprises compulsory, unrequited, non-repayable receipts for public 
purposes collected by central governments. This is always included in the analysis as logged, 
multiplied by 100, to ease interpretation.  
Income, GDP per Capita  (Current US $) (WDI, World Bank) - derived by first converting GDP 
in national currency to US dollars and then dividing by total population. For ease of 
interpretation this was then multiplied by 100. 
Appendix A          Paul Clist 
140 
 
Agricultural Value Added as % of GDP (WDI, World Bank) - measures the output of the 
agricultural sector less the value of intermediate inputs. Agriculture comprises value added 
from forestry, hunting, and fishing as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. 
Industrial Value Added as % of GDP (WDI, World Bank) - comprises value added in mining, 
manufacturing, construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net out put of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs.  
Imports of Goods and Services as % of GDP (WDI, World Bank) - represents the cif value of all 
goods and other market services procured from the world.  
Exports of Goods and Services as % of GDP (WDI, World Bank) - value of all goods and other 
market services provided to the world.  
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Table A 1 reports results from instrumental variables approach, where the instruments used 
are total years as a colony, total global aid given in that year, and twice lagged aid. The 
results are broadly in line with the pattern of results using other methods. While tests show 
the instruments to be valid, the problems of using IV in this context are illustrated by the low 
explanatory power, especially when using fixed effects. 
 Table A 1: Instrumental Variable Results (using annual data) 
Variable RE FE RE FE 
 Whole sample 1985-2005 
Aid -0.16 
(0.705) 
-3.70 
(2.64) 
7.82*** 
(2.1) 
-67.5 
(461.7) 
Aid2 0.0005 
(0.005) 
0.023 
(0.0169) 
-0.047*** 
(0.0128) 
0.33 
(2.227) 
Agriculture 
 
-1.08*** 
(0.155) 
-1.74** 
(0.859) 
-3.99*** 
(0.989) 
-0.25 
(11.28) 
Industry 
 
0.74*** 
(0.166) 
1.32*** 
(0.379) 
2.75*** 
(0.88) 
9.30 
(57.58) 
Income 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
0.056 
(0.40) 
Income2 -0.0000004*** 
(0.00000004) 
-0.0000003*** 
(0.0000001) 
-0.000002*** 
(0.0000005) 
-0.0000003 
(0.000006) 
Imports 
 
0.31** 
(0.152) 
0.79* 
(0.461) 
0.078 
(0.42) 
25.3 
(172.9) 
Exports 
 
0.02 
(0.134) 
-0.93* 
(0.512) 
-0.68 
(0.474) 
-16.12 
(-0.108) 
Observations 1619 1619 887 887 
Countries 80 80 72 72 
R-Squared 0.36 0.05 0.03 0.01 
 
Notes: As Table 2.1; Overall and Adjusted R-Squared refer to RE/FE respectively. The instruments of total aid given 
that year, a colony dummy and aid twice lagged are used to instrument for Aid and its square. R squared is either 
Overall or Adjusted, depending upon whether FE or RE are used.  
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 Table A 2: Determinants of Tax/GDP Ratios (RE), 1970-2005 
Variable Current Aid Lagged Aid 
Loans 1.11*** 1.17*** 0.58* 0.72** 
(3.17) (3.42) (1.67) (2.13) 
Loans 2 -0.0028* -0.0029* -0.0013 -0.0017 
(1.76) (1.83) (0.62) (0.85) 
Grants -1.32*** -1.15*** -0.87*** -0.72*** 
(6.05) (5.41) (3.96) (3.38) 
Grants2 0.00033 0.00029 -0.0000052 -0.000064 
(1.47) (1.35) (0.02) (0.25) 
Agriculture -1.26*** -0.95*** -1.27*** -0.93*** 
(9.46) (7.10) (9.44) (6.95) 
Industry 0.44*** 0.71*** 0.47*** 0.77*** 
(3.05) (4.97) (3.19) (5.32) 
GDP -0.0061*** 0.00046 -0.0061*** 0.00084 
(10.07) (0.52) (9.92) (0.93) 
GDP2 
 
-0.0000004*** 
 
-0.0000004*** 
 
(9.86) 
 
(10.27) 
Imports 0.58*** 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 
(6.57) (6.21) (5.68) (5.21) 
Exports -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.37*** -0.40*** 
(4.80) (5.08) (3.76) (4.22) 
N 1554 1554 1558 1558 
Countries 82 82 81 81 
Chi-Stat 315.9 438.0 289.9 414.8 
Overall R2 0.36 0.43 0.35 0.41 
Notes: As Table 2.1,except RE is used. 
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 Table A 3: Investigating Time Effects, 1970-2005 FE 
Variables Base With 
Individual 
Year 
Dummies 
With Year 
(-1969) 
With post 
1985 
Dummy 
Loans 1.25*** 1.07*** 1.29*** 1.20*** 
(3.57) (3.07) (3.69) (3.43) 
Loans 2 -0.0028* -0.0029* -0.0029* -0.0028* 
(1.78) (1.86) (1.84) (1.76) 
Grants -1.18*** -1.10*** -1.13*** -1.21*** 
(5.42) (5.08) (5.17) (5.52) 
Grants2 0.00033 0.00061*** 0.00039* 0.00031 
(1.49) (2.73) (1.73) (1.43) 
Agriculture -1.16*** -1.26*** -1.27*** -1.10*** 
(8.59) (8.22) (8.28) (7.44) 
Industry 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.46*** 0.54*** 
(3.48) (2.65) (3.05) (3.60) 
GDP -0.0054*** -0.0054*** -0.0050*** -0.0056*** 
(8.82) (8.05) (7.51) (8.82) 
Imports 0.55*** 0.51*** 0.55*** 0.56*** 
(6.10) (5.62) (6.09) (6.19) 
Exports -0.51*** -0.41*** -0.48*** -0.53*** 
(5.17) (3.99) (4.76) (5.28) 
Year 
  
-0.14 
 
  
(1.49) 
 Post 1985 dummy 
   
1.53 
   
(1.04) 
Observations 1554 1554 1554 1554 
Countries 82 82 82 82 
F 30.4 9.33 27.6 27.5 
Overall R squared 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.33 
Notes: As Table 2.1 except for the final three columns. For the first of these, individual year dummies are included 
but not reported. The next column includes a variable that is the year minus 1969, i.e. in the first year included 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?ŝƚŝƐ ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚ ?ĂŶĚƐŽĨŽƌƚŚ ?dŚĞĨŝŶĂůĐŽůƵŵŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐĂ ‘ƉŽƐƚ ? ? ? ?ĚƵŵŵǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞǀĂůƵ  ?
if the year is between 1985 and 2005, and 0 otherwise.
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APPENDIX B:  
DESCRIPTIVE LITERATURE 
This section provides a more detailed discussion of the descriptive literature that is 
summarised in the literature review. It consists of two parts. The first looks at different 
practices that are considered to be donor errors or weaknesses. Their disparate nature 
illustrates why a full discussion was not included in the main body of the thesis. The second 
part examines the most important recent indices that use different data to form judgements 
on donor behaviour.  
IDENTIFYING DONOR-ERRORS 
This section catalogues various donor practices and problems that have been identified as 
 ‘ĚŽŶŽƌĞƌƌŽƌƐ ? ?dŚŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐĞĞŬƐƚŽĂƐƐĞƐƐĚŽŶŽƌƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƵƐĞƐƐŽŵĞŽĨ
the points within this section to do so. They deal with much broader concerns than the 
positive literature, and their proponents argue that they capture important points that are 
not captured by any other methodology.  
SELECTIVITY 
A number of the newest indices include statistics on selectivity, mainly focused on policy and 
measured by CPIA or the WGI index1. For example, Wane (2004) argues that while aid 
allocation was previously measured by equity in response to need, the current criterion is 
policy selectivity. However, there is no such consensus regarding what the basis for selection 
should be. Wane (2004) argues that the WGI indicators are justified, by showing successful 
World Bank projects are associated with higher WGI scores on average, compared to failed 
projects. There are a number of problems with this, not least that WGI scores are highly 
correlated with income: in essence development projects are more successful in countries 
that need them less. Indeed it is this that motivates some to argue against not only an 
expansion of selectivity, but its current more-limited form. Institutional improvement has 
traditionally been thought of as a potential consequence of aid, rather than a prerequisite to 
it (Moss et al., 2006). For example, political reform in Uganda was influenced by aid, if in a 
                                                             
1
 dŚĞ W/ ŝƐ Ă tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? ĐŽŵƉůŝĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ? ? dŚĞ t'/  ?tŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞ
Governance Indicators) were originally known as KKZ. They use a variety of inputs (including the CPIA) to form an 
overall judgement. 
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highly circuitous fashion (Verschoor, 2007). If a selectivity mind-set had been used in that 
case, reform may not have occurred.  
Others criticise the selectivity agenda by taking the opposite view  W that selectivity is too 
narrow. Amprou et al. (2007) and McGillivray (2003a) both argue that research has identified 
other significant variables that influence aid effectiveness and that these should be included 
in any measure of selectivity. They mention post conflict situations (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004), negative terms of trades shocks (Collier and Dehn, 2001), structural vulnerability and 
political instability (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001), and democracy (Kosack, 2003; 
Svensson, 1999). Amprou et al. (2007) also show that any ranking of donors is heavily 
influenced by the choice of which of these criteria to use. These arguments must be qualified 
by the aforementioned (deserved) humility of the research community. Unless there is a 
strong and consistent effect found in the literature it is difficult to argue that measures of 
donor performance should be based upon these results.  
FRAGMENTATION AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
Calls for donor harmonisation have existed for some 40 years: the Pearson Commission 
 ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŵƵůƚŝƉůŝĐŝƚǇŽĨĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŽƌĚŝnation 
ůĞĂĚƐƚŽŵƵĐŚƵŶŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĚƵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĨĨŽƌƚ ? ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĚŽŶŽƌƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
need to tackle fragmentation by using comparative advantages to specialise by country 
and/or sector (OECD, 2007, p.45). This is motivated by the vast anecdotal evidence regarding 
the consequences of the status quo. The costs are varied and difficult to catalogue or 
measure, but an overview is given here. It is reasonable to believe that aid projects are 
subject to returns to scale. As such, a certain fixed cost will be incurred regardless of the 
project or disbursement size. For smaller disbursals this fixed cost would be a higher 
proportion of aid, and so diminish the value of the aid. Fragmentation would then diminish 
the effectiveness of aid overall. Some of these fixed costs are borne not by donors but by 
recipients: for example developing countries produce 8,000 audit reports for multilateral 
agencies, some 5,500 are for the World Bank alone (World Bank, 2003, p.207). A 
consequence of this fragmentation is tŚĂƚ ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐ ĚŝŵŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? ŝĨ ĚŽŶŽƌƐ
each give a small percentage of the total aid for any given country their individual effect 
cannot be easily measured. This may lead to a lack of responsibility for success and failure 
(see Acharya et al., 2006; Easterly, 2007) ?dŚŝƐ ‘ůŽǁŽǁŶĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ŵĂǇĂůƐŽƉĂƌƚůǇĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚǇ
conditionality has often failed to influence policy in recipients. With larger shares of aid 
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money, a given donor would have had greater influence for potential changes, and greater 
incentive to ensure the effectiveness of its aid (a point made in the theoeretical literature by 
Bigsten, 2006; Cordella and Dell'Ariccia, 2007). 
Also from a theoretical perspective, Torsvik (2005) models donors as deriving welfare from 
poverty reduction abroad. Thus aid is a public good amongst altruistic donors, and as such is 
under provided. Coordination could reduce the resulting moral hazard problem. Acharya et 
al. (2006) catalogue further consequences of fragmentation, amongst which are inefficient 
use of staff both within aid agencies and recipient governments, increased wastage to do 
with promoting a given donor and needless competition over projects and staff. Van de 
tĂůůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŶĞŐůŝŐŝďůĞ P “/ŶEŝŐĞƌ ?ĨŽƌŝnstance, the 
majority of NGOs appear to be operated by moonlighting civil servants and ex-ministers of 
ĐĂďŝŶĞƚ ? ? /Ŷ DŽǌĂŵďŝƋƵĞ Ă ĐůĞĂŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐĂůĂƌǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ǁĂƐ
comparable to the national director of the civil service (Fallon and da Silva, 1994). The 
competition for staff results in a drain from the government, weakening the institution. 
Recent attempts to increase donor harmonisation include the Paris and Rome declarations 
(2003 and 2005 respectively). However, previous attempts to harmonise through 
multilateral mechanisms did not work well. For example the UNDP was supposed to fulfil 
this task after World War 2 (Disch, 1999), but multilateral aid flows remain at relatively low 
levels. SWAps have also been tried, but often found expensive1. It is interesting to note that 
a lack of coordination is not necessarily a result of divergent donor interests (Halonen-
Akatwijuka, 2004). Regardless of their cause, the widespread opinion is that they are 
ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞ P  “Ă ŵĂĚĚĞŶŝŶŐ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ŝŶ ĨŽƌeign aid for all concerned is the huge 
administrative costs on both recipient and donor sides from the duplication of donor efforts 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞŝƌĞĨĨŽƌƚƐǁŝƚŚĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?(Easterly, 2007, pp.639-640). 
However, no accurate measure of them exists, which may contribute to the general inertia 
when it comes to reducing them.  
When thinking about measuring transaction costs, it is worth dividing them into tangible and 
intangible costs (also called administrative and institutional). Tangible costs are those that 
are easy to measure, such as the number of hours that a civil servant must spend in order to 
coordinate an aid transfer. Intangible costs are less easily identified, including things like the 
                                                             
1
  “The experience of Tanzania and Uganda suggests that the move to SWAps  W which may reduce costs for the 
partner country  W often seems to increase the costs for the donors. ?(OECD, 2003, pg.116)   
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damage to an institution by coordinating different projects and programmes. It can also 
include an element of opportunity cost. Amis et al. (2005) highlight the difficulty in 
quantifying transaction costs, but point to research that suggests institutional costs are more 
problematic than administrative ones. The latter are to some extent unavoidable and 
marginal, the former includes the use of parallel systems, the movement of talented staff 
away from domestic government to donor missions and so forth. They also highlight many of 
the concerns that the PRSP approach and Paris Declaration were meant to answer (donor-
driven priorities and uncoordinated donors respectively).  
EVALUATION Ȃ AN ǮNDERFUNDED PUBLIC GOODǯǫ 
Evaluation of a specific kind has enjoyed a surge in support in recent times (a prominent 
example being J-PAL) and some descriptive works include support for evaluation in an index 
of donor performance. This popularity has in part been based on results from randomised 
trials, which reflects the great desire within the development community to have proof of 
impact. As such, evaluations of different interventions are now more commonplace. One 
consequence of knowing more is to stop poorly performing projects, another is to expand 
the coverage of successful ones. The problem of foregone benefits of economies of scale 
(Acharya et al., 2006; Easterly, 2007) is linked to low levels of evaluation (Birdsall, 2004, 
pp.13-19). Aid agencies would have more incentive to scale-up successful projects if the 
differences in outcomes between different projects were known to be large. While the 
methods of randomised trial evaluations have become popular, they do not enjoy a 
consensus. Deaton (2009) coherently catalogues their advantages and disadvantages. A 
common concern is that of applicability: a project found successful in one area may not 
ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞŝƚƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ?'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨ ‘ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂƐĂƉƵďůŝĐŐŽŽĚ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽũƵĚŐĞĚŽŶŽƌƐŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞ
of evaluation seem somewhat premature.  
ǮUTDATEDǯ AID MODALITIES 
Easterly (2007) argues tied aid, food aid and technical assistance are outdated and 
indefensible aid modalities. Easterly and Pfutze (2008, pp.12-18) report some remarkable 
statistics for these three types: 92% of Italian aid is tied, 44% of Portuguese aid is food aid 
and Greece gives 64% of its aid in the form of technical assistance.  However, the reality is 
significantly more nuanced than implied. Tied aid is perhaps the best understood. 
Recognising the body of research which highlights problems with tied aid, the OECD 
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recommended that aid be untied to the least developed countries (in 2001), which is steadily 
becoming a broader recommendation. Tying in this sense relates solely to conditions placed 
on the procurement of goods and services, commonly meaning an aid transfer must be 
spent within the donor country. A widely cited statistic is that tying aid reduces aid value by 
some 13-23% (Jepma, 1991, p.50). This loss in value is natural, given that procurement 
conditions limit the amount of suppliers that are able to provide a good. Furthermore, 
foreign markets may sell goods and services that are less catered to distant developing 
country markets, and incur high transport costs. This estimate of diminished value does not 
include the wider and less quantifiable consequences, which include the likely foregone 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ŝŶ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŝŶŐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚƚƌĂĚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? dŚƵƐ
tied aid is found significantly less valuable than untied aid. 
Food aid and technical assistance are more contentious areas. Easterly and Pfutze (2008) 
ĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĨŽŽĚ ĂŝĚ ŝƐ ĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚƵŵƉŝŶŐ ? ŽĨ ƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚ ĨŽŽĚ ďǇ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
which erodes domestic food production and thus exacerbates food shortages in future 
years. The UN WFP responded to criticism by arguing 80% of its budget was spent within the 
third world (Roman, 2008). The resulting concern of this criticism is that the data does not 
distinguish between good and bad practice. The potential severity of the distinction is shown 
by an estimate published by the OECD that tied food aid costs can be up to 55% higher than 
alternatives (Clay et al., 2005), thus reducing the value of aid by up to a third. Food aid is 
undoubtedly a difficult and complex area, and as such including it in a simple aggregation 
exercise is not appropriate. Technical assistance (TA) is generally spent within a donor 
country in order to create knowledge and skills that is of benefit to a recipient, which often 
entails funding research in the west. The concern with this type of aid is that it never reaches 
the countries it is supposed to help, where it could achieve greater value for money. This is 
another type of aid that cannot be judged collectively as simply good or bad, and simplistic 
judgements are not appropriate. 
NEWER MODALITIES 
Some efforts to codify donor behaviour have also focused on the type of aid given, with 
specific reference to some of the newer modalities. To justify this there needs to be a clear 
advantage or disadvantage of a given type, and while many modalities have been designed 
in order to overcome the deficiencies of other types that does not automatically mean they 
achieve their goal. The use of Budget Support is typically motivated by a desire to use a 
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governments own systems and thus increase recipient government efficiency. The potential 
benefits of Sector Wide Aproaches (SWAps) are that they increase coordination amongst 
donors and recipients, predictability of funds and domestic accountability, whilst decreasing 
transaction costs. Parallel systems have been used in order to ensure a basic level of 
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ďƵƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĨŽƌŶŽƚŐŝǀŝŶŐĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽ
become more efficient. Research relating to the World Bank suggests the more basic 
problem that these parallel systems are simply no better than the original systems that they 
try to circumvent (Boyce and Haddad, 2001). An apparent benefit of project aid is that it 
allows a donor more control over its own expenditure, and some influence over the 
ƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚƐ ?ďƵĚŐĞƚƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨĨƵŶŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
ŶŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵŽŶĞǇŝƐĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŽƌĚĞůůĂĂŶĚĞůů ?ƌŝĐĐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĐŽŵƉĂƌĞ
budget support with project aid, from a theoretical perspective. They essentially demarcate 
the former as allowing a donor some partial power over the whole budget, whereas the 
latter gives total power over a smaller section of that budget. When defined in this way, the 
choice of which type of support to use simply becomes reliant upon the relative size of the 
ĂŝĚ ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ  ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĚŽŶŽƌ-recipient 
preferences (which determines their need for power). Whilst many of the wider 
consequences are not included in the model (e.g. the potential foregone efficiency 
improvement in the government associated with using their processes), it is still useful to 
highlight these two factors in a donors decision.  
 ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĨŽƌ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ĂŝĚ ŵĂǇ ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚ ƐƚĞŵ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĚĞƐŝƌĞ ƚŽ ĨƵŶĚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
activities, perhaps owing to a desire to justify their aid expenses to their own citizens. As 
ƐƵĐŚ ? ĞǆƉĞŶĚŝƚƵƌĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉůĂĐĂƚĞ ? Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ĂƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ďĞ ĐŚŽƐĞŶ ? ŶĞĐĚŽƚĂů
evidence confirms this situation: donors are more likely to fund a school being built than a 
ƚĞĂĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐĂůĂƌǇ ? ůĞĂƌůǇ ? ďŽƚŚ ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĞĚ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ? Ƶƚ ƚŚĞ
desired effect (say a better educated population) is less observable or immediate than a 
simple input statistic. Donors are reluctant to forego control of aid budgets, especially in 
poor governance situations. The popular wisdom is that countries with a better policy record 
should receive more aid through its own systems and for its own priorities, such as General 
Budget Support (GBS)1. This is a reasonable proposition, as better policy would tend to be 
highly correlated with the ability of a government to turn a given amount of money into a 
                                                             
1
  ?Ő ?&/ƐƚĂƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ'^ ŝƐƉƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ  ‘ǁŚĞƌĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞƐƵŝƚĂďůĞ ?(National Audit Office, 2008, 
pg.4)  
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certain outcome. The relative effectiveness of a parallel system is likely to be less affected by 
ĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?ƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŚĂƌĞƐŽĨƉƌŽũĞĐƚ
and programme aid should be influenced by government policy. If this is the case, a simple 
tally of the use of certain systems does not measure good or bad practice. 
DISBURSAL, SCHEDULING AND VOLATILITY ISSUES 
Even if the problems of the wrong type of aid are overcome, recipients often complain about 
the wrong date of delivery. Delayed disbursal appears to be both a severe problem for some 
donors and a common problem for all donors, Leurs (2002, p.36) reports that Senegal think 
it is their greatest donor-related problem and it is rated by recipients as the fifth problem 
overall (ibid, p.13). The SPA (Strategic Partnership for Africa) documents promote an ideal 
calendar which includes when aid should be disbursed, so that it can be included in planning 
cycles. Progress has been made, but it is a varied picture. This is closely related to aid 
volatility, which the SPA also examines. Recipients are unlikely to use aid money as well if 
they cannot plan ahead for its use, and so multi-year commitments and a smaller number of 
transparent conditions are useful. A gradual and proportionate response to a condition not 
being met is also seen as key.  
During 1993-2005 the mean absolute error in predicting aid disbursals was around 1% of 
GDP, but disbursals were not consistently more or less than commitments (Celasun and 
Walliser, 2008, p.570). Some of the discrepancy is lost aid, whereas other parts are merely 
postponed. Not only is aid found to be less predictable than tax revenue, it compounds 
other problems as its fluctuations are likely to coincide with those of tax revenue (Bulír and 
Hamann, 2008; Celasun and Walliser, 2008, p.574). There is evidence that this kind of 
volatility considerably hurts developing countries, as they are less able to withstand it than 
developed countries (Pallage and Robe, 2003). Indeed, Lensink and Morrissey (2000) find 
once the negative effective of aid volatility is controlled for, aid has a positive effect on 
growth. It is then worrying that recent measures of volatility and pro-cyclical behaviour are 
either static or increasing (Bulír and Hamann, 2008).  
It is worth noting that some volatility can be defended, for example if a policy condition is 
nŽƚŵĞƚ ?ƵůşƌĂŶĚ,ĂŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ ‘ŽŶ-ƚƌĂĐŬ ?ǁŝƚŚ/D&ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ
ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ  ? ?A? ŽĨ ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ  ‘ŽĨĨ-ƚƌĂĐŬ ? ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ŽŶůǇ  ? ?A? ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ƚŚĞ
Strategic Partnership for Africa (2005) provide some data that explains why disbursements 
differ. They report that the most common reasons for late disbursal are (in order) failed 
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policy-conditions, donor-side administration and recipient-side administration. A large 
amount of funds are not delivered by IFIs because they have more conditions attached to 
them, which are not met. This may in part explain why multilaterals are considerably less 
likely to disburse monies in the same year as they are committed.  
LATEST DESCRIPTIVE WORKS 
I now turn to outlining various newer indices that typically bring together a range of the 
above factors. This is an extended version of the summary found in the literature review 
chapter, and while repetition is kept to a minimum some parts are replicated so as to ease 
comprehension.  
CRITIQUE OF COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT INDEX (CDI) 
The CDI (Commitment to Development Index) is noteworthy because of its large impact on 
policy: it is used explicitly by Dutch and Finish governments, has influenced Australian, 
Canadian and Norwegian policy, has angered Japanese officials, and is supported financially 
by ten bilateral donors  (Roodman, 2006). It is a broad index that seeks to rate the effect of 
donor countries on developing countries in many different areas. This results in the 
weakness that donors may be rewarded or punished for factors that are out of their 
immediate control. For example, the United States is rewarded for receiving large numbers 
of migrants, but this is influenced by the proximity of other countries, something Australia 
does not enjoy. Within this wider index is the Index of Donor Performance (IDP) which is 
more relevant here. It is essentially a measure of aid/GDP from donor, but aid is discounted 
for poor practices, for example tied aid is discounted by 20%. 
The driving force behind the IDP is the amount of aid given, as quality does not vary as much 
as quantity. The biggest changes are that Japan is penalised for its high inflows from debt 
interest and the proliferation of Australia and Italy are penalised. It is interesting to note that 
each multilateral institution is given a ranking, and scores for donor-countries are adjusted 
to take account of their contributions to these agencies. The index incorporates a high 
degree of whimsy and decisions are often taken without a theoretical justification. For 
example, there is no real conceptual framework to explain why all administration costs are 
discounted, as it could be argued higher administration costs signify a greater level of 
efficiency and efficiency in disbursal (McGillivray, 2003b). It is certainly clear that aid 
completely without administration costs seems unrealistic and undesirable. 
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The most common problem of aggregation weights seems to be small, as Chowdhury and 
Squire (2006) examined the CDI and found the weighting was close to the general consensus 
amongst academics they questioned. However, a large number of problems remain. 
Selectivity weights used to be independent of the amount of aid given to a recipient  
(McGillivray, 2003b), and so giving even a miniscule amount of aid to a couŶƚƌǇ ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ďĂĚ
ƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŝŶ Ă ǁŽƌƐĞ ƐĞůĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ƌĂƚŝŶŐ ? /Ŷ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŽĨ
project proliferation in the index, a discount is used. This fits a form where projects above or 
below a certain size are discounted. Conservative parameter choices mean these discounts 
are small, especially for large projects. However, research on the optimal size of aid 
disbursals does not allow any confidence when deciding upon a figure.  
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA 
Next are two attempts to gather data on specific issues. The Strategic Partnership for Africa 
gathers data on donor behaviour by asking just over a dozen African recipients of general 
budget support to score donors out of five on six different areas of aid. The six questions 
relate to alignment, disbursement and transaction costs. The questionnaires are specific to 
general budget support, but the answers are more broadly applicable. Figure B 1 indicates 
the average scores of the rated donors by year. Small sample sizes mean, for example, that 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? ƐĐŽƌĞ ŽĨ :ĂƉĂŶ ŝƐ ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚ ƐŽůĞůǇ ďǇ dĂŶǌĂŶŝĂ ? dŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĂŶĚ
ŚĂǀĞ ŽŶ ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ďĞĞŶ ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐ ? dŚĞ ĚĂƚĂ ?Ɛ ŵĂŝŶ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶ ŵĂǇ Ɛŝŵply be publicizing 
ĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐďĂĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? 
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 Figure B 1 SPA Average Scores By Donor 2004-2006 
 
Source: Strategic Partnership with Africa: Survey of Budget Support, 2006, Volume II  W Detailed finding. Available  
at http://www.spa-
psa.org/resources/2007%20Plenary/SPA%20Survey%202006%20Final%20Draft%20Volume%20II.pdf 
ǯS FRAGMENTATION MEASURE 
The OECD (2008a) report a measure of fragmentation that differs from others previously 
used. As reported later in this section, Easterly and Pfutze (2008) use the Herfindahl index, 
which is a measure of concentration common in the industrial organization literature. The 
OECD measure is much simpler to calculate and builds upon the OECD concept of country 
programmable aid (CPA), which is essentially only includes aid which a recipient country 
government can programme. As shown in the table Table B 1, the concentration measure 
then counts the number of times a donor is a large donor in a given country, relative to its 
own size. For example, if a donor gives 1% of global aid, the measure counts the number of 
ƚŝŵĞƐƚŚĞĚŽŶŽƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶ ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĐŝƉŝĞŶƚ ?ƐĂŝĚďƵĚŐĞƚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞŶĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ
by the number of partners a donor has, and reported as a percentage. Thus IDB has a score 
of 100% as while it only gives 0.8% of global aid; it always surpasses that figure in each of its 
recipients (not shown in table). This is in contrast to the Herfindahl index, where it is not 
ĨĞĂƐŝďůĞĨŽƌĚŽŶŽƌƐƚŽƐŚŽǁ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŝƐƚŚĂƚ
it is very simple, and as such gives clear implications for donors wishing to decrease their 
fragmentation. 
0
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 Table B 1 OECD Fragmentation Measure for DAC Members  
2006, by Donor 
 
 Total CPA Ȃ DAC 
standard definition 
(USD million)  
 Donor's 
share of 
total CPA   
 Total 
no. of 
partners   
 No. of partners 
above average 
share   
Concentration 
measure (D as 
% of C)   
 
A B C D E 
 United States   12,967 21.70% 128 34 27% 
 Japan   8,416 14.10% 135 44 33% 
 EC   6,219 10.40% 144 82 57% 
 United Kingdom   3,177 5.30% 93 36 39% 
 France   2,740 4.60% 123 50 41% 
 Germany   2,723 4.50% 110 59 54% 
 Netherlands   1,601 2.70% 93 42 45% 
 Sweden   1,080 1.80% 91 44 48% 
 Norway   1,003 1.70% 88 42 48% 
 Canada   974 1.60% 100 35 35% 
 Australia   955 1.60% 50 24 48% 
 Denmark   905 1.50% 71 27 38% 
 Spain   831 1.40% 81 42 52% 
 Italy   519 0.90% 76 32 42% 
 Switzerland   501 0.80% 86 38 44% 
 Belgium   498 0.80% 83 39 47% 
 Ireland   347 0.60% 56 23 41% 
 Finland   241 0.40% 62 27 44% 
 Austria   158 0.30% 53 27 51% 
 Portugal   146 0.20% 20 11 55% 
 Luxembourg   128 0.20% 40 25 63% 
 New Zealand   122 0.20% 43 25 58% 
 Greece   119 0.20% 34 23 68% 
Note: Gross disbursement average 2005-06 Source: OECD (2006, pg.9) 
COLLECTIONS OF DATA  
A number of articles and reports exist that do not argue that their sole contribution is new 
data or original focus. Instead, they collate (but not necessarily aggregate) data on a range of 
topics to give an overview of donor behaviour. They typically include data on poverty 
selectivity, aid modalities and perceived indicators of inefficiency. Table B 2 provides a list of 
the included variables for three collections of data. The list does not include the factor which 
is represented, but rather the actual variables freely reported.  
 
Appendix B          Paul Clist 
155 
 
 Table B 2 Collections of Data 
Paris Declaration Indicators OECD Development Co-Operation 
Reports 
Easterly and Pfutze  
x Budgetary Aid disbursed as 
expected  
x Of technical assistance, how 
much is coordinated with 
recipient 
x Number of Parallel 
implementation units 
x Matching of Aid Scheduled 
and Disbursement 
x % Aid Untied 
x % of aid that was 
programme-based (OECD 
concept which denotes 
 ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ĂŝĚŵŽĚĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ? 
x Coordinated donor missions 
x Coordinated donor analysis 
 
x Total Net ODA receipts 
x Country Programmable Aid (CPA, 
meaning the above minus 
humanitarian work, debt relief, 
admin, in-donor refugee costs etc.) 
x Proportion of funds going to the 
LDCs 
x WƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŐŽŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ůĂƌŐĞ
countries with good policies and 
ŵĂŶǇƉŽŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ? 
x Emergency/humanitarian aid as % 
of total aid 
x % of aid that is tied 
x Paris Declaration indicators  
 
x Fragmentation: 
Herfindahl index 
x Selectivity rank 
(allocations to 
free, corrupt and 
poor countries) 
x Ineffective 
Channels (food 
aid, tied aid and 
TA) 
x Overheads (mainly 
staff costs)  
x Transparency  
 
The Paris Declaration indicators are distinctive due to their clearer focus: they exist to 
measure progress on the Paris declaration amongst major donors. The indicators of progress 
together represent ten of the twelve indicators outlined in 2005, and can be found in 
surveys in 2006 and 2008 (OECD, 2005, 2006, 2008b). Three variables deal with co-
ordination, three with aid modalities and two with disbursement. Also from the OECD are 
the Development Co-Operation Reports, which incorporate the Paris declaration indicators. 
The Development Co-Operation Report 2003 prŽƉŽƐĞĚ  “Ă ĚŽǌĞŶ ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ-
sense kind for measuring the contribution that development co-operation is making to 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?(OECD, 2007, p.15). In a similar fashion to the Paris declaration, the 
measures are represented by the variables reported above.  
Easterly and Pfutze (2008) rank donors on a number of different criteria, giving a composite 
rank that is an average of the disaggregated rank. The criteria include allocation principles, 
selectivity, inefficient channels, fragmentation, administration costs and transparency. The 
ranking system used means Portugal receive no extra punishment in the ranking for 
providing 44% of its aid as food aid, the punishment is solely based on providing more than 
9% as food aid. It is also easier to cut an aid budget from 50% to 40% being food aid than 
40% to 30%, thus a quadratic relationship makes sense. Changing the rankings in this way 
(summing the square of each component) gives the below change:  
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 Table B 3 Altered Ranking ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
Inefficient Aid Channels Table 
 
Ranking 
Change  
Ranking 
Change New Old New Old 
Ireland 1 3 2 Finland 14 14 0 
Luxembourg 2 12 10 Spain 15 23 8 
EC 3 9 6 Belgium 16 16 0 
Switzerland 4 2 -2 Portugal 17 15 -2 
United Kingdom 5 6 1 Canada 18 20 2 
Sweden 6 4 -2 Germany 19 17 -2 
Denmark 7 10 3 Austria 20 22 2 
Japan 8 13 5 Australia 21 25 4 
IDB 9 1 -8 United States 22 26 4 
Norway 10 4 -6 Italy 23 21 -2 
Netherlands 11 11 0 Other UN =24 =6 -18 
New Zealand 12 19 7 UNTA =24 =6 -18 
France 13 18 5 Greece 26 24 -2 
 
The major differences have obvious causes. Luxembourg is no longer punished so severely 
for giving 4% of its aid as food aid (22 out of 26 countries give less). The UNTAD and other 
UN are punished more severely for giving all of their aid as technical assistance. Norway and 
the IDB both drop due to a high reliance upon technical assistance. This simple exercise 
illustrates the sensitivity to small arbitrary changes of methodology, highlighting a real 
weakness of this approach. If donors believe the rankings are arbitrary they are less likely to 
be influenced them, blunting their ability to be used as an agent of change.  
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APPENDIX C 
A description of the data used in chapter 4 is provided first.  All Websites accessed June 2009 
unless otherwise stated. 
Aid  W The Aid variable is taken from the OECD DAC Table 3a, and available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE3A . It is the total ODA commitment of 
a donor to a specific recipient, divided by the total commitments by the donor to all 
recipients (bilateral and multilateral) in that year, multiplied by one hundred and then 
logged.  
Ln(GDP) - GDP per capita data was taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
is in constant 2000 US$. This was then logged so as to be normally distributed. 
Ln(Population) - Population data is from the World Development Indicators 2008, the annual 
World Bank publication. This was then logged so as to be normally distributed. 
Freedom Index- This index was taken from Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org), which 
is based upon surveys of various experts of each country. The original Index constitutes of 
two scores, civil liberties and political rights, each scaled from 1-7. The new scale then 
combined and scaled from 2-14 (as in Neumayer, 2003b) with the higher number being the 
best score, to facilitate interpretation. While the two scores measure slightly separate 
concepts, for this purpose they can be taken together to measure the extent to which 
democratic values are in action.  
Political Terror Scale - PTS data is taken from Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., (2008) 
Political Terror Scale 1976-2007 from www.politicalterrorscale.org. This codifies US State 
Department and Amnesty International reports to create a measure of 1-5 (which is rescaled 
so that higher scores are better outcomes) that focuses on politically-motivated violence and 
imprisonment.  
Religion - the variables Protestant/Catholic, Buddhist and Muslim are the percentage of 
adherents to the respective religions of the recipient population. The data is taken from 
Neumayer (2003b). 
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Arms - Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) 
prices. They are the value of arms purchased by a recipient from a donor. Data are provided 
by the think tank SIPRI (www.sipri.org). 
Exports  W Data is the value of exports from a donor to a recipient, as a share of total exports 
of that donor. This was then multiplied by 100 and logged so as to be normally distributed. 
dŚĞĂƚĂŝƐ ‘dƌĂĚĞŝŶǀĂůƵĞďǇƉĂƌƚŶĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ĨƌŽŵK ?ƐŽƵƌĐĞ(www.sourceoecd.org), 
apart from for the Netherlands, which is from the IMF Directions of Trade Statistics, as it has 
large amounts of data missing in the OECD database.  
Colony  W The group of variables take the value 1 if the recipient was ever a colony of the 
donor, and zero otherwise. It is taken from the CEPII distance dataset (often used in the 
trade literature) and be accessed from www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances . 
Language is a selection of variables that take the value 1 if at least 9% of the recipient and 
ĚŽŶŽƌ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƐŚĂƌĞĂĐŽŵŵŽŶůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚǌĞƌŽŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ?/ƚŝƐƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
CEPII distance dataset (often used in the trade literature) and be accessed from 
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances . 
US Military Grants  W Only available for the USA, the data is taken from Neumayer (2003b), 
and is the value of military aid from the USA by recipients.  
Corruption  W The variable is taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators and is based 
upon a wide variety of information sources and can be located at 
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ .   
CPI  - The Corruption Perception Index is used as a robustness check, and is taken from 
Transparency International (www.transparency.org).  
CPIA- The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment is published by the World Bank for 16 
criteria, and can be accessed at : http://go.worldbank.org/7NMQ1P0W10 
Distance  - ŝƐĂǀĂƌŝĂďůĞƚŚĂƚŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞǁĞŝŐŚƚĞĚĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ŽĨƚǁŽ
countries, here coded such that one unit represents 1000 km. It is taken from CEPII: 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
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 Figure C 1 Correlation between Policy Variables 
 
Note:  This Figure only includes data points if available for all three policy variables.   
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 Table C 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable Observations Mean Stn. Dev. Min Max 
G
en
er
al
 
LN(GDP) 752 8.22 1.16 5.15 11.1 
LN(Population) 880 15.09 2.13 9.9 21 
Freedom 793 7.88 3.78 2 14 
PTS 733 3.42 1.04 1 5 
Protestant/Catholic 930 43.97 39.78 0 99.9 
Buddhist 930 3.37 14.64 0 92 
Fr
an
ce
 Arms 660 9.48 39.11 0 606.4 
Imports 804 0.1 0.17 0 1.2 
Colony 890 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Language 890 0.15 0.36 0 1 
G
er
m
an
y Arms 660 8 36.06 0 401.6 
Imports 806 0.09 0.18 0 1.5 
Colony 890 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Ja
p
an
 
Arms 660 0.05 0.9 0 21 
Imports 794 0.13 0.31 0 2.6 
It
al
y 
Arms 660 3.3 13.12 0 140.6 
Imports 790 0.11 0.2 0 1.3 
Colony 890 0.01 0.11 0 1 
U
K
 
Arms 660 8.5 36.17 0 504.4 
Imports 799 0.09 0.18 0 1.2 
Colony 890 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Language 890 0.32 0.47 0 1 
U
SA
 
Arms 660 38.3 145.01 0 1259 
Imports 782 0.13 0.29 0 2.7 
Colony 890 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Language 890 0.43 0.49 0 1 
US Military 825 2.2 9.4 0 114.2 
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s 
Arms 660 2.42 18.96 0 346 
Imports 815 0.07 0.15 0 1 
Language 890 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Sw
ed
en
 
Arms 660 1.42 11.29 0 220 
Imports 785 0.08 0.16 0 1.1 
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This second half of Appendix C provides additional tables for chapter four, which are 
included by donor, period and step. They are estimated in similar ways to the econometric 
results shown in the body of the paper, e.g. the first step models use the Probit estimator, 
and the second OLS. Time period 1 refers to the Cold War period (1982-1991), 2 the post-
Cold War period (1992-2001) and 3 the GWOT period (2002-2006). In these regressions each 
period is estimated separately, meaning the results come from much lower sample sizes 
than the main regressions. Table A8 gives the non-standardised betas for the equivalent of 
table 3.  
 Table C 2 France: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
Time Period 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.13 -0.40*** -0.40* -0.088 -0.090 -0.13 
 
(1.01) (3.38) (2.46) (1.28) (1.60) (1.34) 
Ln(Population) -0.058 -0.18* 0.041 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.22 
 
(0.62) (2.13) (0.35) (4.45) (4.35) (1.66) 
Freedom Index 0.049 0.12*** 0.032 -0.074 0.00066 0.073 
 
(1.35) (3.97) (0.74) (1.31) (0.013) (0.80) 
Political Terror 
Scale -0.048 -0.55*** -0.31 0.12 0.082 -0.019 
 
(0.30) (3.76) (1.18) (1.80) (1.38) (0.15) 
Exports 0.050 0.31 -1.17 0.19** 0.35*** 0.31** 
 
(0.063) (0.37) (1.33) (2.69) (5.86) (2.83) 
Proximity Index 0.16 0.22 -0.19 0.57*** 0.62*** 0.42*** 
 
(0.43) (0.63) (0.42) (10.4) (13.7) (4.72) 
Observations 220 270 137 188 212 106 
Pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.164 0.183 0.583 0.670 0.378 
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 Table C 3 Germany: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
T 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.019 -0.28** -0.38* -0.21* -0.17* -0.14 
 
(0.13) (2.59) (2.45) (2.56) (2.47) (1.45) 
Ln(Population) -0.0014 -0.037 0.19 0.42*** 0.38*** 0.46*** 
 
(0.014) (0.45) (1.49) (3.97) (4.58) (3.41) 
Freedom Index 0.055 0.11*** 0.098* 0.15* 0.064 0.077 
 
(1.38) (3.46) (2.19) (2.39) (0.97) (0.81) 
Political Terror 
Scale -0.046 -0.52*** -0.29 -0.089 -0.0048 0.0050 
 
(0.28) (3.58) (1.06) (1.19) (0.063) (0.038) 
Exports -1.96* -1.41* -1.68* 0.22* 0.40*** 0.20 
 
(2.13) (2.07) (2.18) (2.58) (5.30) (1.82) 
Proximity Index 0.99 0.45 -0.48 -0.032 -0.018 -0.11 
 
(1.21) (0.62) (0.55) (0.56) (0.33) (1.39) 
Observations 220 270 137 192 211 105 
Pseudo R-squared 0.085 0.175 0.251 0.433 0.454 0.329 
  
  
 Table C 4 Netherlands: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
T 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.55*** -0.48*** -0.29 -0.28** -0.26** -0.34* 
 
(4.22) (4.22) (1.93) (2.76) (2.88) (2.63) 
Ln(Population) 0.066 0.11 0.31* 0.25 0.36*** 0.70*** 
 
(0.75) (1.56) (2.44) (1.95) (3.58) (3.51) 
Freedom Index 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.12* 0.11 0.32*** 0.22 
 
(4.16) (3.35) (2.32) (1.23) (3.53) (1.57) 
Political Terror Scale -0.20 -0.41** -0.65* -0.087 -0.12 0.29 
 
(1.31) (3.18) (2.39) (0.97) (1.13) (1.55) 
Exports -4.43** -2.60** -3.43* 0.18 -0.079 -0.39* 
 
(2.98) (2.64) (2.38) (1.67) (0.80) (2.37) 
Proximity Index -0.45 -0.40 0.061 0.12 0.087 0.054 
 
(1.71) (1.88) (0.21) (1.59) (1.21) (0.45) 
Observations 227 283 141 161 183 64 
Pseudo R-squared 0.321 0.285 0.347 0.284 0.192 0.256 
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 Table C 5 Japan: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
T 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.33* -0.37*** -0.56*** -0.20** -0.098 -0.085 
 
(2.50) (3.56) (3.29) (2.70) (1.51) (0.86) 
Ln(Population) -0.29** -0.17* -0.13 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.54*** 
 
(2.75) (2.12) (0.93) (3.91) (4.53) (4.01) 
Freedom Index 0.096* 0.14*** 0.096 0.16* 0.11 0.070 
 
(2.36) (3.83) (1.89) (2.53) (1.58) (0.67) 
Political Terror Scale -0.15 -0.46** -0.45 -0.018 0.0036 0.029 
 
(0.93) (2.92) (1.52) (0.26) (0.044) (0.21) 
Exports 1.03 0.59 0.39 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.17 
 
(1.75) (1.64) (0.73) (5.60) (6.10) (1.55) 
Proximity Index 4.87 6.41 -2.65 0.078 0.088 -0.019 
 
(0.46) (0.39) (0.12) (1.33) (1.57) (0.21) 
Observations 195 223 113 168 179 89 
Pseudo R-squared 0.095 0.145 0.219 0.501 0.491 0.341 
 
 
 Table C 6 Sweden: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
T 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.25 -0.32** -0.34* -0.57*** -0.36** -0.34* 
 
(1.95) (3.02) (2.21) (3.93) (2.84) (2.57) 
Ln(Population) 0.24** 0.25** 0.45*** -0.088 0.35* 0.36 
 
(2.85) (3.18) (3.38) (0.45) (2.28) (1.78) 
Freedom Index 0.10** 0.14*** 0.10* 0.019 0.21 0.11 
 
(2.96) (3.90) (2.10) (0.14) (1.60) (0.81) 
Political Terror 
Scale 
-0.0085 -0.23* -0.40 -0.064 -0.046 0.081 
(0.065) (1.99) (1.49) (0.48) (0.33) (0.48) 
Exports -0.74 -1.44* -2.44* 0.29 -0.063 -0.17 
 
(0.72) (2.07) (2.56) (1.81) (0.45) (0.98) 
Proximity Index 0.44 -0.48 0.45 0.14 0.12 0.080 
 
(1.09) (1.31) (0.80) (1.30) (1.16) (0.72) 
Observations 218 268 136 82 96 81 
Pseudo R-squared 0.126 0.169 0.339 0.258 0.162 0.113 
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 Table C 7 UK: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
T 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.40** -0.35** -0.65*** -0.24** -0.40*** -0.24* 
 
(3.03) (3.11) (3.61) (2.85) (5.77) (2.48) 
Ln(Population) -0.020 0.047 0.14 0.38*** 0.52*** 0.53*** 
 
(0.23) (0.62) (1.00) (3.36) (6.22) (3.53) 
Freedom Index 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.18*** 0.0075 0.15* 0.054 
 
(3.73) (3.90) (3.39) (0.10) (2.25) (0.53) 
Political Terror 
Scale -0.038 -0.51*** -0.68* 0.025 0.091 -0.046 
 
(0.25) (3.81) (2.26) (0.30) (1.25) (0.35) 
Exports -1.15 -1.04 -1.66 0.22* 0.098 0.029 
 
(1.42) (1.24) (1.35) (2.53) (1.30) (0.26) 
Proximity Index 0.42 0.50 1.42** 0.35*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 
 
(1.25) (1.96) (3.03) (5.04) (8.15) (5.30) 
Observations 220 269 137 177 185 89 
Pseudo R-squared 0.198 0.190 0.376 0.414 0.549 0.473 
 
 
 Table C 8 USA: By Step and Time Period 
Step 1st 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 2nd 
T 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Ln(GDP) -0.65*** -0.64*** -0.56*** -0.10 -0.087 -0.19* 
 
(5.26) (5.49) (3.65) (1.32) (1.64) (2.50) 
Ln(Population) -0.14 -0.18* -0.089 0.23* 0.32*** 0.089 
 
(1.62) (2.37) (0.80) (2.55) (5.22) (0.86) 
Freedom Index 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.082 0.11 0.014 0.090 
 
(3.79) (5.86) (1.79) (1.59) (0.25) (1.11) 
Political Terror 
Scale -0.24 -0.58*** -0.47 -0.11 -0.021 -0.30** 
 
(1.61) (4.00) (1.67) (1.46) (0.34) (2.74) 
Exports -0.13 1.04* 0.85 -0.069 -0.18*** -0.073 
 
(0.31) (2.09) (1.17) (0.90) (3.35) (0.89) 
Proximity Index 0.57 -1.93 -2.38 0.62*** 0.79*** 0.56*** 
 
(0.50) (1.72) (0.83) (9.88) (17.9) (7.80) 
Observations 215 268 136 157 198 106 
Pseudo R-squared 0.195 0.257 0.211 0.538 0.683 0.568 
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 Table C 9 2nd Step with Non-Standardised Betas 
 France Germany Japan Netherlands Sweden USA UK 
Ln(GDP) -0.018 -0.051** -0.055* -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.015 -0.11*** 
 (1.19) (2.81) (2.58) (4.33) (3.95) (0.90) (5.24) 
Ln(Population) 0.073*** 0.092*** 0.13*** 0.068*** 0.059* 0.063*** 0.11*** 
 (6.48) (6.87) (7.72) (3.73) (2.30) (5.58) (7.25) 
Freedom Index -0.0029 0.0066 0.015* 0.016* -0.0043 0.0038 0.0056 
 (0.63) (1.20) (2.25) (2.12) (0.40) (0.75) (0.90) 
Political Terror 
Scale 
0.040* 0.00072 0.021 0.025 0.043 -0.032 0.027 
(2.36) (0.035) (0.76) (0.94) (1.17) (1.75) (1.20) 
Religion 0.00028 -0.00046 0.0040*** -0.000057 0.00079 0.00060 0.00042 
 (0.82) (1.07) (3.47) (0.10) (1.09) (1.47) (0.87) 
Arms -
0.00053 
0.00092* 0.028 0.010*** 0.0037 -0.00034* 0.00091 
 (1.32) (2.12) (1.62) (6.28) (0.37) (2.59) (1.53) 
Exports 0.58*** 0.46*** 0.53*** -0.11 0.039 -0.12* 0.24 
 (5.48) (3.37) (7.41) (0.34) (0.17) (2.28) (1.40) 
Colony 0.37*** -0.052    0.21 0.41*** 
 (9.37) (0.70)    (1.89) (9.06) 
Language 0.17***   -0.094*  0.081** -
0.00098 
 (4.48)   (2.30)  (2.78) (0.021) 
US Military Grants      0.038***  
      (17.0)  
Observations 436 442 436 369 234 400 393 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.554 0.390 0.472 0.257 0.123 0.563 0.509 
Note: This is the non-standardised version of Table 4.3. 
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Appendix D 
Dependent variables were transformed (except for the binary variable for GBS) so as be a 
percentage in the form x/AID, where x is a given criterion or aid instrument. In order to do 
this the total of aid given from the recipient to the donor was calculated, using the same 
data source that provided the dependent variable in order to ensure comparability.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
CRS Dataset  W This is the most comprehensive dataset available on General Budget Support. 
It is made available by the OECD, and can be accessed at http://stats.oecd.org/ .  
AiDA Dataset  W This dataset was accessed from 
http://aida.developmentgateway.org/AidaHome. It provides donor-reported information on 
aid activities. The dependent variables from this dataset are the percentage of aid that is 
given to the civil society and the percentage that is general programme assistance.  
DFID Project database  W This is a self-reported dataset from DFID. It provides details of all 
current DFID activities, with limited information on past years. It is available at 
http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/home.asp 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Prsp  W A dummy was created to signify that a PRSP document has been agreed. The list of 
documents agreed was taken from the IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp) 
Education spending  W This is the amount of public money spent on education, divided by 
GDO. This is taken from the World Development Indicators, provided by the World Bank. 
They can be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators. 
The equity of public resource use - This is discussed at some length in the body of the text. It 
ŝƐƚĂŬĞŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞW/ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ/D&ĂŶĚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐĚĂƚĂďĂŶŬĂƚ
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IQ.CPA.ECON.XQ. The variable ranges from 1 to 6, with 
a more positive number meaning a more positive situation. 
Public sector management - It is taken from the CPIA, provided by the IMF and available 
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ ?Ɛ ĚĂƚĂďĂŶŬ Ăƚ ŚƚƚƉ P ? ?ĚĂƚĂ ?ǁŽƌůĚďĂŶŬ ?ŽƌŐ ?ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌ ?/Y ?W ?KE ?yY. 
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The variable ranges from 1 to 6, with a more positive number meaning a more positive 
situation.  
Government Effectiveness  W this is taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
and can be accessed at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The variable 
ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with a more positive number meaning a more positive situation.  
Number of donors  W This was constructed using the CRS/OECD dataset 
(http://stats.oecd.org/). A dummy was created and took the value one if there was a positive 
commitment from a donor to a recipient in a given year. The number of donors is then the 
sum of these, i.e. the number of donors giving aid to a recipient in a given year.  
Aid/GNI  W This is taken from the World Development Indicators, provided by the World 
Bank. They can be accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators. 
GNI per capita PPP (in current international dollars is taken from the World Development 
Indicators, WDI) - accessible at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators. 
^ŚĂƌĞ ŽĨ Ă ĚŽŶŽƌ ?Ɛ ĂŝĚ ďƵĚŐĞƚ  W This was constructed using the CRS/OECD dataset 
(http://stats.oecd.org/). The total amount of aid disbursed by a donor in a given year was 
first calculated, and then used as tŚĞĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŽƌƚŽŐŝǀĞĚĂƚĂŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵ ‘ǆA?ŽĨĚŽŶŽƌǌ ?Ɛ
ĂŝĚŝŶǇĞĂƌƚǁĂƐĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚƚŽĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǇ ? ? 
 
  
Appendix D          Paul Clist 
168 
 
DFID RESULTS 
DFID  W this dataset is provided by DFID, and includes the expenditures on all active DFID 
projects relating to development. The advantage of this dataset is that it provides rich detail 
on DFID expenditures. The four variables we extract are based upon dummies, but are 
transformed to be the percentage of aid to that recipient that meets a given criterion. These 
criteria are whether the contribution was budget support, to the government sector, a 
program based approach and/or led by a host country/organisation. Data is available for 56 
recipients, and as only active projects are used, the data is aggregated to be in effect over 
one time period. The dependent variables are highly correlated, with correlations of 
between 0.60 and 0.84. The variables can be seen as giving different degrees of control, with 
GBS being the highest, followed by contribution to the government sector, followed by 
programme approach and then recipient-led. DFID are particularly interesting to study given 
that they describe what is here termed pragmatic selectivity most vividly, although they 
never explicitly propose it as an alternative allocation paradigm.  
This last set of dependent variables describes the amount of control that DFID relinquish to 
different recipients. The four variables used each describe a situation toward the end of 
higher recipient control. Each variable is the percentage of current (in March 2010) aid that 
meets the given criterion.  
Table D 1 reports the results from the DFID dependent variables, with both the main and 
alternate specifications. The table has the variable indicating most recipient control on the 
left and the least on the right, although this categorisation is somewhat loose. The two 
alignment variables do not match closely, but we find one significant effect with the 
program based approach and equality of public resource use. The PRSP variable is found to 
be insignificant in every case. Governance is positive in each column and significant in six of 
the eight. This confirms previous analysis regarding the importance of governance, both in 
terms of narrowly-defined technocratic ability and the slightly broader sense of government 
effectiveness. Interestingly, both governance variables report a much stronger relationship 
with the two higher degrees of recipient control (Budget support and contribution to 
government sector) than with the broader modalities, matching the broader modalities. The 
now familiar relationships with aid modality are found for number of donors and income 
level, but the positive link with aid/GNI is not found.  
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 Table D 1 DFID Control, Current Aid (March 2010),  
both specifications 
 Budget Support 
 
Contribution to the 
Government Sector 
Program Based Approach Led by Recipient 
% Education 
spending/GDP 
-1.30  0.36  -0.59  0.95  
(1.06)  (0.22)  (0.39)  (0.47)  
Equality of Public 
Resource Use 
 4.90  1.96  22.1*  22.0 
 (0.51)  (0.16)  (1.85)  (1.38) 
Government 
Effectiveness 
24.4***  30.7***  22.6**  25.6*  
(3.07)  (2.84)  (2.32)  (1.95)  
Public Sector 
Management 
 33.2***  45.0***  12.2  5.36 
 (2.73)  (2.90)  (0.80)  (0.26) 
PRSP document  
created 
-2.08 -9.91 -2.83 -12.5 -5.84 -12.2 -4.06 -7.26 
(0.27) (1.27) (0.27) (1.25) (0.62) (1.25) (0.32) (0.56) 
Number of Donors 1.34** 0.93* 1.90** 1.02 1.89*** 1.19* 2.13** 1.45 
(2.57) (1.70) (2.68) (1.47) (2.96) (1.74) (2.48) (1.60) 
Aid/GNI % 0.53 -0.022 -0.090 -0.79 -0.078 -0.67 -0.24 -0.66 
 (1.24) (0.05) (0.16) (1.41) (0.15) (1.22) (0.34) (0.91) 
GNI pc/100 -0.0059*** -0.017*** -0.0083*** -0.025*** -0.0085*** -0.018*** -0.0083** -0.013 
(2.73) (3.16) (2.81) (3.68) (3.20) (2.72) (2.33) (1.47) 
Observations 54 45 54 45 54 45 54 45 
Pseudo R-squared 0.279 0.386 0.215 0.382 0.269 0.322 0.142 0.143 
F stat 4.42 5.61 3.42 5.54 4.26 4.48 2.46 2.22 
Mean of Y 13.0 15.6 26.6 28.1 23.7 26.6 37.6 39.1 
Note: Standard OLS used. T statistics are provided beneath coefficients in brackets,  and 10, 5 and 1% significance 
levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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